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 Abstract 
 
The research employs an adaptive cross-disciplinary research strategy in an industrial 
example to address port facilities’ inability to assess whether their security systems 
are efficient.  The research combines a twin-pronged approach of first, adapting 
Markowitz (1952) theory of portfolio selection from the field of finance to maritime 
port security to examine each port facility’s security systems as a portfolio; and 
secondly, through portfolio optimization to construct the optimum theoretical 
portfolio of security systems drawn from a number of different port facilities owned 
by Dubai Ports World.  The research builds on the existing literature and proposes 
new definitions of security, port security, port security risk and port security risk 
management.  The research also develops a model of port security risk based on 
Willis et al’s (2005) definition of terrorist risk.  Furthermore, the research builds on 
the work of Gleason (1980) and examines terrorist attacks on ports and on shipping in 
ports between 1968 and 2007 and shows, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, that 
they follow a Poisson distribution.  The contribution which the research makes is in 
terms of adapting Markowitz (1952) theory to the port security environment; and the 
modelling and measurement of the impact of the introduction of new port security 
technology, changes in background port security threat levels and for the planning of 
port security in Greenfield sites.  Furthermore, the adaptive approach of the research 
is generalisable to all nodes in the supply chain and is not limited to port facilities 
alone. 
 
 
Keywords 
Security; port security; port security risk; port security risk management; terrorism; 
efficient frontier; portfolio selection theory; portfolio analysis; ISPS Code; port 
facility security officer; company security officer; benefit-cost analysis; residual 
security risk; expected loss. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters and is structured as follows.  Chapter one begins 
with an introduction which contains a statement of the research problem; the purpose 
and rationale behind the research; and a summary of the research.  Chapter two 
contains a review of the literature and is focused on port security; port security risk; 
port security risk management; contemporary port security initiatives and their costs; 
and portfolio theory.  Chapter three describes the research strategy; and the research 
design and methodology.  Chapter four describes the model of port security risk and 
shows how portfolio optimization and the application of Markowitz theory of 
portfolio selection can be applied to port facilities’ security systems.  Chapter five sets 
out the empirical findings based on the theoretical models advanced in chapter four.  
Chapter six contains the discussion and describes the contribution and the scope for 
further research.  Finally, the conclusion follows in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Statement of the Research Problem 
Port facilities around the world have been subjected to international port facility and 
supply chain security initiatives in the wake of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks 
on New York and Washington.  These initiatives include, among others, the 
International Maritime Organisation’s International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code, the United States’ Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Initiative (Peck, 2006; Bichou, 2004; 
Barnes & Oloruntoba, 2005; Price, 2004; Raymond, 2006; Stasinopoulos, 2003).  This 
has resulted in significant investment in security systems by companies in the supply 
chain (Bichou, 2004; Farrow & Shapiro, 2009) and in port facilities in particular 
(Dekker & Stevens, 2007).   
According to Sheffi (2001), companies in the supply chain must determine how to 
balance the costs and benefits of security needs and how to do so in the most efficient 
manner.  Closs and McGarrell (2004) state that enhanced supply chain security is 
expected with no increase in cost.  According to Haubrich (2006), the substantial 
investments in security made by democracies around the world after 9/11 merit closer 
scrutiny given that efficiency is an increasingly important criterion by which the 
success of public policy is being judged. The predominant security initiative which 
internationally trading port facilities have been subjected to is the ISPS Code, which 
was introduced into European Union legislation in the form of EC Regulation 
725/2004 (Dekker & Stevens, 2007; Anyanova, 2007).  U.S. implementation of the 
ISPS Code was accomplished through the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA) 2002 (Helmick, 2008).  The main provisions of the ISPS Code came into 
force on 1 July 2004, eighteen months after the ISPS Code was introduced by the 
IMO’s Diplomatic Conference of 12-14 December 2002 by amending the 
International Convention on the Saving of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 by the addition 
of a new chapter XI-2.  The speed with which the port and maritime security 
initiatives came into force means that it is unlikely that the ports industry were able to 
evaluate the benefit-costs of the various industry security solutions on offer or the 
amended working practices which needed to be adopted in order to comply with the 
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provisions of the ISPS Code.   Therefore, the problem which the research aims to 
address is the determination by ISPS Code compliant port facilities of whether they 
have been able to discover the efficient relationship between security and cost.   
 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of the research is to discover the efficient relationship between residual 
security risk and security investment for maritime port facilities.  No new theory will 
be generated but the research undergoes an adaptive cross-disciplinary research 
approach to generate the Markowitz risk-return efficient frontier which is 
generalisable to all nodes in the supply chain, not limited to maritime port facilities.  
 
 
1.3 Rationale 
According to Stock (1997, p515), “much of logistics research has its roots in theories 
borrowed from more established disciplines.”  Stock (1997, p524) identifies 
Markowitz theory of portfolio selection as one which could be applied to logistics 
applications which include budgeting, company performance and logistics decision 
making.  Goankar & Viswanadham (2004) have successfully adopted Markowitz 
theory to supply chain research for the purpose of managing a portfolio of suppliers, 
though their strategic level deviation management model does not extend to matters of 
security.  The research aims to extend this cross-disciplinary research by 
incorporating port facilities’ security performance and investments as inputs to the 
Markowitz theory.   
The research addresses part of Juttner et al’s (2003, p208) agenda for future research 
in supply chain risk management by defining the risk concept and mitigating risks for 
the supply chain, specifically with an emphasis on port security.  
Williams et al (2008, p255) highlight the gaps in academic knowledge of supply chain 
security (SCS), in particular they refer to the lack of quantitative research in the field.   
Finally, Helmick (2008) concludes that much work remains to be done to create a 
framework for maritime security research that is truly risk-based and that effectively 
engages stakeholders. 
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1.4 Summary of the Research 
The research proposes to solve the problem of the inability of port facilities to assess 
whether they have discovered the efficient relationship between port security residual 
risk and security investment following the introduction of the ISPS Code in the wake 
of the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.   The 
research employs an adaptive cross-disciplinary research strategy in an industrial 
example to examine the phenomenon of security in the maritime port facility 
environment, framed in Juttner et al’s (2003) model of supply chain risk management.   
The literature review begins by examining the origins of security and proposes new 
definitions for security, port security and port security risk before conducting a review 
of the literature on port security risk management; port security investments; port 
security incident costs; and benefit-cost analysis.  
The literature on port security risk management prompts a further investigation of risk 
assessment; risk sources; risk consequences; and risk drivers.  The review of port 
security risk mitigating strategies introduces the key security initiatives: the ISPS 
Code and the MTSA and includes other global and local relevant contemporary 
security initiatives.  The literature review concludes with an examination of portfolio 
selection theory and efficient frontiers and draws some parallels between portfolio 
theory and port security investment. 
The research design describes how the main research question is broken down into 
two questions which prompt a further five questions.  The main research question is: 
how can ISPS Code compliant port facilities discover the efficient relationship 
between residual security risk and security investment?  In order to tackle the main 
research question, it is necessary to discover first, what is meant by an ISPS Code 
compliant port facility and secondly, to assess how the efficient relationship between 
residual security risk and security investment can be calculated.  While the first part 
involves an examination of the regulatory requirements of the ISPS Code, the second 
part is addressed by asking a further five questions: 
1) What are the security threats to the port facility and what are their 
probabilities? 
2) What are the estimated gross losses to the port facility following each 
prescribed security threat? 
3) What do the security systems consist of in each port facility? 
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4) How well do the port security systems perform in the face of the prescribed 
security threats? 
5) What are the port security systems’ costs? 
The research design subsequently lists the data sources and collection methods in 
order to address each of the five questions which are concerned with a port facility’s 
security threats; the estimated gross losses following the prescribed security threats; 
the security systems in the port facility; how well the security systems perform; and 
the size of the security investment. 
The research then develops a model of port security risk, based on Willis et al (2005) 
definition of terrorism risk and continues the work of Gleason (1980) but for terrorist 
attacks against ports or against shipping in ports from 1968 to 2007 with interesting 
results: they resemble a Poisson distribution, as confirmed by the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test.   
The research findings capture an array of data beginning with the estimated gross 
losses to the port facilities from the seven prescribed security incidents, chosen from a 
combination of the literature and input from Dubai Ports World’s security specialists.  
Figures for each port facility are presented for the expected physical damage and 
business interruption from the prescribed security incidents and combined with the 
data from the Lloyd’s Terrorism Underwriter, also a figure for the gross expected loss 
to the port facility.  With this is combined the data from the interviews with the 
Company Security Officers on their subjective assessments of the performances of the 
security systems to calculate the port facilities’ residual security risks (in US$).   
At this juncture two port security ratios are calculated: the benefit-cost ratio which 
calculates by how much the residual security risk is reduced for every $1 invested in 
security; and the residual risk : expected loss ratio which depicts how well the port 
facility’s security system performs against the prescribed security incidents.  The data 
for the six port facilities is presented in turn and the results are then summarised to 
examine the performances (mean and standard deviation) of the security systems; a 
comparison of the benefit-cost ratios; and the residual risk : expected loss ratios.  
The research methodology follows a twin-pronged approach to the discovery of the 
efficient relationship between residual security risk and security investment in port 
facilities.  The first approach entails applying Markowitz (1952) theory of portfolio 
selection individually to the port facilities.  Subsequently, the portfolio optimization 
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approach employs an analysis of the performances of the 216 possible different 
combinations of the three security systems across the six port facilities.    
The application of the Markowitz (1952) approach shows how, for each port facility’s 
portfolio of security systems, the expected performance-standard deviation efficient 
frontier can be constructed and when combined with the model for port security risk, 
can be used to reduce residual risk efficiently.  The portfolio optimization approach is 
also used to generate a solution to the relationship between residual security risk and 
security investment.   Subsequently, a comparison is made of how effective the two 
approaches are in reducing port security risk, with some interesting results. 
The main limitation in the research is that the prescribed security incidents are limited 
to acts of terrorism owing to constraints on the type of data available from the Lloyd’s 
Insurance Market.   
The contribution of the research is four-fold.  First, the research adapts Markowitz 
theory from the field of finance to the field of port security.  Secondly, the methods 
can be employed in the development of Greenfield sites to guide a Company Security 
Officer to implement a security system which best suits his/her requirements in terms 
of both residual security risk and security investment and to do so efficiently.  
Thirdly, the proposed introduction of new port security technology with an enhanced 
performance in an existing port facility can be modelled to learn the extent to which 
the residual security risk might be reduced, for a new given level of security 
investment.  Fourthly, a change in the background security threat to a port facility can 
be quantified in terms of a change to the residual security risk. 
The research was conducted over a period of three years and involved making four 
visits to the offices of Dubai Ports World in Jebel Ali, UAE.  The first three visits 
were essential in laying the groundwork for the final visit when much of the 
subjective data was collected.  The security sensitive nature of much of the data 
collected has resulted in the need to cloak the data and the results in this research. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
The literature review begins by tracing the origin of security and proposing a new 
definition of port security.  The concepts of port security risk and port security risk 
management are then developed and subsequently framed in Juttner et al’s (2003) 
model of supply chain risk management with a discussion on port security risk 
sources, risk consequences, risk drivers and risk mitigating strategies.  The discussion 
addresses some of the threats that ports face and their potential consequences 
followed by an overview of contemporary maritime and supply chain security 
initiatives with a discussion of the ISPS Code and the U.S. Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA).  Next, the literature review addresses the costs of 
implementing the ISPS Code, the costs of potential port security incidents and 
techniques for carrying out port security benefit-cost analysis.  The literature review 
concludes with a discussion of portfolio selection theory and draws some parallels 
between port security investment and portfolio investment.   
 
 
2.1 Port security 
In trying to arrive at a definition of port security it is suitable to begin with some 
origins of the term ‘security’ from the social science literature.  The definition of 
security is then considered in the context of the supply chain security literature and is 
subsequently refined in order to arrive at a suitable definition of port security.   
Maslow (1942) describes security as a “feeling of safety; rare feelings of threat or 
danger”.  Maslow (1942) includes security as a basic human need, together with 
safety, in his hierarchy of needs model.  Baldwin (2005) defines security as ‘the 
absence of threat’ and Buzan (1991, p19) includes such definitions as ‘relative 
freedom from harmful threats’ and ‘absence of threats to acquired values’.   
Williams et al (2008, p258) describe how the origin of security stems from individual 
level theories in sociology and psychology.  Fischer and Green (2004, p21) state that 
security “implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual 
or group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear or 
disturbance or inquiry.”  Robinson’s (2008, p188) definition of security is that it 
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“implies freedom from threat” and “one’s desire not merely to be free from threat but 
to feel free.” 
Combining Maslow (1942), Baldwin (2005), Buzan (1991) and Robinson (2008), 
security can be defined as the absence of and/or the perception of the absence of 
threat.  Thus an individual who is surrounded by threats but has taken steps to reduce 
the threats may feel secure.  Conversely, an individual who does not feel secure but 
who is not surrounded by any threats is in effect secure.  This concept is important 
because different individuals (with the appropriate security knowledge and 
experience) when questioned about the security of a port facility, may have differing 
views in terms of their own perceptions as to both the threats that the port facility 
faces and how effectively existing security measures address the threats.   
Here it is also important to distinguish between security and security measures: 
security measures are the measures (personnel, procedures and technology) required 
to achieve the absence of and/or the perception of the absence of threat.   
Given that ports are considered to be nodes in a supply chain network (Yap & Lam, 
2004), it is necessary when developing the definition of port security to examine the 
literature on supply chain security (SCS).   
Williams et al (2008, p256) state that few formal definitions can be found in the 
literature and draw their definition of SCS from Closs and McGarrell’s (2004, p8) 
definition of SCS management.  The Closs and McGarrell (2004, p8) definition is: 
“the application of policies, procedures and technology to protect supply chain assets 
(product, facilities, equipment, information and personnel) from theft, damage, or 
terrorism and to prevent the introduction of unauthorised contraband, people or 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the supply chain.”  In pursuit of a definition 
of port security it would be easy simply to substitute ‘port’ for ‘supply chain’.  
However, this would not distinguish between port security and port security 
management, in the way that Williams et at (2008) do not distinguish between SCS 
and SCS management.  Furthermore, this would limit the definition simply to the 
port’s assets and exclude cargoes and, specifically, the ship-port interface which the 
ISPS Code seeks to protect.  Also, the Closs and McGarrell (2004) definition is in 
some ways too specific in its reference to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
given that by naming threats they run the risk of excluding others such as sabotage or 
criminal damage arising from strikes and riots by locked out workers (see Miller, 
1994, p452 for a fuller description of named threats to ports covered by marine 
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insurance).  The ISPS Code does not single out terrorism as a threat per se but refers 
to measures which provide protection from security incidents (which include 
terrorism), while the MTSA refers specifically to the threat of terrorism in the 
maritime domain.  This is understandable given that the MTSA was drafted in the 
United States in the wake of the attacks on 9/11.  However, the MTSA focus on 
terrorism also potentially excludes other forms of unauthorised acts such as maritime 
fraud, which is included in Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004.  Furthermore, the focus on 
WMD appears to be centred more on the United States, specifically in consideration 
of containerised trade (Harrald et al, 2004; Gerencser et al, 2003). 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to amend the named threats in the Closs and 
McGarrell (2004) definition to ‘unauthorised acts’, which is wider in scope.  
‘Unauthorised acts’ is chosen in preference to ‘illegal acts’ in order to avoid any 
confusion arising from differing definitions of legality between jurisdictions.  
The proposed definition for port security is: the absence of and/or the perception of 
the absence of threat to port facility assets, cargoes and the ship-port interface from 
unauthorised acts.  From this, it follows that port security management is: the 
application of measures (personnel, procedures and technology) to reduce the threat 
and/or the perception of threat to port facility assets, cargoes and the ship-port 
interface from unauthorised acts.  The choice of words is significant for while it may 
be preferable to try to eliminate threats rather than to reduce them, it will never be 
possible to eliminate all security threats absolutely (Price, 2004, p335). 
 
 
2.2 Port security risk 
As risk is present in all walks of daily life, it is logical that an extensive literature 
exists on the subject.  Whether considering individuals’ attitudes to risk and decision 
making under uncertainty (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979), or risk as a factor in 
decision making (March and Shapira, 1987), the interpretation of risk varies from 
person to person.  Definitions of risk also vary according to the discipline in which the 
discussion is framed, be it supply chain (Rao and Goldsby, 2009; Christopher, 2005; 
Juttner et al, 2003; Zsidisin et al, 2004; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004), supply chain 
security (Williams et al, 2008), port security (Bichou, 2004, 2009; Talas and 
Menachof, 2009), terrorism (Sheffi, 2001; Woo, 2003; Raymond, 2006; Price, 2004, 
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Willis et al, 2005; Greenberg et al, 2006), sociology and psychology (Heimer, 1988) 
or more established disciplines such as economics, finance or management (Juttner et 
al, 2003).    Rao and Goldsby (2009) present selected definitions of risk from the 
literature including from Lowrance (1980) “risk is a measure of the probability and 
severity of adverse effects” and Yates and Stone (1992) “risk is an inherently 
subjective construct that deals with the possibility of loss.”  
Definitions of risk relevant to this study can be found in Robinson (2008), March and 
Shapira (1987), Bedford and Cooke (2001), Markowitz (1952), Broder (2006), 
Greenberg et al (2006),  Price (2004) and Willis et al (2005).  Robinson (2008, p182) 
describes risk from a security perspective as “the probability that harm may result 
from a given threat.”  March and Shapira (1987, p1404) review managerial 
perspectives on risk and risk taking and define risk as “reflecting variation in the 
distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods and their subjective values.”   
Bedford and Cooke’s (1996) analysis of probabilistic risk analysis describes risk as 
having two particular elements: hazard and uncertainty.  Markowitz (1952, p89) 
describes risk as “variance of return.”  Broder (2006, p3) describes risk as “the 
uncertainty of financial loss, the variations between actual and expected results or the 
probability that a loss has occurred or will occur.”  Greenberg et al (2006, p143) state 
that terrorism risk “does not exist without existence of threat, the presence of 
vulnerability and the potential for consequences.”  Price (2004, p335) claims that 
ports (in the context of terrorism) are actually faced with uncertainty, not risk because 
uncertainty implies that while the range of events is known, the associated 
probabilities of each type of event are not.  To an insurance underwriter, risk can 
represent not only the vessel, aircraft or property under consideration for insurance 
(Broder, 2006, p3) but also the product of the probability of the occurrence of an 
insured event and the financial consequences of such an event.  Willis et al (2005) 
describe terrorism risk as consisting of the product of threat, vulnerability and 
consequence: where threat is the probability that an attack occurs; vulnerability is the 
probability that an attack results in damage, given that an attack has occurred; and 
consequence is the expected damage, given that an attack has occurred which resulted 
in damage.  Drawing on this definition and the definitions by Robinson (2008), 
Broder (2006) and Bedford and Cooke (2001), the proposed definition for port 
security risk is: the product of the probability of a threat to port facility assets, cargoes 
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and the ship-port interface which may give rise to a loss and the size of the financial 
consequences that might follow.   
 
2.3 Port security risk management 
Williams et al (2008) present a comprehensive overview and research agenda for 
supply chain security.  They categorise the literature into four organisational 
approaches to supply chain security: an intra-organisational approach, an inter-
organisational approach, a combination of the two and an ignore approach.  In the 
intra-organisational approach they discuss the security processes and technology used 
by companies to secure their supply chains and the scope for adopting a total quality 
management (TQM) or Six Sigma philosophy.  The inter-organisational approach is 
focussed on organisational relationships with other supply chain members, public 
entities and competitors and some key contemporary supply chain security initiatives 
are listed.  Furthermore, they propose an update to the Juttner et al (2003) model for 
supply chain risk management by adding an additional dimension to supply chain risk 
mitigating strategies which includes three of the above approaches (intra-
organisational, inter-organisational and combination) to supply chain security.   As 
this research is chiefly concerned with ports which have adopted the risk mitigating 
strategies as set out in the ISPS Code, it is also appropriate to frame the discussion on 
port security risk in Juttner et al’s (2003) original four constructs of supply chain risk 
management: supply chain risk sources, risk consequences, risk drivers and risk 
mitigating strategies.  However, the discussion begins by considering some 
methodologies for port security risk assessment. 
 
2.3.1 Port security risk assessment 
Bichou (2009, p116) describes the process of risk assessment as “the assessment of 
risk in terms of what can go wrong, the probability of it going wrong and the possible 
consequences.”  Drawing on the system safety literature he states that “the empiricist 
approach is to regard accidents as random events whose frequency is influenced by 
certain factors” and that under this approach the cause of an accident is a hazardous 
event.  Bichou (2009, p117) classifies the major hazard analysis tools as either 
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sequence dependent or independent and following either consequence or cause 
analysis (see table 2.1). 
 
 Consequence analysis Cause analysis 
Sequence dependent Event Tree Analysis Markov Process 
Sequence independent Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Table 2.1 – Major hazard analysis tools (source: Bichou, 2009) 
 
Event tree analysis (ETA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are two 
forms of hazard analysis which analyse the consequences of an event, whereas Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and the Markov process analyse the causes of an event.  Pyzdek 
(2003) describes FTA as providing a graphical representation of the events that might 
lead to failure.    According to Bichou (2009), a shortcoming of FTA is the 
assumption that the sequence of causes of an incident is not relevant and that “where 
sequence does matter, Markov-chain techniques may be applied.”  
Bichou and Evans (2007) describe how precursor analysis combined with other 
techniques such as near-misses and probabilistic risk analysis provide an effective 
framework for risk assessment and risk management in the context of maritime 
security.  They define ‘precursor’ as “any internal or external condition, event, 
sequence, or any combination of these that precedes and ultimately leads to adverse 
events.”  Bichou and Evans (2007) argue that the benefits from introducing 
programmes of security assessment based on precursor analysis include the 
identification of previously unknown failure modes (for FMEA analysis) and the 
analysis of the effectiveness of actions taken to reduce risk. 
In addition to the risk assessment tools described by Bichou (2009), other industry-
specific methods exist in the security field.  One seaport-specific method of risk 
assessment can be found in the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 
No. 11-02 dated 13 January 2003 issued by the United States Coast Guard.  Enclosure 
5 (Guidance on Assessing Facility Security Measures) includes a simplified risk-
based security assessment methodology which seaports can conduct themselves in 
pursuit of their compliance with the requirements of the United States Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (2002). 
22 
 
Another industry-specific document which contains a methodology on risk assessment 
is the International Standard ISO 28001 (2007) “Security management systems for the 
supply chain — Best practices for implementing supply chain security, assessments 
and plans — Requirements and guidance.”   
 
Talas and Menachof (2009) developed a conceptual model for calculating a port 
facility’s residual security risk.  The conceptual model examines the following 
characteristics:  the security threats that the port facility faces and their probabilities  an estimate of the economic damage to the port facility from each prescribed 
security threat  the port facility’s security components and systems and their performance in 
the face of the potential security incidents  the port facility’s security components’ costs. 
 
Merrick and van Dorp (2006) describe a methodology for risk assessment in the 
maritime domain by developing a probabilistic risk framework for modelling 
collisions between a ferry and another vessel.  In their model, the probability of a 
collision depends on triggering incidents and other criteria such as situation and the 
probability of the incident occurring given the situation.  Merrick and van Dorp 
(2006) state that to perform an assessment of the risk of an accident using the model, 
each term in the probability model must be estimated.  However, the complexity of 
the data which must be captured in order for the model to work may to be beyond the 
bounds of even the most experienced insurance underwriter and port security 
specialist. 
 
2.3.2 Port security risk sources 
Juttner et al (2003) describe supply chain risk sources as environmental (accidents, 
socio-political actions such as terrorism), organisational (labour, production 
uncertainties or IT-system uncertainties) or network-related (risks arising from 
interactions from companies within the supply chain.)   
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Environmental risk sources 
The environmental risks that ports face include but are not limited to acts of terrorism.  
While the focus on terrorism appears to be uppermost in the literature, there are 
limited references to such attacks being directed at port facilities.  Examples found in 
the literature include the incident in April 1996 when the Tamil Tigers launched an 
attack on the port of Colombo and succeeded in damaging three vessels(Aryasinha, 
2001), including one belonging to the Van Ommeren shipping line which was insured 
by the author; in 2004 Jamaat al-Tawhid attacked the Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah 
oil facilities in Iraq and in the same year suicide bombers from Hamas and the al-Aqsa 
Martyr’s Brigade launched an attack in the Port of Ashdod (Greenberg et al, 2006).   
However, this gap in the literature on terrorist attacks against ports is addressed in 
some additional research which builds on Gleason’s (1980) research on terrorist 
attacks against targets in the United States and is described in more detail in chapter 
four.  Nevertheless, ports also face threats of unlawful entry and activity by thieves, 
smugglers and potential stowaways as well as individuals bent on destruction or the 
interruption of international trade on political or ideological grounds.   
Prior to 9/11 the main threats to ports were considered to be from drug smuggling and 
organised crime.  These threats resulted in the creation in the United States of the 
Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), which has now been superceded by the 
Business Alliance for Secured Commerce, a security initiative initially aimed at 
reducing the risk of legitimate cargo being used by illegal organizations for the 
narcotics trade (Gutierrez et al, 2007).  Nevertheless, the potential for terrorist attacks 
to disrupt ports and supply chains dominates the literature post-9/11.  According to 
Raymond (2006, p242) ports are vulnerable to attack by terrorists: they are extensive 
in size and accessible by water and land.  Furthermore, their accessibility impedes the 
deployment of the types of security measures that, for example, can be more readily 
deployed at airports.  Bichou (2004) highlights the additional security threats that 
ports face due to their “close spatial interactions with large city-agglomerations and 
seashore tourist attractions.”  Table 2.2 lists examples of potential attack 
characteristics against US maritime targets (Parfomak and Fritelli, 2007).    
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Dimensions  Example Characteristics
Perpetrators  Al Qaeda and affiliates
 Islamist unaffiliated 
 Foreign nationalists 
 Disgruntled employees 
 Others 
Objectives  Mass casualties
 Port facility Disruption 
 Trade disruption 
 Environmental damage 
Locations  360+ U.S. ports
 165 foreign trade partners 
 9 key shipping bottlenecks 
Targets  Military vessels
 Cargo vessels 
 Fuel tankers 
 Ferries / cruise ships 
 Port facility Area 
populations 
 Ship channels 
 Port industrial plants 
 Offshore platforms 
Tactics  Explosives in suicide boats
 Explosives in light aircraft 
 Ramming with vessels 
 Ship-launched missiles 
 Harbor mines 
 Underwater swimmers 
 Unmanned submarine 
bombs 
 Exploding fuel tankers 
 Explosives in cargo ships 
 WMDs in cargo ships 
Table 2.2 – Example Maritime Attack Characteristics (source: Parfomak and Fritelli, 2007) 
 
According to Nincic (2005, p623), the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), Hizballah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Abu Sayyaf 
Group, Gama al-Islamiya, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the IRA are all 
believed to have varying levels of maritime expertise.  According to Raymond (2006, 
p240), the terrorist groups that are known to have a maritime capability include 
“Polisario, the Abu Sayyaf Group, Palestinian groups, Al Qaeda, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.”  However, Raymond 
(2006, p244) points out that “in order to be considered a threat, it is not necessary for 
a terrorist group to have already carried out a maritime terrorist attack against 
shipping or port facilities.” 
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With the potential for maritime terrorists to deploy a mothership with tenders, their 
geographic reach is, in theory, considerably extended from their homelands’ territorial 
waters.  Somali pirates are reported to use this mode of transport to attack ships 
hundreds of miles offshore1  and the Mumbai bombers are rumoured to have arrived 
in Mumbai via inflatable boats from a highjacked fishing vessel, which was later 
found adrift with the body of a man onboard. 2 
 
Organisational risk sources 
Organisational risk sources in port security stem chiefly from the security labour force 
and the operational aspects of security systems, including IT-systems.  Examples of 
labour force risks include security guard manpower shortfalls and security guard 
violations.  Security guard violations cover not only on-site breaches in working 
practices but include the unauthorised copying, lending or sale of security passes.  
According to Raymond (2006, p243), seafarer certificates can easily be forged and 
identity documents can be bought on the black market so it must follow that this can 
be done onshore as well.  Operational aspects of security systems include failure by 
the security workforce to adhere to security procedures, failure of CCTV camera 
units, intruder detection devices, scanning equipment or any IT security system. 
 
Network-related risks 
Juttner et al (2003) describe network-related risk sources as those “which arise from 
interactions between organisations in the supply chain.”  Network-related security 
risks which ports face are those which had their origins in supply chain interactions 
and can result from the failure of any company’s security systems or the exploitation 
of a security weakness.  For example, in the containerised trade, the possibility of the 
introduction of a chemical, nuclear, biological or radiological (CNBR) device which 
is detonated in a port will have considerable consequences for the port facility As well 
as cause severe supply chain interruption.  In the port security war game Gerencser et 
al (2003) showed that a dirty bomb, a conventional explosive device used to scatter 
nuclear or radiological material, found at the port of Los Angeles followed by the 
                                   
1
 “Piracy off the Somali Coast :  Workshop commissioned by the Special Representat ive of the Secretary 
General of the United Nat ions to Somalia” , p19, Nairobi, 10-21 November 2008.  Accessed 3/ 08/ 2009 
at  ht tp: / / www.imcsnet .org/ imcs/ docs/ somalia_piracy_int l_experts_report_consolidated.pdf 
2
 Greenberg, M. 1/ 12/ 2008 “The Terror At tacks in Mumbai:  Background, Operat ional Uniqueness and 
Implicat ions” , I nternat ional I nst itute for Counter-Terror ism   
ht tp: / / www.ict .org.il/ NewsCommentar ies/ Commentar ies/ tabid/ 69/ Art iclsid/ 538/ currentpage/ 3/ Default
.aspx 
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discovery of another shipped through the port of Savannah could ultimately lead to 
supply chain interruptions and stock market falls which could cause up to $68 billion 
in direct and indirect losses.  
Other network-related risks include the use of the containerised trade to transport 
stowaways or even terrorists through ports and across national boundaries, as in the 
case of the suspected member of al-Qa’eda found on the quay in an Italian port in a 
container converted into a mobile hotel room (Raymond, 2006, p246; OECD, 2003).  
 
2.3.3 Port security risk consequences 
The consequences of port security risk events are typically negative and can be 
classified as direct or indirect losses.  Direct losses include physical damage to port 
infrastructure.  The disruption of port facility Activities resulting from direct losses 
will invariably lead to indirect losses such as business interruption through supply 
chain shocks, increased insurance costs and increased cost of working through the 
implementation of a tougher security regime which restricts cargo movements through 
the port.  Details of empirical studies of port security risk consequences can be found 
later in this chapter under the section ‘Port Security Incident Costs.’ 
 
2.3.4 Port security risk drivers 
Juttner et al (2003, p205) describe how supply chain risk drivers “impact directly on 
network-related risk sources.”   Supply chain risk drivers such as globalisation of 
supply chains and the trend to outsourcing have their equivalents in their effect on 
network-related security risks.   The globalisation of terrorist and criminal networks 
and the trend to outsourcing security in the supply chain act as potential port security 
risk drivers.  Miller and Talas (2007) state that there are approximately twenty 
terrorist groups that have aligned themselves to al-Qaeda, signing up to Osama bin 
Laden’s fatwa of November 2000 and in effect globalising bin Laden’s terrorist 
organisation.  In particular, the outsourcing of security in the supply chain can lead to 
a lack of transparency of implemented security measures and with it confidence in the 
third party provider of security.  Security initiatives such as the ISPS Code and ISO 
28000 are designed to counter this type of port security risk driver by introducing a 
given set of minimum security standards in a transparent manner.  The importance of 
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identifying port security risk drivers becomes clear in the examination of port security 
vulnerability.    
 
2.3.5 Port security vulnerability 
Juttner et al (2003) describe supply chain vulnerability as “the propensity of risk 
sources and risk drivers to outweigh risk mitigating strategies, thus causing adverse 
supply chain consequences.”  Translating this to port security, a description of port 
security vulnerability can be the propensity of port security risk sources and risk 
drivers to outweigh port security risk mitigating strategies, thus causing adverse 
security events.  Broder (2006) defines vulnerability as “the probability of failure and 
the probability of occurrence after countermeasures are implemented.  It measures the 
likelihood of threat and its ability to cause damage.”  Willis et al (2005) describe 
vulnerability in terrorist context as the probability of an attack resulting in damage 
given that an attack occurs. 
Considering the earlier proposed definition of port security risk, port security 
vulnerability can thus be defined as the product of the probability of a security event 
and the inability of a port’s security systems to prevent the occurrence of the event.  
This definition is important because it forms one of the key parts of the methodology 
for the calculation of a port facility’s residual security risk.   
 
2.3.6 Port security risk mitigating strategies 
Pinto and Talley (2006, p268) describe the security incident cycle of ports in four 
phases: prevention, detection, response and recovery.  They describe prevention as 
barriers that deny terror plans and events; detection provides early apprehension; 
response pursues as event and mitigates its impact; and recovery involves the return to 
normal operations.  The port security risk mitigating strategies in this research are 
concerned with the first two phases as described by Pinto and Talley (2006).   
There are two key port security risk mitigating strategies which were introduced after 
9/11.  The main one is the ISPS Code introduced by the IMO at the Diplomatic 
Conference in December 2002.  The other is the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
which was passed by the US Congress in November 2002 and relates to US port 
facilities, or facilities in US parlance.  According to Bichou (2004, p323), the ISPS 
Code is “the most important global security initiative ever.”  The European Union 
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equivalent of the ISPS Code is Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004, which is largely a 
word-for-word reproduction of the ISPS Code.  In the next section the key points of 
the ISPS Code and the MTSA are addressed and there follows a brief summary of 
other key supply chain security initiatives which also have a bearing on port security. 
 
 
2.4 ISPS Code 
The ISPS Code was drawn up by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee and its 
Maritime Security Working Group in little over a year following the adoption of 
resolution A.924(22) on the review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of 
terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships, 
in November 2001 (ISPS Code, 2003, p iii.)  The ISPS Code was adopted on 12 
December 2002 by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 when the existing chapter XI 
was amended and re-identified as chapter XI-1 and a new chapter XI-2 was adopted 
on special measures to enhance maritime security.  Amendments were also made to 
the existing SOLAS chapter V.   
The ISPS Code is divided into two parts, A and B.  Part A establishes the new 
international framework of measures to enhance maritime security by introducing 
mandatory provisions while part B provides non-compulsory guidance on the 
procedures to be undertaken in order to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2 
and of Part A of the ISPS Code (Bichou, 2004.)  Certain countries, such as the 
European Union under EC Regulation 725/2004, have made compliance with part B 
of the ISPS Code mandatory through legislation (Dekker & Stevens, 2007; Anyanova, 
2007). 
The objectives of the ISPS Code are to enable the prevention and detection of security 
threats within an international framework; to establish roles and responsibilities; to 
enable the collection and exchange of security information; to provide a methodology 
for assessing security and to ensure that adequate security measures are in place.  The 
objectives are to be achieved by the designation of appropriate personnel on each 
ship, in each port facility and in each shipping company, to prepare and to put into 
effect the approved security plans.  
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The ISPS Code is applicable to vessels engaged in international trade including 
passenger vessels with 12 or more berths, cargo vessels of 500 gross tonnes and over, 
mobile offshore drilling units and all port facilities serving such vessels engaged in 
international trade. 
The ISPS Code definition of responsibilities determines the responsibilities of 
Contracting Governments, ship operators and port facility operators.  Contracting 
Governments must identify the Designated Authority (for port facilities), set security 
levels, coordinate with port facility security officers and issue and inspect 
International Ship Security Certificates. 
In turn, ship and port facility operators must designate the appropriate security 
officers and develop and implement the security plans.  In addition, each Contracting 
Government (or a Recognised Security Organisation appointed by the Designated 
Authority) must carry out a Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) which will 
include the following elements (ISPS Code Part A.15.5):  Identification and evaluation of important assets and infrastructure it is 
important to protect;   Identification of possible threats to the assets and infrastructure and likelihood 
of their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritise security measures;  Identification, selection and prioritisation of countermeasures and procedural 
changes and their level of effectiveness in reducing vulnerability; and  Identification of weaknesses, including human factors, in the infrastructure, 
policies and procedures.  
 
Each Contracting Government (or Recognised Security Organisation appointed by the 
Designated Authority) must then prepare a port facility security plan (PFSP) which 
addresses at least the security measures listed in ISPS Code Part A.16.3.   
Against the background of the security measures described above, all port facilities 
and the relevant vessel types must also operate at one of three security levels, 
determined by their Contracting Government.  Security level 1 is the level for which 
minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all times.    
The following security-related activities in a port facility are mandated by the ISPS 
Code (Part A.14) at security level 1:  Ensuring the performance of all port facility security duties 
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 Controlling access to the port facility  Monitoring of the port facility, including anchoring and berthing areas  Monitoring restricted access areas to ensure that only authorised persons have 
access  Supervising the handling of cargo  Supervising the handling of ship’s stores  Ensuring that security communication is readily available 
At security level 2 additional protective measures, as detailed in the PFSP shall be 
implemented and maintained for a period of time as a result of a heightened risk of a 
security incident.   
At security level 3 further specific protective measures, as detailed in the PFSP shall 
be implemented and maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident 
is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target 
(Jones, 2006, p128). 
Following the approval of the PFSA and the PFSP, including any amendments, the 
Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility is then issued by the Contracting 
Government (ISPS Code, B.16.54) for a period not exceeding five years. 
 
 
2.5 Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 
The MTSA is the US equivalent of the ISPS Code and in common with its 
international counterpart was implemented on 1 July 2004.  It shares many 
commonalities with the ISPS Code but goes much deeper into specific requirements 
of securing the US maritime infrastructure (Jones, 2006, p99).   The MTSA prescribes 
the formation of a national maritime security plan and advisory committee; area 
maritime transportation security plans and committees; vessel and (port) facility 
security plans; security incident response plans; the appointment and training of 
security personnel; and the development of specific sanctions against those who fail 
correctly to implement the Act.  In line with the ISPS Code, the MTSA also 
establishes the three levels of security.  Furthermore, the MTSA introduces additional 
security initiatives, the most significant of which are the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorsm (C-TPAT).   
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2.5.1 Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
The Container Security Initiative was launched in 2002 with 20 of the world’s largest 
container terminals and forms part of the US Maritime Transportation Security Act.  
By June 2003, 23 ports representing at least 60% of container imports to the United 
States had signed CSI agreements.   In 2006, 43 ports with approximately 75% of 
cargo containers destined for US ports were part of the CSI scheme (Jones, 2006, 
p101).  By September 2007 there were 55 CSI ports worldwide and in 2009 there 
were over 60 ports that were part of the scheme. 
CSI addresses the threat to border security and global trade posed by the potential for 
terrorist use of a maritime container to deliver a weapon.  CSI proposes a security 
regime to ensure all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified 
and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the 
United States.  The United States’ Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) has 
stationed multidisciplinary teams of U.S. officers from both CBP and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to work together with host foreign government 
counterparts.  Their mission is to target and pre-screen containers and to develop 
additional investigative leads related to the terrorist threat to cargo destined to the 
United States.  The pre-screening of containers is assisted by the introduction in 
December 2002 of the Advanced Manifest Rule, or 24 Hour Rule.  
Through CSI, CBP officers work with host customs administrations to establish 
security criteria for identifying high-risk containers. Those administrations use non-
intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection technology to screen high-risk 
containers before they are shipped to US ports.  CSI, a reciprocal program, offers its 
participant countries the opportunity to send their customs officers to major US ports 
to target ocean-going, containerized cargo to be exported to their countries. Likewise, 
CBP shares information on a bilateral basis with its CSI partners.  Japan and Canada 
currently station their customs personnel in some US ports as part of the CSI program. 
 
2.5.2 C-TPAT, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism3  
C-TPAT is a Joint government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships 
that strengthen overall supply chain and border security.  Central to the security vision 
of C-TPAT is the core principle of increased facilitation for legitimate business 
                                   
3
 URL:  http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ [ accessed 17 March 2009]  
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entities that are compliant traders.  Only importers and carriers based in the US were 
initially eligible to participate in the program and one of its main motivations is to 
protect US borders from terrorist attacks occasioned by goods entering the country. 
 
 
2.5.3 C-TPAT and non-US Terminals 
Under C-TPAT, foreign-based marine port facility authorities and terminal operators 
(MPTOs) may be eligible for membership of the C-TPAT scheme but only following 
an invitation from CBP to join.  The terminal must handle cargo vessels departing to 
the US and have a designated company officer that will be the primary cargo security 
officer responsible for C-TPAT. 
 
2.5.4 Requirements for C-TPAT membership 
US and Foreign-based MPTOs must conduct a comprehensive assessment of their 
security practices based on C-TPAT minimum-security criteria.  C-TPAT recognizes 
the complexity of MPTOs and endorses the application and implementation of 
security measures based upon risk.   Therefore, the program allows for flexibility and 
the customization of security plans based on the C-TPAT member’s business model, 
the port’s geography, the commodities handled at the port facility and the terms and 
conditions of the lease agreement between the marine port facility authority and the 
terminal operator.  
C-TPAT also recognizes the unique role and relationship between MPTOs situation 
regarding terminal operators who operate as tenants within a marine port.  For C-
TPAT purposes, each terminal operator must implement the C-TPAT security criteria 
within the physical area and processes within the terminal operator’s area of control 
and responsibility.  Where a does not control a specific process or element of the 
supply chain, such as a sea carrier, terminal operator or independent contractor, the 
marine port facility authority should work with these business partners to seek to 
ensure that pertinent security measures are in place and adhered to within the overall 
port.  
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2.6 Contemporary supply chain security initiatives 
 
The following are other contemporary supply chain security initiatives which have a 
bearing on port security and will be described briefly in turn:  BASC – Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition  PIP – Partnership in Protection  WCO Framework of Standards  European Union AEO - Authorised Economic Operator   TAPA – Transported Asset Protection Association  StairSec  Secured Export Partnership  ISO 28000  Advanced Cargo Information Initiatives 
 
 
2.6.1 BASC, Business Alliance for Secured Commerce / (formerly: 
Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition) 4 
BASC is a cooperation program between the private sector and national and 
international organizations, created to promote a secure global supply chain.  The 
main goal is to encourage within its membership the development and implementation 
of voluntary steps to address the risks of narcotics and merchandise smuggling 
through legitimate trade, as well as the threat of a disruption in the global economy 
brought about by terrorism.   
BASC procedures require a security program which consists of a number of operating 
measures adopted to protect an organization, its assets, properties, employees and 
customers. 
 
Factors to consider in preparing a security program include:  Organizational security requirements  Potential of the organization to meet those requirements  The organization's vulnerability to current and future security risks  Available options to the organization to cover its security needs 
                                   
4
 URL:  http://www.wbasco.org/english/documentos/bascstandards.pdf [ accessed 17 March 2009]  
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Other important aspects that should be included in a Security Plan are: 
 Clear definition of security methods.  Written procedures for internal / external security notification.  Mechanisms to establish accountability in case of theft or robbery.  Handling of documents and files.  Procedures for checking lighting and perimeter fencing.   Procedures when closing facilities (doors, gates, windows, etc).  Security systems to check entry and exit of people and /or vehicles.  Procedures for handling cargo.  Defined policies for external monitoring.  Control and handling of keys and conducting periodic inventory checks.  Policies and procedures for personnel hiring.  Policies to be applied in criminal background checks.  Procedures for obtaining photographs and fingerprints of all employees.  Assignment of responsibilities of security personnel. 
 
 
2.6.2 PIP, Partners in Protection5 
PIP is designed to enlist the co-operation of private industry in efforts to enhance 
border security, combat organized crime and terrorism, increase awareness of customs 
compliance issues, and help detect and prevent contraband smuggling. This program 
does not have a "certification" component as such.  Companies may be refused if they 
do not fulfill the requirements, but once accepted in the program they work together 
with Canadian Customs to improve their supply chain security, even though they will 
not get a certification as such.  A PIP participant can apply for CSA (Customs Self-
Assessment program) to expedite goods into Canada. 
 
 
                                   
5
 URL:  ht tp: / / www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/ security-securite/ pip-pep/menu-eng.htm l [ accessed 17 March 
2009]  
35 
 
 
2.6.3 WCO Framework of Security standards to secure and facilitate 
global trade6 
This is a framework of security standards developed by the World Customs 
Organization.  It intends to provide a new and consolidated platform which will 
enhance world trade, ensure better security against terrorism, and increase the 
contribution of Customs and trade partners to the economic and social well-being of 
nations.  It aims to improve the ability of customs to detect and deal with high-risk 
consignments and increase efficiency in the administration of goods, thereby 
expediting the clearance and release of goods.  Specifically, the aims of the 
Framework are the following: 
•  Establish standards that provide supply chain security and facilitation at a 
global level to promote certainty and predictability 
•  Enable integrated supply chain management for all modes of transport 
•  Strengthen co-operation between customs administrations to improve their 
capability to detect high-risk consignments 
•  Strengthen customs/business co-operation 
•  Promote the seamless movement of goods through secure international trade 
supply chains 
 
2.6.4 EU AEO, European Union Authorized Economic Operator7 
This designates the status that Customs authorities from European member states 
should grant to reliable traders established in the European Community.  AEOs will 
be able to benefit from facilitations for customs controls or simplifications for 
customs rules or both, depending on the type of AEO certificate.  There are three 
certificate types: 
 Customs Simplifications.  AEOs will be entitled to benefit from 
simplifications provided for under the customs rules.  
 Security and Safety.  AEOs will be entitled to benefit from facilitations of 
customs controls relating to security and safety at the entry of the goods into 
                                   
6
 URL:  http://www.wcoomd.org/home.htm [ accessed 17 March 2009]  
7URL:  http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/customs_security/index_en.htm#auth_eco 
[ accessed 17 March 2009]  
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the customs territory of the Community, or when the goods leave the customs 
territory of the Community.  
 Customs Simplifications/Security and Safety.  AEOs will be entitled to 
benefit from both simplifications provided for under the customs rules and 
from facilitations of customs controls relating to security and safety (a 
combination of 1 and 2). 
The main benefits of AEO status will not be realised until the requirements for pre-
arrival and pre-departure are introduced in July 2009 and the changes linked to the 
Modernised Customs Code are introduced in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
2.6.5 TAPA, Transported Asset Protection Association (formerly 
Technology Asset Protection Association8) 
This is an association of security professionals and related business partners from high 
technology companies who have been working together to address emerging security 
threats that are common to the technology industry and high-tech businesses.  In 
recent years TAPA has added both an Asian and an EMEA chapter to the US original. 
The goals of TAPA include: 
•  Security of goods from theft 
– in transit 
– in-transit storage 
– warehousing  
•  Specifies minimum standards for security throughout the supply chain  
•  Describes methods for maintaining standards 
•  Includes process for TAPA certification 
•  TAPA suppliers must: 
– Have a security policy, procedures and plan 
–  Submit to periodic audits and certification 
 
                                   
8
 URL:  http://www.tapaonline.org [accessed 17 March 2009] 
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2.6.6 StairSec9 
This is a module introduced to the Swedish Customs program Stairway (originally 
created to facilitate customs processes for compliant traders).  This module makes it 
possible to provide quality assurance for operators within the Stairway not only for 
quality in their customs routines but also for the security measures they have taken to 
prevent terrorists from using the operators commercial flow of goods for transporting 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 
2.6.7 Secured Export Partnership10  
It is designed to protect cargo against tampering, sabotage, smuggling of terrorists or 
terrorist-related goods, and other transnational crime, from the point of packing to 
delivery.  Exporters from New Zealand are eligible and encouraged to participate: 
especially those moving goods to the US.  The program emphasizes that security 
measures are customizable depending on the applicant’s situation. 
 
2.6.8 ISO 2800011  
The International Standards organization has developed security standards aimed at 
becoming the global supply chain security standard program.  It is intended to be in 
concert with and complementing the World Customs Organization’s Framework of 
Security Standards and it does not attempt to cover specific Customs agency 
requirements.  ISO 28000 was launched in November 2005 as a publically available 
specification and is now a fully-fledged ISO standard.   
 
ISO 28000 is applicable to all sizes of organizations, from small to multinational, in 
manufacturing, service, storage or transportation at any stage of the production or 
supply chain that wishes to:  
 establish, implement, maintain and improve a security management system;   assure compliance with stated security management policy;   demonstrate such compliance to others;  
                                   
9
 URL:  http://www.tullverket.se/en/Business/the_stairsec/ [ accessed 17 March 2009]  
10
 URL:  http://www.customs.govt.nz/exporters/Secure+Exports+Scheme.htm [ accessed 17 March 2009]  
11
 URL:  http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=41921 [ accessed 
17 March 2009]  
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 seek certification/registration of its security management system by an 
Accredited third party Certification Body; or   make a self-determination and self-declaration of compliance with ISO 28000. 
ISO 28000 is based on the format adopted by ISO 14000 owing to its risk-based 
approach to management systems and is based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
methodology:  Plan: establish the objectives and processes necessary to deliver results in 
accordance with the organization’s security policy  Do: implement the processes  Check: monitor and measure processes against security policy, objectives, 
targets, legal and other requirements, and report results  Act: take actions to continually improve performance of the security 
management system 
 
The supply chain security initiative “specifies the requirements for a security 
management system, including those aspects critical to security assurance of the 
supply chain. These aspects include, but are not limited to, financing, manufacturing, 
information management and the facilities for packing, storing and transferring goods 
between modes of transport facility And locations.” 
 
ISO 28000 relies on the principle of continual improvement through management 
review as shown in figure 2.1.  The process begins with the setting out of the firm’s 
security policy, followed by security risk assessment and planning, followed by the 
implementation and operation stage with checking and corrective action leading to a 
review by management and subsequent restatement of policy.   
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Figure 2.1.  ISO 28000 security management system (source: ISO 28000) 
 
The key sections in ISO 28000 are the security risk assessment process, the 
operational control process and the emergency preparedness process. 
The security risk assessment process set out in 4.3.1 shall “….consider the likelihood 
of an event and all of its consequences which shall include physical failure threats and 
risks, such as functional failure, incidental damage, malicious damage or terrorist or 
criminal action….operational threats and risks etc.”  The emphasis is on identifying 
all of the threats to the organisation’s supply chains, not only the upstream and 
downstream threats.   
Section 4.4.6 ‘Operational Control’ is concerned that the organisation shall ensure that 
the operations and activities listed in 4.4.6 a) to f) are carried out under specified 
conditions by “evaluating any threats posed from upstream supply chain activities and 
applying controls to mitigate these impacts to the organisation and other downstream 
supply chain operators.” 
Section 4.4.7 ‘emergency preparedness, response and security recovery’, describes 
how the organisation shall “establish, implement and maintain appropriate plans and 
procedures to identify the potential for, and responses to, security incidents and 
emergency situations, and for preventing and mitigating the likely consequences that 
can be associated with them.”   The procedures are concerned with preventing and 
mitigating the likely consequences from any security incidents and emergency 
situations. 
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2.6.9 Advanced Cargo Information Requirements 
The first mandatory advanced cargo information (ACI) requirement introduced in the 
wake of September 11th was the US Customs and Border Protection Advanced 
Manifest Rule, commonly known as the 24-hour Rule.  The 24-hour rule requires sea 
carriers and NVOCCs (Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers) to provide the US 
Customs and Border Protection Agency with detailed descriptions of the contents of 
sea containers bound for the United States 24 hours before the container is loaded on 
board a vessel.  The rule allows US Customs officers to analyze the container content 
information and identify potential terrorist threats before the US -bound container is 
loaded at the foreign seaport, not after it arrives in a US port.  The use of such vague 
cargo descriptions as "Freight-All-Kinds", "Said-To-Contain" or "General 
Merchandise," is no longer tolerated.   Sea carriers and NVOCCs that violate the 24-
hour rule 2003 receive "Do-Not-Load" messages.  The "Do-Not Load" message 
instructs these parties not to load a specific container that has been found in violation 
of the 24-hour rule.  Carriers and NVOCCs that disregard these "Do Not Load" 
messages (and load the cited container) are denied permission to unload this container 
at any US port.   
The tightened reporting requirements for containerised cargo entering the United 
States as prescribed by the 24 hour rule has forced companies’ supply chains towards 
greater functionality.  To meet the 24 hour rule requirements, shipowners and other 
NVOCCs have extended their electronic commerce technologies by developing e-
commerce portals through which their customers can communicate more easily their 
shipping information and giving customers the capability to manage their shipments 
by increasing visibility in their supply chains. 
 
Since then, additional mandatory ACIs have been introduced in the United States, 
Mexico, Canada, the European Union, China and Japan.  They are outlined below and 
the section concludes with a brief description of the United States’ intention to scan 
100% of inbound containers by 2012.  
 
Importer Security Filing “10+2 Rule” 
The Importer Security Filing (ISF), commonly known as the “10+2” initiative, is a 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regulation that requires importers and vessel 
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operating carriers to provide additional advance trade data to US CBP pursuant to 
Section 203 of the SAFE Port Act of 200612.  10+2 is designed to build on the 
capability of CBP’s automated targeting system (ATS) by helping to identify the 
entities involved in the supply chain and their locations as well as providing more 
detailed descriptions of the goods to be imported into the United States.  The ten items 
to be transmitted to CBP by the importer, or their authorized agents no later than 24 
hours before loading at the non-US port are:     
  Manufacturer (or Supplier)  Seller  Buyer  Ship to Party  Container Stuffing Location  Consolidator (Stuffer)  Importer of Record/Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) Applicant Identification 
Number  Consignee Number(s)  Country of Origin  Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) 
Number 
 
The additional two items that must be submitted by the carrier, electronically to CBP, 
within 48 hours of the vessel departing from the last port, inbound US are:  Vessel Stow Plan  Container Status Messages 
 
However, in the event of foreign cargoes remaining onboard or other transit cargoes, 
only the following five items need to be transmitted 24 hours before loading in the 
non-US port:  Booking Party name/address   Ship to Party  
                                   
12
 URL:  
ht tp: / / www.cbp.gov/ linkhandler/ cgov/ t rade/ cargo_security/ carr iers/ security_filing/ ra.ct t / ra.pdf 
[ accessed 29 January 2010]  
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 Commodity HTS-6   Foreign Port of Unlading   Place of Delivery  
 
Mexico 24 hour rule 
On 1 September 2007, Mexican Customs implemented a similar ACI system to the 
United States.  The information which must be transmitted to Mexican Customs at 
least 24 hours before loading in the non-Mexican port is designed to be similar to that 
required by CBP and is as follows13:  Name and complete address of the shipper, consignee and of the person who 
shall be notified of the arrival, as stated in the bill of lading. (When the 
consignee is labelled TO THE ORDER OF. the name of the Notify party must 
be declared.)  Amount of the merchandise and measurement unit, if the merchandise is 
carried in containers, the amount and measurement unit shall also be specified 
as well for each container.  Gross weight or volume of the merchandise. If the merchandise is carried in 
containers, the gross weight or volume shall be specified also for each 
container.  Merchandise description, avoiding general descriptions that do not allow 
proper identification of the nature of the merchandise; such as “general cargo”, 
“dry cargo”, “chemicals”, “perishable items”, “bulk merchandise”, “bulk 
minerals” ,“F.A.K.”.  Number, quantity and dimensions of containers.  Seal number(s) for each container.  (No slashes, no hyphen, neither blank 
spaces within seal number)  Type of service contracted.  In case of dangerous merchandise, state class, division and United Nations 
number, as well as a telephone number for emergencies. 
 
                                   
13
 URL:  
ht tp: / / www.hamburgsud.com /WWW/EN/ Services_and_Offices/ Regional_I nformat ion/ Asia/ Regional_C
ontent /Microsoft_Word_-_NEW_24_HRS_REGULATION_FOR_MEXICO_sep_1_RAS.pdf [ accessed 29 
January 2010]  
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Canadian Advance Commercial Information 
On 19 April 2004, the Canadian Border Services Agency introduced the advance 
commercial information programme which is similar to the US CBP 24 hour rule. 
requiring marine carriers to electronically transmit marine cargo data to the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) 24 hours prior to loading cargo at a foreign port.14 
 
European Union Pre-Arrival and Pre-Departure  
As of 1 July 2009, EU authorities required importers and exporters to lodge pre-
arrival and pre-departure summary customs declarations up to 24 hours prior to 
exportation or importation, depending on the method of transportation. Thus, the 
European Union has become one of the few customs territories in the world requiring 
not only pre-arrival declarations but also pre-departure customs declarations. The new 
EU customs rules require pre-arrival and pre-departure declarations to be stored in 
electronic format for at least three years. Since many multinational companies will 
choose to centralise their electronic storage of these documents, they will have to 
carefully evaluate the applicable EU Member State’s national legislation relating to 
data protection and retention. The AEO Security and Safety Certificate and AEO 
Customs and Security Certificate are aimed at lessening this burden by providing 
significant benefits with regard to pre-arrival and pre-departure declarations. Non-
AEO entities have to provide pre-departure and pre-arrival declarations consisting of 
additional security-related information.15  
 
Japan Advance Cargo Information 
On 1 June 2007, Japan Customs introduced their advance cargo information for both 
marine and air cargoes.  The required items include16:  Shipping location and destination of cargo  Marks, numbers, name and quantity of goods  Address or place of residence, name or appellation and telephone number of 
consigner and consignee 
 
                                   
14
 URL:  ht tp: / / www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/ prog/ aci- ipec/menu-eng.htm l# a1 [ accessed 29 January 2010]  
15
 URL:  ht tp: / / www.mwe.com/ index.cfm / fuseact ion/ publicat ions.nldetail/ object_id/ 61581f82-7f64-
4c88-b797-c2e63964ed1a.cfm  [ accessed 29 January 2010]  
16
 URL:  ht tp: / / www.customs.go.jp/ english/ procedures/ advance2_e/ index_e.htm  [ accessed 29 January 
2010]  
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China Advance Cargo Information 
From 1 January 2009, Decree No. 172 of the General Administration of Customs of 
the People’s Republic of China came into force “for the purposes of regulating the 
customs administration of manifests of inbound and outbound means of transport, 
facilitating international trade and ensuring international trade security.”  Under the 
measures, operators of inbound and outbound means of transport, non-vessel 
operating common carriers, freight forwarders, shipping agency companies are 
obliged to submit cargo manifests to Chinese Customs 24 hours prior to the loading of 
cargo.17 
 
United States 100% Container Scanning 2012  
The United States legislation “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007” unilaterally introduced a 100% scanning requirement for 
US-bound maritime cargo at the point of export, to be implemented by 1 July 2012.18  
Pilot programmes for 100% scanning have been conducted in Southampton Container 
Terminal, UK; Qasim International Container Terminal in Karachi, Pakistan; and 
Cortes in the Honduras under the auspices of the Secure Freight Initiative which 
derived from the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006.  
While commentators disagree about the financial and security viability of 100% 
container scanning, ports should be aware that failure to comply with the legislation 
may put them at risk of being unable to export to the United States from 2012, though 
the legislation does allow for a period of up to two years in which the mandatory 
introduction may be delayed.  Nevertheless, there is much opposition to the 
introduction of the legislation, particularly from the European Union, which is 
considering introducing a requirement for US ports to scan 100% of all containers 
bound for Europe. 
 
                                   
17
 URL:   ht tp: / / english.customs.gov.cn/ publish/ portal191/ tab3972/ info162113.htm  [ accessed 29 
January 2010]  
18
 URL:  ht tp: / / www.gao.gov/ new.items/ d08126t .pdf [ accessed 29 January 2010]  
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2.7 Port Security Costs 
Estimates of the costs of the introduction of the ISPS Code can be found in Bichou 
(2004), Bichou and Evans (2007), OECD (2003), Dekker and Stevens (2007) and 
Benamara and Asariotis (2007).  According to Bichou (2004), the US Coast Guard 
(USCG) estimated the cost implications of security compliance on US ports to be $1.1 
billion for the first year and $656 million each year up to 2012.  The OECD (2003) 
report on the global economic impacts of the new security measures estimated that 
more than $2 billion was required as an initial investment with 1$ billion annual 
expenditure for developing country ports alone.  Table 2.3 summarises the research by 
USCG and OECD with regard to the costs of security compliance in ports.  
 
 Nature of estimates Initial costs Annual costs 
Port Facility Security 
Assessment 
US port facility Costs (USCG) 23 1 
Global port facility Costs 
(OECD) 
27.9 0.8 
Port Facility Security Plan 
US port facility Costs (USCG) 23 1 
Global port facility Costs 
(OECD) 
27.9 0.8 
Port Facility Security 
Officer 
US port facility Costs (USCG) 335 335 
Global port facility Costs 
(OECD) 
undetermined undetermined 
Security training/drills 
US port facility Costs (USCG) 17 52 
Global port facility Costs 
(OECD) 
undetermined undetermined 
Security staff/equipment 
US port facility Costs (USCG) 565 146 
Global port facility Costs 
(OECD) 
undetermined undetermined 
Total ISPS Code 
US port facility Costs (USCG) 963 509 
Global port facility Costs 
(OECD) 
undetermined undetermined 
Table 2.3 - Summary of OECD and USCG estimates of ISPS cost compliance for ports in US$million 
(source: Bichou, 2004) 
 
Bichou (2004) states that there is no international benchmark for calculating ISPS 
costs among ports.  Capital and operating costs vary significantly between ports which 
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makes it difficult to construct cost analyses on average-global approximations.  He 
also states that security measures targeting ports differ by scope, nature and level of 
compliance and that the cost of compliance will therefore vary accordingly. 
Bichou and Evans (2007) include data on UK and Australian ports.  They report that 
in the UK, total initial costs for ISPS Code compliance for 430 port facilities was 
US$26 million with annual costs at US$2.5 million.  In Australia, the Australian 
Government reported that total ISPS Code costs for 70 ports, in which there are a total 
of 300 port facilities and for 70 Australian-flagged vessels was US$240 million 
initially with annual costs of US$74 million.  While it is not possible to compare 
directly the figures for the UK and Australia given that the Australians include the 
costs associated with ISPS Code compliance for 70 vessels in addition to the ports, the 
data presented by Bichou and Evans (2007) suggests that the Australian experience is 
considerably more costly than in the UK.     
 
Dekker and Stevens (2007) carried out a survey of port facilities’ security investments 
in EU Member States and EEA countries.  Their results are based on a total of 27 port 
facilities based in six European ports: Klaipeda, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Lisbon, 
Barcelona and Bilbao.  The authors found that the average security investment per 
port facility was €464,000 and the average annual running cost was €234,000.   The 
average security investment costs and running costs are clustered by type of port 
facility and are reproduced in table 2.4. 
 
Port Security Costs 
Dry 
Bulk 
Liquid 
Bulk 
Ro/Ro Container Cruise 
Multi-
purpose 
Average investment costs 
(€1000s) 
253 439 101 74 430 798 
Average running costs (€1000s) 177 110 69 108 260 409 
Table 2.4 - Average port security investment and running costs in a study of 27 EU Member States 
(source: Dekker and Stevens, 2007) 
 
Benamara and Asariotis (2007) present the findings of the UNCTAD (2007) survey 
report which surveyed 55 ports in 28 countries.  They found that the average initial 
cost per ISPS port facility for smaller respondent ports (with up to 10 port facilities) 
amounted to US$386,000 which was more than double the amount for larger 
respondent ports (US$181,000).  The corresponding figures for the annual costs was 
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US$128,000 and US$81,000 for the smaller respondent ports and the larger 
respondent ports respectively.      
 
2.8 Port Security Incident Costs 
Greenberg et al (2006) describe how the economic consequences of a successful 
terrorist attack are likely to be large and widespread and that economic consequences 
of attacks on the container shipping system would have direct and indirect effects.  
The authors describe the direct effects as life and injury compensation, repair and 
replacement of port infrastructure and other public property, losses of cargo and 
damaged and destroyed private property.  The indirect effects are a consequence of 
the role of the port in the supply chain: business interruption due to delayed or 
missing shipments, long term adjustments to the modified transport system, 
augmented security procedures and lost revenue to the port facility And to the public 
purse. 
The OECD report (2003, p.19) describes how, after the attack on the tanker Limburg 
off Aden in November 2002, Yemeni terminals saw container throughput plummet 
from 43,000 TEU in September 2002 to 3,000 TEU in November 2002. This resulted 
largely from marine war underwriters’ increased war additional premiums rising to as 
much as USD 300,000 per vessel call.  The Yemeni government estimated that 3,000 
workers were laid off and economic losses arising from the attack were running at 
USD 15,000,000 per month. The OECD Report (2003, p.20) also states that property 
damage from a terrorist attack to a modern 16 hectare container terminal could be as 
much as USD 32,000,000. 
Farrow and Shapiro (2009) review the literature on the cost of potential terrorist 
attacks in the United States.  They present estimates for the overall costs of various 
attack scenarios, some of which are based in ports.  The authors’ findings are 
reproduced in table 2.5.   
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Author Attack Cost Estimate 
Gordon et al (2007) Aviation system $214 to $421 billion (not 
counting lives) 
Rose, Oladosu, Liao (2007) Los Angeles blackout $2.8 to $20.5 billion, depending 
on resilience (defined by the 
author as ability to respond to 
attack) 
Rosoff and Winterfeldt (2007) Dirty bomb in ports of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach  
$130 million to $100 billion, 
depending on the length of the 
shutdown 
Gordon et al (2005) Ports of Los Angeles / Long 
Beach 
From $1.1 billion to $34 billion 
Park (2008) Dirty bomb in ports of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach 
$34 billion in import/export 
losses.  No estimate based on 
lives or property lost. 
Cheng, Stough and Kocornik-
Mina (2006) 
Power plant attack in 
Washington DC 
$1.18 billion 
Abt (2005) Bioterrorist attack From $200 billion to $3 trillion; 
deaths from 500,000 to 30 
million 
Bae, Blaine and Bassok (2005) Seattle highways From $1.2 to $1.5 billion 
Table 2.5 – Costs of various terrorist attack scenarios [source: Farrow and Shapiro, 2009] 
 
While the OECD (2003) report focuses on Yemeni port terminals, the Farrow and 
Shapio (2009) review extends to the host country’s economy and supply chains.  In 
carrying out an analysis of the potential economic losses arising from port security 
incidents, it is important to distinguish between the two. 
 
2.9 Port Security Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Farrow and Shapiro (2009) summarize a benefit-cost framework for investing in 
security which is designed to be consistent with benefit-cost guidance from the US 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  They define benefits as expected avoided 
costs which include elements of both probability and consequences.  Farrow and 
Shapiro (2007, p4) also state that “if a system is resilient the cost avoided may be 
large with respect to several different types of attacks or types of hazards.”  They refer 
to a model developed by ‘Risk Management Solutions’, a private company, for 
insurance companies to use to measure the risk of terrorist attacks.   
Willis and LaTourette (2008) describe a probabilistic risk modelling approach in 
break-even benefit-cost analysis which employs the Risk Management Solutions 
methodology.  They describe how terrorism risk can be expressed in terms of the 
annual expected loss from damage caused by terrorist attacks and that the expected 
loss accounts for the probability of that the attack will occur and the consequence of 
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the attacks.  Furthermore, Willis and LaTourette (2008) state that “since terrorism risk 
reflects both probability and consequence, using risk reduction as a measure of benefit 
in a benefit-cost analysis captures both effects.”  The authors state that the benefit of a 
security regulation can be expressed in terms of the reduction in the expected loss of 
damage.   This principle is echoed in the calculation of residual security risk by Talas 
and Menachof (2009) and is also applied in this research.  Willis and LaTourette 
(2008) also describe how benefit-cost analysis is the normative framework for 
determining whether a regulation is efficient.  They qualify their argument by stating 
that a regulation is justified if the incremental cost of implementing the regulation is 
exceeded by the incremental benefit generated by the regulation.   
Pinto and Talley (2006) propose a framework for calculating the risk-based return on 
investment (RROI) for a port’s security systems.  The authors state that their approach 
may be used to determine whether the expenditure on security resources is sufficient 
given the corresponding reduction in risk.  Pinto and Talley (2006, p281) refer to the 
framework developed by Arora et al (2004, p35) which “uses a risk management 
approach that integrates risk profile with actual damages and implementation costs to 
determine the costs and benefits of information security solutions.”  The Arora et al 
(2004, p37) framework describes RROI as the ratio between the net benefit in 
implementing an IT solution and the implementation cost.  In particular, RROI 
measures “how effectively you use resources to avoid or reduce risk.  Specifically, a 
positive RROI means that the dollar value of the avoided risk is greater than the 
implementation cost.”  Furthermore, the RROI helps to guide the company in its IT 
security investment by indicating the point where further investment in IT security has 
such a diminished return that “you’re better off investing the money elsewhere.”  
Pinto and Talley (2006) also describe how investments should be made in port 
security until the RROI falls to the minimum acceptable rate but do not elaborate on 
what the minimum acceptable rate might be or how it can be assessed.  Also, the 
framework proposed by Pinto and Talley (2006) is unable to assess how port security 
systems can be deployed efficiently.  Finally, the authors make no provision for the 
interpretation of RROI when certain security measures are mandated by initiatives 
such as the ISPS Code.   
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2.10 Portfolio Selection Theory and Efficient Frontiers 
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) describe the challenges that companies face to mitigate 
supply chain risks without eroding profits. The manager’s role is similar to that of a 
stock portfolio manager: achieve the highest possible profits for varying levels of risk, 
and do so efficiently.  
Markowitz (1952) states that a portfolio is efficient when it is impossible to obtain a 
greater average return (of the stocks in the portfolio) without incurring greater 
standard deviation; that it is impossible to obtain a smaller standard deviation without 
giving up return on the average. Furthermore, the investor must choose one 
combination of average return and standard deviation which, more than any other, 
satisfies his needs and preferences with respect to risk and return.  Markowitz (1952) 
also states that portfolio selection can not only rely on past averages and standard 
deviations (of stocks) as reasonable measures of the likely return and the uncertainty 
of return in the future but that it is also possible to use the ‘probability beliefs’ of 
experts as inputs to a portfolio analysis. He describes a scenario in which a 
meteorologist is asked to advise on the probability belief that it will ‘rain tomorrow’ 
and describes how the ‘security analyst is the meteorologist of stocks and bonds’.  The 
security analyst in Markowitz’ (1952) example becomes the port security analyst in 
this model. He also shows how an investor can compute the set of efficient portfolios 
and efficient expected returns – variance (E-V) combinations by combining statistical 
techniques and the judgements of experts to form reasonable probability beliefs.  In 
the application of Markowitz (1952) theory of portfolio selection to port security, the 
theory shows that it is possible to arrange the security systems in such a way as to 
obtain a certain level of expected performance of the portfolio of security systems for 
a given level of risk, in this case represented by the standard deviation of the portfolio.  
Markowitz (1952) theory of portfolio selection calculates how the efficient portfolio 
should be structured by allocating a security investment coefficient for each security 
system.   
Byrne and Lee (1994) describe how the Markowitz portfolios can be connected to 
generate the efficient frontier and how Markowitz Efficient Frontiers can be 
calculated using Microsoft Excel Solver.  The Markowitz efficient frontier “represents 
the boundary of the risk/return set of asset combinations (portfolios).”  The Byrne and 
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Lee (1994) process involves matrix methods for the portfolio calculations and follows 
these five steps: 
1) Find the maximum return portfolio and compute the risk for this  
2) Find the minimum risk portfolio and compute the return for this 
3) Compute the difference between the maximum and minimum risk 
portfolios and divide into a sufficient number of points to produce a 
reasonable graph 
4) Solve the maximum return combinations for each of the subdivided risk 
levels 
5) Graph these returns against the risks. 
 
2.11 Some Parallels between Portfolio Theory and Port Security 
Investment 
Some interesting parallels exist between the balancing of a portfolio of stocks and 
shares and the implementation of port security measures to protect a port facility and 
its operations.  These parallels are set out below.  An investor buys shares in a stock in the belief that he will gain a positive return 
from his investment.  This is equivalent to a port security manager investing in a 
security solution in the belief that it will protect his port facility and the port’s 
operations against a security incident and thus lower his risk towards a particular 
security incident.  An investor could invest solely in the one stock with the maximum predicted 
return but instead invests in such a way as to balance his portfolio against risk and 
return.  Similarly, the port security manager does not invest solely in one security 
solution, such as fencing, at the expense of any other security solution because he 
realises that he faces more than one type of security risk.  He must balance his 
investments in security solutions in such a way as to counteract the threats that his 
port faces until he has lowered his overall risk level to his satisfaction.  The value of a share portfolio is equivalent to the performance of a portfolio of 
security solutions in a port.  Certain security solutions may perform well but the 
overall performance can be negatively affected by the failure of or lack of a 
security solution designed to tackle a particular security incident which interrupts 
port operations. 
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 Stock prices react to unforeseen events.  The performance of a security solution 
can be tested by a security incident in the port.  The security incident is equivalent 
to the unforeseen event.  Stocks are correlated or uncorrelated to movements in an index: certain security 
solutions have no bearing on a particular type of security incident and as such 
their individual performance will be unaffected by it.  Stocks are correlated or uncorrelated to each other.  Certain security solutions are 
related in terms of their performance in the face of a security incident e.g. access 
control and intruder detection measures.  Others, such as container radiation 
detectors and office smoke alarms are unrelated and their performance 
uncorrelated.   
 
The existence of these parallels lends weight to the justification for employing the 
Markowitz (1952) theory of portfolio selection in determining the efficient 
relationship between residual security risk and security investment for maritime port 
facilities.   However, the cross-disciplinary adaptation of theory from finance to port 
security requires a statement of assumptions which will need to stand up to scrutiny 
before the efficient relationship between residual security risk and security investment 
can be calculated. 
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Chapter 3 - Research Methodology 
The chapter is structured as follows.  First, the research design and methodology are 
discussed in detail.  This includes the research questions; data sources and collection 
methods; and units of analysis.  Secondly, the issues of research reliability and 
validity are addressed.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the research 
protocol. 
 
3.1 Research Design 
The research in this study has both qualitative and quantitative elements and follows 
an adaptive cross-disciplinary approach of recasting Markowitz (1952) theory of 
portfolio selection into maritime port security in an industry example.  .  The research 
does not follow a case study methodology because case studies necessarily generate 
new theory (Yin, 1994) and furthermore, it was felt that a case study approach would 
not be suitable given the extensive literature on the different forms of theory 
generation from case study research (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1991, 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Bryman, 2004; Mangan et al, 2004; Hilmola et al, 
2005; Siggelkow, 2007).  The objective behind the research is not the generation of 
new theory about port security efficiency but is aimed at addressing some of the 
problems faced by port security managers today through the cross-disciplinary 
application of financial portfolio theory in the field of port security.  The research 
uncovers some of the parallels which exist in managing a portfolio of stocks and 
shares and a portfolio of port security systems while at the same seeking to identify 
the limitations and potential problems with the application of portfolio theory in a 
security setting.  Furthermore, the choice of the mixed methods approach of survey 
questionnaires and structured interviews fits with the epistemological and ontological 
considerations mentioned below.  Nevertheless, one key  principle of case study 
research  is evident in the methodology, which is  the adoption of a research protocol, 
as championed by Yin (1994).   
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3.1.1 Epistemological and Ontological Considerations 
Research where the emphasis is on quantification in the collection and analysis of data 
and entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research 
typically points to a positivist epistemology with an objectivist ontology (Bryman, 
2004).   While this research contains some quantitative elements, the lionshare of the 
research is of a qualitative nature.  The clue to the epistemology can be found in the 
definition of port security at the end of section 2.1: “….perception of the absence of 
threat.”  The researcher’s role is to see the World View of the company security 
officers and to interpret it from their point of view.  Furthermore, according to 
Bryman (2004) a phenomenologist views human behaviour as a product of how 
people interpret the world in order to grasp the meaning of a person’s behaviour: the 
phenomenologist attempts to see things from that person’s point of view.  Given these 
considerations, the epistemology can be described as interpretivist-phenomenological.  
Positivism can be ruled out because much of the data on the performance of port 
security systems is subjective in nature and cannot be measured with any physical 
gauge.  In the same vein, it is possible to eliminate realism as an epistemological 
position because the perception of security cannot be discerned by the ‘effect’ of the 
security measures alone.   
The definition of port security also guides the ontological considerations.  The 
‘perception of the absence of threat’ is an interpretation of social phenomena and thus 
necessarily dependent on social actors, in this case the company security officers.   
The ontology is therefore constructionist.   Furthermore, the interpretations cannot be 
independent of social actors and thus cannot follow an objectivist ontology. 
 
3.2 Main Research Question 
Recalling the statement of the research problem from the introduction, the problem 
the research aims to solve is the determination by ISPS Code compliant port facilities 
of whether they have been able to discover the efficient relationship between security 
and investment.  Considering the earlier definition of security, in order to arrive at a 
quantitative measure of the threat to a port facility following the application of 
security measures, it is necessary to consider the residual security risk, which can be 
estimated in financial terms.  From this it follows that the main research question is: 
how can ISPS Code compliant port facilities discover the efficient relationship 
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between residual security risk and security investment?  In order to address this main 
research question it is necessary to split it into two further questions.  The first is: 
what does it mean for a port facility to be ISPS Code compliant?  The second is: how 
can the efficient relationship between residual security risk and security investment be 
calculated?  However, in order to address the second question, it is necessary to pose a 
further five questions, as set out below. 
1) What does it mean for a port facility to be ISPS Code compliant? 
In the section on the ISPS Code above, a port facility is deemed to be ISPS Code 
compliant once it has been granted a Statement of Compliance for Port Facility 
(SoCPF) certificate by its Contracting Government which is valid for a maximum of 
five years.  However, in order to obtain a SoCPF certificate, the port facility will have 
had to have drawn up the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and in so doing, have 
introduced ISPS Code compliant security working practices which will likely include 
new security procedures, personnel and technology.  The security working practices 
that will have been introduced must comply with the requirements of Part A of the 
ISPS Code and these will be detailed in the PFSP.  Furthermore, while the ISPS Code 
is silent on minimum security personnel manning levels for port facilities, these 
details would also be included in the PFSP.  However, the minimum requirements for 
the security equipment which must be deployed in an ISPS Code compliant port 
facility can be obtained by conducting a line-by-line analysis of Parts A and B of the 
ISPS Code.  This will apply only to those port facilities which have either voluntarily 
or through local legislation been required to adhere to the guidance under part B of 
ISPS Code.  A copy of this analysis can be found in appendix A.  Therefore, in terms 
of the port security procedures, personnel and technology, it is possible to 
comprehend what is meant by an ISPS Code compliant port facility. 
 
2) How can the efficient relationship between residual security risk and security 
investment be calculated?   
The calculation of a port facility’s residual security risk follows the model developed 
by Talas and Menachof (2009) and given that the level of security investment for 
ISPS Code compliance can be known and the residual security risk can be estimated, 
two of the three key components in this question can be answered.  The third 
component, the mapping of the efficient frontier between residual security risk and 
security investment, is tackled using a dual approach: first, by applying Markowitz 
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(1952) theory of portfolio selection to each port facility individually and secondly, by 
examining the 216 possible portfolios of security systems which can be constructed 
from the six port facilities.  This twin pronged approach is addressed in greater detail 
in chapter IV.  However, in order to follow the model described in Talas and 
Menachof (2009), it is necessary to address the following five questions:  
 
1. What are the security threats to the port facility and what are their 
probabilities? 
2. What are the estimated gross losses to the port facility following each 
prescribed security threat? 
3. What do the security systems consist of in each port facility? 
4. How well do the port security systems perform in the face of the prescribed 
security threats? 
5. What are the port security systems’ costs? 
 
1. What are the security threats to the port facility and what are their 
probabilities 
Pinto and Talley (2006) describe a number of major US port security fears, which 
include chemical or nuclear weapons smuggled inside containers; mines used on ships 
to block shipping channels; and pirated vessels crashed into bridges or famous 
landmarks.  Other examples of the types of potential security incidents that a port 
facility faces can be found in the Congressional Research Service Report for the 
United States Congress (Parfomak and Fritelli, 2007).  Furthermore, the security 
threats that a given port facility faces and their probabilities are regularly considered 
in the normal course of business by the specialist marine war and terrorism 
underwriters in the Lloyd’s Insurance Market in London.  Terrorism underwriters 
regularly review the probabilities and subsequently their pricing levels of security 
risks and according to Kunreuther, et.al. (1995, p338) “underwriters make pricing 
decisions regularly as part of their jobs; they are expert, experienced risk evaluators.”   
Furthermore, a comprehensive risk assessment is a requirement for port facilities that 
are compliant with the International Organisation of Standards’ (ISO) Supply Chain 
Security Standard ISO 28000.  Section 4.3.1 of ISO 28000 states that: “the risk 
assessment shall consider the likelihood of an event and all of its consequences.”   
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The research concentrates on seven different types of security incident.  These have 
been selected from examples in Pinto and Talley (2006), Parfomak and Fritelli (2007) 
and from discussions with Dubai Ports World.  The types of security incident are: 
bomb introduced by person on foot; car bomb; truck bomb; biological agent attack on 
the port facility – on foot; biological agent attack on the port facility – by vehicle; 
mining of port infrastructure; and vessel attacked by suicide boat.  The methodology 
used to select the scenarios is based on a breach of the port facility’s security systems 
from both the land and seaward entrances with varying degrees of severity with 
attacks aimed at different parts of the port facility using both conventional explosives 
and a biological agent.   
The security scenarios for each port facility were presented to a Lloyd’s terrorism 
underwriter for his pure premium rating in an interview at his desk in the underwriting 
room in Lloyd’s of London.  The terrorism underwriter, Russell Kennedy of BRIT 
Insurance, employs a similar approach to that described in Willis and LaTourette 
(2008), except that he employs the services of Exclusive Analysis, a competitor of 
Risk Management Solutions in the London Insurance Market, to guide him in his 
pricing of terrorism risk.  The methodology which Kennedy applies for pricing a 
terrorism risk in a given country is as follows.  He refers to his “notional base rate” 
for a terrorism risk which is 0.02% per annum.  He then examines the Exclusive 
Analysis risk score for terrorism for the country in question which is represented as a 
number between 1 and 10 to one decimal place.  This scale he has interpreted as a 
logarithmic scale of base 2.  In order to arrive at his country rate for a particular 
terrorism risk he multiplies his base rate of 0.02% by 2 to the power of the Exclusive 
Analysis risk score minus 1.  He then makes a further subjective adjustment 
depending on the nature of the business (‘occupancy’ in Kennedy’s parlance) of the 
proposed assured. He has subdivided ‘the occupancies’ into 20 business sectors and 
examples include: professional services such as banking and finance; oil and gas; 
power generation; and ports and harbours.  Kennedy’s methodology subsequently 
yields a single country rate for a terrorism risk in a specific business sector.  However, 
his methodology is unable to distinguish between two different locations in the same 
country and nor will it distinguish between different types of terrorism attack modus 
operandi.   
While Kennedy’s underwriting methodology appears to follow some logical path to 
arriving at a suitable pure premium pricing level for terrorism risks, there are a 
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number of issues which need to be highlighted.  First, his selection of 0.02% as a 
notional base rate for an annual terrorism premium may in time be revised upwards in 
the event of sustained losses on his underwriting book.  Any such decision might be 
driven by the higher cost of reinsurance in future years but it should also be borne in 
mind that any increase in the notional base rate may also reflect a global increase in 
terrorist activity.  Secondly, there are limitations with seeking data from a single 
underwriter but the justification for following this method is as follows.  Kennedy 
bases much of his terrorism premium setting on the expert opinion of Exclusive 
Analysis, a respected provider of terrorism and political risk intelligence to the 
Lloyd’s Insurance Market.  Exclusive Analysis gather their data from in-country 
specialists who feed intelligence back to the London headquarters.  The London 
headquarters of Exclusive Analysis in turn interpret the intelligence provided to them 
by their network of contacts and subsequently feed this information to underwriters 
such as Kennedy in a quantitative form.  Thus the expert opinion of a number of 
specialists outside of the insurance market has a direct bearing on the subjectivity 
which Kennedy exhibits in his underwriting process. 
Nevertheless, it is accepted that seeking the opinions of either a panel of terrorism 
underwriters or more underwriters individually would have been preferable but 
difficulties with access unfortunately prevented this from happening. The transcript of 
the interview with Russell Kennedy is in appendix E. 
 
2. What are the estimated gross losses to the port facility following each 
prescribed security threat? 
The OECD (2003) report and Farrow and Shapiro’s (2009) review of the potential 
economic losses following security incidents show two of the levels at which losses 
can be calculated: at the port facility level and the national level.  This research aims 
to capture the data at the port facility level, as per the OECD (2003) report.  The 
reason for this is that trying to estimate the damage to the host economy or to entire 
supply chains is beyond the scope of this study. 
The data source for the estimates of potential economic damage to the port facilities 
following the prescribed security incidents listed above is chiefly a copy of the 
schedule of one of the insured port facilities owned by Dubai Ports World.  Given that 
insurance limits generally reflect the values of property at risk, this can be judged to 
be a valid data source.  However, the data which was provided by the Director of 
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Security is limited to port facility A as this was the only data available.  The seven 
security scenarios were presented to the Director of Security on 24 March 2009 and 
based on the port facility A insurance data and through his own professional 
experience, he estimated the size of financial loss of physical damage and business 
interruption for the different terrorism attacks for the terminal in port facility A only.  
The full results are presented at the beginning of chapter IV. 
 
 
 
3. What do the security systems consist of in each port facility? 
The units of analysis in the research are the port security systems in each port facility.  
The security systems have been classified as access control, biometrics and detection, 
which in turn consist of individual security components.  The access control systems 
include all the physical gates, fencing and security personnel engaged in access 
control procedures.  The biometric systems, also described as ‘enhanced access 
control systems’ range from pass cards to fingerprint scanning.  The detection systems 
include CCTV systems, automatic intruder alerts, radar, sonar and also the security 
personnel involved in security patrols.   
The security components in the port facility can be identified through the use of a 
survey questionnaire completed by each of the port facilities’ Port Facility Security 
Officer (PFSO).  The questionnaire, a copy of which can be found in appendix B, was 
compiled following a line-by-line analysis of the port security equipment and 
components mandated by the ISPS Code (see appendix A).   
Questions 1-4 are concerned with the details of the port, the specific port facility 
owned by Dubai Ports World, the role of the respondent and the principal activity of 
the port facility.  Questions 5-8 are concerned with the specification and cost of the 
perimeter fencing in the port facility.  Questions 9-10 are concerned with the type and 
cost of access control measures (excluding fencing) in the port facility.  Questions 11-
14 are concerned with the types, specifications and costs of detection systems, 
including lighting coverage in the port facility.  Questions 15-17 are concerned with 
the types and cost of biometric security systems deployed in the port facility.  
Question 18 is concerned with a description of the types and coverage of security 
patrols in the port facility.  Question 19-21 are concerned with security 
communications in the port facility.  Questions 22-23 are concerned with the number, 
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location and cost of security personnel in the port facility.  Questions 24-26 are 
concerned with the type, location and cost of cargo security detection equipment in 
the port facility.  Questions 27-28 are concerned with security systems integration, 
monitoring and cost in the port facility’s main control room.  Questions 29-30 are 
concerned with the extent and cost of crisis management systems in the port facility.  
The survey questions were formulated in line with De Vaus’ (2002) principles of 
question design and his key benchmarks for setting questions. 
The data sources for the completed survey questionnaires are the Port Facility 
Security Officers in the six port facilities.   
 
 
4. How well do the port security systems perform in the face of the prescribed 
security threats? 
While it may appear impossible to assign a quantitative measure to the performance of 
access control measures or intruder detection measures, the ISPS Code Part B 18.5 
requires that “drills should be conducted every three months unless the specific 
circumstances dictate otherwise.  These drills should test individual elements of the 
port facility security plan such as those security threats listed in paragraph 15.11.”  
The performance of the individual security systems can be assessed based on a series 
of key performance indicators (KPIs) that the port facility security officers (PFSOs) 
report monthly to the company security officers (CSOs).  They report, among other 
measures, the number of security non-conformities for each security system.  This 
means that the CSOs are able to build a picture over time of how effectively the 
security systems are operating in the port facilities for which they have responsibility.  
By conducting semi-structured interviews with the company security officers (CSOs), 
the intention is to collect quantitative data by asking the CSOs to interpret and 
translate the KPI data into percentage performance measures for each of the three 
main security systems: access control, biometrics and detection for each of the port 
facilities.  The quantitative responses to the interview questions are an evaluation of 
how effectively each security system works to prevent the occurrence of each of the 
prescribed security incidents, working completely in isolation of the other two 
security systems.   
 
5. What are the port security systems’ costs 
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The survey questionnaire described in 3 above also captures details of the investment 
of each port facility’s security systems and their components.  The data captured 
includes both the cost of the security infrastructure from 2004 to 2007 and the running 
costs of the port facility’s security systems for the 2007 year.  The term ‘security 
investment’ in this research combines both the cost of the security infrastructure from 
2004 to 2007 and the running costs for the 2007 year.  The figure for the cost of the 
security infrastructure is aggregated across the years 2004 – 2007 to capture all of the 
improvements made to the port facilities’ security systems in that time.  This is 
because the CSOs were not confident that the PFSOs would be able to provide 
accurate figures for the security investments for 2004 alone, the year of the 
introduction of the ISPS Code.   
 
3.3 Units of Analysis: Representativeness 
The units of analysis in this research are the port facilities and the security systems in 
the six port facilities owned by Dubai Ports World which have been labelled A to F.  
All of the port facilities are container terminals.  One of the port facilities is located in 
the Americas, one in Europe and the remaining four are located in Asia.  The six port 
facilities presented in this research are a  representative sample of the types and 
locations of port facilities in the Dubai Ports World portfolio in terms of their 
container throughput, geographic location and background terrorist threat, as 
determined by the two company security officers  The company security officers 
selected the six port facilities based on the following criteria:  
1)  The port facilities were equally spread between developed and developing 
countries; 
2) The port facilities ranged from low to high in terms of their terrorism threat, in 
the opinion of the company security officers; 
3) The port facilities were equally spread across the various time zones in which 
the parent company’s portfolio of ports are located. 
While the selection of port facilities in this research is deemed to be representative, it 
is acknowledged that the reader will be unable to satisfy him or herself as to the 
validity of these statements given that the locations of the port facilities are not 
disclosed, arising from the company’s security concerns. 
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3.4 Research Reliability and Construct Validity 
The research reliability test focuses on one key aspect of the research:  the methods 
employed in the data gathering process.  Yin (1994) describes reliability as the ability 
of a later researcher to conduct the research all over again and to arrive at the same 
findings and conclusions.  Yin (1994, p36) states that the reliability issue can be 
addressed through the documentation of the procedures followed in the research to 
minimize the occurrence of errors or bias.  Bryman (2004, p71) describes reliability in 
terms of stability.  Bryman’s description of stability involves the test-retest method, 
with the results presented by way of Cronbach’s Alpha, a computed coefficient which 
calculates the average of all possible split-half reliability coefficients (Cronbach, 
1951).  Forza (2002, p177) describes Cronbach’s Alpha as the “most commonly used 
reliability indicator in Operations Management research” and states that it is 
expressed in terms of the average inter-item correlation ߩҧ among the n measurement 
items in the instrument under consideration thus: 
 ןൌ ݊ߩҧ1 ൅ ሺ݊ െ 1ሻߩҧ 
 
Forza (2002, p177) describes an alpha value of equal to or greater than 0.8 to 
represent a high level of reliability in the data being measured.  
Bryman’s (2004, p72) description of construct validity refers to “whether an indicator 
that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept.”  In this research, the 
performance of each security system is defined as a separate construct.  The research 
protocol contains details on how the research addresses the validity of each construct 
in the interviews. 
 
3.5 Research Protocol 
While the research is not adopting a case study strategy per se, nevertheless, there are 
many tools employed by case study researchers which can increase the reliability of 
research.  One such tool is the case study protocol (Yin, 1994, p63).   
For the purposes of this research, a research protocol was prepared which specifically 
addresses two key issues: the interviews and construct validity.  A copy of the 
research protocol is reproduced below. 
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Research Protocol (Interviews & Construct Validity) 
1. Procedures 
a. Scheduling of field visits.  Field visits were arranged to both the offices of 
Dubai Ports World in Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates and to Lloyd’s of 
London. The visit to the main office in Jebel Ali was scheduled for March 
2009.  A two day visit to the offices of Dubai Ports World was required in 
order to complete the interviews.  The visit to Lloyd’s of London was 
arranged for April 2009.  
b. Access procedures.  Access to the two Company Security Officers (CSOs) 
of Dubai Ports World has been secured through the Director of Security.   
Access to the Lloyd’s Terrorism Underwriter, Russell Kennedy of BRIT 
Insurance, has been arranged through Nigel Miller of Miller Insurance 
Services. 
c. Interview documents.  The interview documents required for the 
interviews with the CSOs at DP World are the prepared (blank) 
spreadsheets for the performance of the security systems in the face of the 
prescribed security threats.  One form was filled in for each port facility.  
An example of this form can be found in table 3.1.    
 
 
Table 3.1 - Interview document for CSO interviews (one per port facility) 
 
 
These were filled out by the interviewer during the interview process in the 
full view of the interviewee.  It was  arranged that DP World will provide 
the documents regarding the size of the port facilities’ insured assets.   The 
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interview with the terrorism underwriter was unstructured and required no 
prior documents. 
 
2. Persons to be interviewed.  The four persons  interviewed were:  the two company 
security officers of DP World; the Director of Security for DP World and the 
Lloyd’s Underwriter, Russell Kennedy. 
 
3. Interview questions 
a. Topics.  The interviews with the CSOs  concentrated on their subjective 
assessments of the performances of the individual port facilities’ security 
systems in the face of the prescribed security threats. 
The interview with the Global Head of Security  concentrated on his own 
subjective assessments of the expected losses due to the prescribed 
terrorist attacks in the port facilities.  This sought to capture his knowledge 
and experience of munitions explosions in the maritime environment and 
translate it into quantifiable loss estimates in US$ terms. 
The interview with the Lloyd’s Underwriter sought to understand his 
underwriting methodology and  his subjective assessments of the 
probabilities of the occurrences of the prescribed security incidents. 
b. Research constructs. 
The research constructs are defined as the performance of the security 
systems of access control, biometrics and detection. 
c. Procedure to ensure construct validity during interviews. 
The procedure to ensure construct validity during the interviews is 
specifically relevant to the interviews with the CSOs.  In order to ensure 
construct validity, it was necessary to draw to the interviewees’ attention 
that the interviewees’ subjective assessments of the performance of each 
security system should be considered to be independent of the other two.  
This was done on three occasions in each interview: first when the 
interviewee was asked to give their subjective assessments of the 
performance of the access control measures; secondly when the 
interviewee was asked to give their subjective assessments of the 
performance of the biometrics systems; and thirdly when the interviewee 
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was asked to give their subjective assessments of the performance of the 
detection systems.   
 
3.6 Ethics 
The nature of the research in the security field necessarily requires a high level of trust 
between researcher and researched.  The researched does not want security sensitive 
information about any potential weaknesses in a port facility’s security system to leak 
out and to be used by criminal or terrorist interests for their own ends.  They also do 
not wish to share with their competitors the data on what security systems are located 
in each port facility and their costs.  Therefore, the identities of the port facilities 
cannot be disclosed.  Furthermore, it may be interesting to note that the level of trust 
between researcher and researched was such that no confidentiality agreement was 
ever signed or deemed necessary to be signed.  
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Chapter 4- Port Security Risk: A Model and its Application 
in Portfolio Analysis 
The chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section concerns the construction 
of the model for port security risk, though limited in this research to acts of terrorism.  
The second section shows how the model can be applied in a portfolio optimization 
analysis of port facilities’ security systems.   The third section shows how Markowitz 
theory of portfolio selection can be applied to a port facility’s portfolio of security 
systems in order to construct the risk-return efficient frontier.  
 
4.1 Constructing the Port Security Risk Model 
First, the port security risk model is described, which is based on the Willis et al 
(2005) definition of terrorism risk.  Secondly, we examine Gleason’s (1980) method 
of modelling terrorism risk using the Poisson distribution.  Thirdly, we repeat 
Gleason’s (1980) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the data from the RAND database of 
worldwide maritime terrorist attacks19 from 1968 to 2007 and from Jenkins et al 
(1983) in order to test whether the port-focussed data describes a Poisson distribution.    
Fourthly, we show how empirical data of the terrorist incidents in ports and on vessels 
in ports can be used to predict the probability of future terrorist attacks of this nature 
and provide the model for port security risk with a coefficient of threat, though limited 
to terrorist incidents.   
Willis et al (2005) describe terrorist risk as “the expected consequence of an existent 
threat, which, for a given target, attack mode and damage type can be expressed as: 
Risk = P (attack occurs)  * P (attack results in damage | attack occurs)  * E (damage | 
attack occurs and results in damage)  
= Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence” 
This definition is not inconsistent with the new definition for port security risk as 
described in II.2 above.  In order to be able to estimate the terrorist risk, it is necessary 
                                   
19
 RAND Terrorism  I ncidents Database 
URL: ht tp: / / www.rand.org/ nsrd/ projects/ terror ism- incidents/  [ Accessed 23 April 
2010]  
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to be able to estimate the probability of the threat manifesting itself in an attack, the 
probability that the attack results in damage and an estimate of the expected damage 
that might follow.  Willis et al (2005) also state that if terrorist risks are independent, 
expected damages of a specific type can be aggregated by summing across threat 
types and target types.   
 
4.1.1. Modelling Terrorism Risk Using the Poisson Distribution 
Gleason (1980) modelled terrorism risk using the Poisson distribution and focused 
exclusively on acts of international terrorism in the United States which occurred 
between 1968 and 1974.  Gleason (1980) describes the Poisson distribution as a good 
model for occurrences such as terrorist events for three reasons: first, “the probability 
than an event of terrorism occurs during a time interval increases with the length of 
the time interval”; secondly, “the probability is almost negligible that two events of 
terrorism occurs will occur in a very small time interval” and thirdly, “events of 
terrorism which occur during one time interval are independent of those which occur 
in any other time interval”.   
The poisson distribution is described by equation 1:   ݌ሺܰ ൌ ݊ሻ ൌ ఒ೙௘షഊ௡!   (1) 
where n = number of occurrences of an event and λ = expected number of occurrences 
during a given time interval.   
The data in the RAND terrorism databases found in Jenkins et al (1983); Gardela and 
Hoffman (1990); Gardela and Hoffman (1991); Gardela and Hoffman (1992) and the 
online RAND database of terrorism incidents were analysed and only terrorist attacks 
in the maritime domain were recorded.  See appendix F for the complete list of 
maritime terrorist attacks.  These include attacks on port facilities as well as attacks on 
vessels while alongside at or at anchor in any port but excludes attacks on vessels that 
were not in a port or harbour.  A summary of the number of terrorist attacks in each 
year can be found in table 4.1.  The mean, λ=1.85, represents 74 attacks over 40 years 
from 1968 to 2007.  Performing the calculation in equation 1, the probabilities of the 
number of attacks in any given year are shown in table 4.2. 
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Year  
# 
Attack
s 
Year  
# 
Attack
s 
Year  
# 
Attack
s
Year  
# 
Attack
s
Year   # 
Attacks 
1968  2  1970  1  1980 3 1990 0 2000  1 
1969  0  1971  1  1981 2 1991 0 2001  1 
1972  2  1982 4 1992 0 2002  1 
1973  2  1983 2 1993 1 2003  2 
1974  6  1984 5 1994 1 2004  3 
1975  5  1985 2 1995 1 2005  1 
1976  3  1986 2 1996 2 2006  1 
1977  1  1987 3 1997 4 2007  2 
1978  2  1988 3 1998 0
1979  2  1989 0 1999 0
Table 4.1 – Number of worldwide maritime terrorist attacks in ports: years 1968-2007 
 
 
No of 
attacks  Probability 
Expected years 
in 40 years 
Actual years 
in 40 years 
0  0.157237166 6.289487 7
1  0.290888758 11.635550 11
2  0.269072101 10.762884 12
3  0.165927796 6.637112 5
4  0.076741605 3.069664 2
5  0.028394394 1.135776 2
6  0.008754938 0.350198 1
7  0.002313805 0.092552 0
8  0.000535067 0.021403 0
9  0.000109986 0.004399 0
10  2.03474E‐05 0.000814 0
Table 4.2 – Probabilities of a given number of attacks in a year in the maritime 
domain calculated using the Poisson distribution, the actual number of attacks and the 
expected number of attacks. 
 
Gleason (1980) hypothesised that the Poisson distribution was a good model for 
incidents of international terrorism in the United States and performed two goodness 
of fit tests, namely Chi-square and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to test the 
hypothesis.  Owing to the nature of his data, Gleason (1980) combined the ‘Number 
of Incidents’ classes in order to ensure a valid Chi-square test, to ensure that the 
expected frequency in each class was at least five.  Owing to this combination of 
classes, he decided to follow up with the K-S test as this “test treats individual 
observations separately; consequently, information is not lost through the combining 
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of categories”.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, specifically the one-sample K-S test, 
is a non-parametric test used to compare a sample distribution with a reference 
probability distribution, in this case, the Poisson distribution.  Gleason (1980) showed 
that the results of both the Chi-square and the K-S tests suggested that the Poisson 
distribution was a good model.  
Following Gleason’s (1980) example, it was decided to test the hypothesis that the 
Poisson distribution is a good model for the maritime terrorism attack data contained 
in column 4 of table 4.2.  However, in order to apply the Chi-square test, the data 
would have to be aggregated into three combinations and as this was the same 
problem that Gleason (1980) had encountered with the data on terror attacks on the 
United States, it was decided to apply the K-S goodness of fit test in isolation.  The K-
S test rejects the null hypothesis that the sample distribution is drawn from the (in this 
case) Poisson distribution if the Z-value is greater than the critical values in the one-
sample K-S test table in appendix G.  The results of the K-S test performed using 
SPSS are shown in table 4.3.    
 
Table 4.3 – Results of the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test from SPSS 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-value of 0.221 means that the data in column 4 of table 
4.2 describes a Poisson distribution as the K-S Z-value is critical at the alpha=0.01 
level.  This means that the probability of future terrorist incidents in ports or on 
vessels in ports can be modelled using the Poisson distribution and the data in table 
4.2.  
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
40
1.8500
.035
.033
-.035
.221
1.000
N
MeanPoisson Parametera,b
Absolute
Positive
Negative
Most Extreme
Differences
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
VAR00001
Test distribution is Poisson.a. 
Calculated from data.b. 
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The model for port security risk is based on Willis et al (2005), Gleason (1980) and 
the RAND terrorism database data in table 4.2. 
If jl is the loss (consequence) from an attack type j and the probability of the 
occurrence of jl is )( jlp and the vulnerability of the port facility from jl  is defined 
as )(1 ijsp where ijs is the ability of security system i to prevent jl , then it follows 
that the aggregate port security risk is jijj
n
i
m
j
lsplp   ))(1()(1 1  (2) 
for n security systems against m different types of security incident.  Furthermore, we 
can use Poisson to calculate )( jlp for any given terminal.  However, this requires two 
assumptions: first, that each terrorist attack is independent and secondly, that each 
port facility is equally likely to be attacked.   
The probability for n attacks in a given year )100(  n  is shown in table 4.2 and 
what is required for our model is the probability of 1 or more attacks in any year.  
This is calculated by summing the probabilities of n attacks where 101  n .   The 
probabilities of n>10 were disregarded as they are very small and unlikely to affect 
the overall result. 
Given that there are 4339 ports in the world20, if we were to model the probability of 
one or more attacks in any year on one of those port facilities with λ=1.85, the 
probability would be 0.000426355 (see equation 3).    
000426355.0
4339
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1
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The resulting model for port security terrorism risk is shown in equation 4. 
jij
n
i
m
j
lsptyRiskPortSecuri    ))(1(000426355.0 1 1  (4) 
                                   
20
 < URL: ht tp: / / www.ports.com>  [ Accessed 23 April 2010]  
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While this model holds for the assumption that each port is equally likely to be 
attacked, it can be improved by obtaining the subjective assessment (expert opinion) 
of a terrorism underwriter regarding the terrorism risks in ports in different countries 
around the world.   
 
4.2 Portfolio Optimization Analysis of Port Facilities’ Security Systems 
The port facility is considered to consist of a portfolio of security systems and a 
portfolio optimization exercise is performed to construct the theoretical portfolio of 
security systems which performs best to reduce, in turn, security risk and cost.   
4.2.1. Portfolio Optimization 
The parallels that exist between investing in a port facility’s security systems and a 
stock portfolio as described in section 2.2 above mean that it is possible to perform 
portfolio optimization to discover, for any k port facilities which consist of i security 
systems, the optimum combination of the security systems drawn from any of the port 
facilities which either minimise the residual risk or the security investment.  In our 
industry example, there are 216 possible different combinations of the six port 
facilities’ three security systems which can be examined and compared to the original 
portfolios of security systems in each of the six port facilities on the basis of how the 
alternative portfolios reduce the residual risk for the given security investment.   
The 216 possible different combinations of the six port facilities’ three security 
systems are each labelled as a portfolio as follows:   
•  Port facility A becomes port facility 1 
•  Port facility B becomes port facility 2 
•  Port facility C becomes port facility 3 
•  Port facility D becomes port facility 4 
•  Port facility E becomes port facility 5 
•  Port facility F becomes port facility 6 
The three security systems are defined as follows: 
•  Access Control - A 
•  Biometrics - B 
•  Detection - D  
72 
 
The change in the labelling is necessary to avoid a clash and potential confusion 
between, say, port facility A and access control system A.  Therefore, the port 
facilities adopt a numerical format for the purposes of the portfolio optimization 
exercise. 
 
The portfolio of 216 possible combinations of the 6 port facilities and 3 security 
systems is listed in appendix E.  The main portfolios are the actual portfolios of the 
port facilities themselves: 
•  Port facility A = A1-B1-D1 (portfolio #1) 
•  Port facility B = A2-B2-D2 (portfolio #44) 
•  Port facility C = A3-B3-D3 (portfolio #87) 
•  Port facility D = A4-B4-D4 (portfolio #130) 
•  Port facility E = A5-B5-D5 (portfolio #173) 
•  Port facility F = A6-B6-D6 (portfolio #216) 
 
The performance of the security systems of each port facility’s actual portfolio of 
security systems is compared with the 215 alternative portfolios and their residual 
security risk is calculated using equation 2, where for each port facility, the 
probability of an attack remains the same, as do the consequences of a loss, but the 
vulnerability of the port facility to security risk will vary as the portfolio of security 
systems vary.  Furthermore, as each of the 215 alternative portfolios are modelled for 
each port facility, there will be differences in cost of the 215 alternatives to the status 
quo.  Therefore, the analysis looks for alternative portfolios where both the residual 
risk and the security investment can be reduced.  The best alternative portfolios which 
result in both the greatest reduction in residual security risk and the smallest security 
investment are presented in the findings chapter. 
 
4.2.2. The Application of Markowitz Portfolio Selection Theory 
In this section the adoption of Markowitz theory of portfolio selection to port security 
is described, beginning with the mechanics of the cross-disciplinary adoption of the 
theory and concluding with a discussion of the relevant assumptions and limitations of 
the adoption in practice.  Markowitz theory of portfolio selection is adopted to 
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discover the portfolio of a port facility’s security systems which describe the 
Markowitz risk-return efficient frontier.  The risk-return equivalents in this research 
are the standard deviation and expected performance of the port facility’s portfolio of 
security systems.  The application of Markowitz theory is subsequently applied to the 
port security risk model in a simulation to identify how efficient portfolios can reduce 
a port facility’s residual security risk.     
The application of Markowitz theory of portfolio selection is achieved by considering 
a port facility’s security systems as securities in an investment portfolio and ex-post 
the application of Markowitz theory, altering the security investment strategy among 
the security systems in order to maximise the portfolio’s performance (return) while 
minimising the risk (in this case, standard deviation).  The data that is generated 
reflects the arrangement of security systems which results in a reduction in the port 
facility’s residual security risk for the same investment as ex-ante the application of 
Markowitz theory.  However, it is necessary to point out the difference between 
trading in financial assets and assets such as security systems.  While Markowitz 
theory was developed for the efficient investment in stocks and shares for a given 
level of risk, it is necessary to recognise that there is no market for the trading in a 
port facility’s security systems.  In these circumstances, tradeability is not applicable 
as ownership of port security systems lies with the port facility’s owners, is not 
publically traded and knowledge of the subjective assessments of the performance of 
security systems is not publically available.  Furthermore, such a market would be 
constrained by liquidity issues.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that the mechanics 
of portfolio selection cannot be applied in the field of port security.However, there are 
some assumptions which must be made for this approach to work.  The first is that the 
assets in a portfolio must be sufficiently diversified, that is to say that they should not 
be perfectly or too closely correlated in their performance.  The second assumption is 
than an increase in investment in a security system will result in an improvement in its 
performance as part of a portfolio of security systems in a port facility.  That is to say 
that investment diverted from an underperforming security system to one which 
performs favourably in comparison will result in a better performance of the portfolio 
as a whole.  
Another assumption is that while the probability distribution of terrorist attacks on 
ports (from 1968-2007, as demonstrated earlier in this study) follows a Poisson 
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distribution, the performance of the security systems themselves in the face of terrorist 
threats is not Poisson, but is normally distributed.  However, it is important to 
highlight that there is no evidence in this research which suggests that terrorist attacks 
against non-port targets follow a Poisson distribution and that there may well be 
patterns in terrorism events which cannot be explained by a Poisson distribution.  
Further research needs to be done in order to shed light on potential probability 
distributions of non-port terrorism. 
This is not an unrealistic assumption yet it is essential for a valid application of 
Markowitz theory.  Furthermore, the risk-return efficient frontier in this research is 
not directly concerned with the risk of a terrorist attack but with the risk (in the form 
of the standard deviation) of the performance of the port facility’s security systems in 
the face of the prescribed security threats.  These two concepts of risk are separate and 
it is important to make the distinction because we have shown that maritime terrorist 
attacks on ports and on vessels in ports follow a Poisson distribution but that the 
performance of security systems themselves are more likely to follow a normal 
distribution. 
The mechanics behind the calculation of a port facility’s residual security risk is set 
out below, followed by the methodology for applying Markowitz portfolio selection 
theory to the performance of the security systems: 
In order to apply Markowitz (1952) theory of portfolio selection to each portfolio or 
security systems, it is necessary to calculate the following for each port facility:  the expected performance of the ith security system as shown in equation 5.
         (5) 
 the standard deviation of the performance of the ith security system  
   the correlations between the performances of the ith and jth security systems in 
each port facility , yielding the covariances between the ith and jth security 
systems in each port facililty as shown in equation 6:   
 (6)  
 
The correlations between the performances of the security systems can be calculated 
using standard statistical software such as in Excel or SPSS but the key is that expert 
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opinion is required to make subjecting quantitative assessments of the performance of 
a particular security system in the face of various prescribed security incidents.  
Another security system’s performance will vary in the face of the same prescribed set 
of security incidents and these two sets of subjective quantitative performance 
assessments can be compared and their correlations subsequently calculated.   
The expected return E(R) of the security portfolio for each port facility is the 
weighted sum of the expected return from each of the security systems and is shown 
in equation 7, where is the proportion invested in the ith security system 
         (7) 
The variance V(R) of the security portfolio is shown in equation 8 with the variance 
of the ith security system  calculated as follows:  
     (8) 
       
The next step is to calculate the standard deviation  as in equation 9 thus: 
     (9) 
and then to minimise it subject to the following constraints.  
       
 
However, it is not necessary to follow the mechanical methodology as set out in 
Byrne and Lee (1994) as it is now possible to purchase software which calculates the 
Markowitz risk-return efficient frontier.  The software used to calculate the 
Markowitz risk-return efficient frontier is VisualMvo version 1.6 by Efficient 
Solutions Inc.  
There are two stages to the execution of the software: the data input stage and the 
calculation stage.  In the data input stage, the first operation is to set up a record for 
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each of the three security systems: access control, biometrics and detection.  For each 
record there are five fields which require populating.  They are: 
1. the mean of the performance of the security system 
2. the standard deviation of the performance of the security system 
3. the correlation of the performance of the security system with the 
performances of the other two security systems 
4. A minimum constraint 
5. A maximum constraint 
The minimum and maximum constraints represent the constraints that are imposed on 
the proportion of the overall port facility’s security investment on any one security 
system.  For example, if no minimum constraint is applied to any of the security 
systems, the application of Markowitz theory of portfolio selection may result in the 
algorithm selecting a single security system solution to secure the port facility 
efficiently.  Furthermore, there are two problems with a ‘no minimum’ constraint 
approach.  First, it is contrary to the principle of a portfolio of security systems to 
counteract the prescribed security incidents by employing only one security solution.  
Secondly, it would be in breach of the principles of the ISPS Code which prescribes 
the application of different types of security equipment in order to comply with the 
Code.  In view of this, it was decided that a minimum security investment constraint 
of 5% of the overall security budget for each port facility would be applied to each 
security system in the application of Markowitz theory of portfolio selection.       
 
A simulation of the port security model and the application of Markowitz theory is set 
out below.  Recalling equation 4, in order to calculate the security risk, it is necessary 
to arrive at estimates for the performance of the security systems in the face of 
prescribed security incidents.  In the simulation it is assumed that there are three 
security systems: access control, biometrics and detection in a given port facility.  The 
simulation includes one type of terrorist attack: a bomb planted in the engine room of 
a container vessel moored alongside the port facility.  The occurrence of the security 
incident would cause the engine room and subsequently the vessel and half the 
containers to catch fire and sink at the mooring.  Vessel and cargo damage, wreck 
removal and business interruption to the port facility is estimated to total 
$100,000,000.  The probability of the attack is taken to be the threat coefficient in 
equation 4.  Therefore, in the absence of any security systems, i.e. with the port 
77 
 
facility’s vulnerability set equal to 1, the port security risk is $100,000,000 * 
0.0426355% = $42,635.50.    
In order to calculate the residual security risk, estimated for the performances of the 
three security systems are made.  They are set out in table 4.4.  Furthermore, estimates 
of how the performances of the security systems are correlated are set out in table 4.5.  
This is necessary in order to be able to plot the Markowitz risk-return efficient 
frontier.  
 
Security 
System Performance
Standard 
deviation
Access 
Control 80% 20% 
Biometrics 60% 10% 
Detection 40% 8% 
Table 4.4 – Port security simulation: estimates of the performance of the security 
systems 
 
The figures for the performances in table 4.4 represent the probability that each 
security solution will, independently, prevent the occurrence of the security incident.  
Taken together, these performance figures represent the port facility’s vulnerability to 
attack and the higher the performance figures, the lower the vulnerability. 
 
 
Table 4.5 – Port security simulation: estimates of the correlations of the performance 
of the security systems 
 
The data in tables 4.4 and 4.5 are used to plot the expected return-standard deviation 
efficient frontier for the port facility’s security systems, as shown in chart 4.1.  The 
result tells us that in order to achieve the maximum return for the performance of the 
security systems of 77.00%, it is necessary to tolerate a level of risk reflected in the 
standard deviation of 18.49%.  This is achieved by investing 90% of the port security 
budget in the access control system and 5% in both the biometrics and detection 
systems. 
Correlations Access Control Biometrics Detection
Access 
Control 1 0.75 0.25
Biometrics 0.75 1 0.5
Detection 0.25 0.5 1
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However, it is also possible to achieve a much more modest level of performance in 
the security systems but at lower level of risk that the systems fail to perform as they 
should.  The corresponding figures for performance and standard deviation are 
46.12% and 7.68% respectively.  This is achieved by investing 5% of the port security 
budget in access control, 20.6% in biometrics and 74.4% in detection systems. 
What this means in practice is that the company security officer may decide to 
rearrange the security investments in order to suit his or her appetite for risk.  A 
higher risk security investment strategy would be allocate the majority of the security 
budget to access control measures in order to benefit from a higher mean performance 
while accepting the accompanying risk that the performance level has a higher 
standard deviation.  A lower risk security investment strategy would be one where the 
majority of the security investment is directed towards detection systems and the 
biometrics: while the overall performance may be less, the security officer has the 
knowledge that the performance of the security systems has a lower standard 
deviation.    One way in which the company security officer might settle on a 
particular strategy would be to evaluate the performance / cost-benefit ratios of the 
two security strategies and decide accordingly at which point along the efficient 
frontier should the company’s security strategy be based. 
From equation 4, the port security risk when the performances of the security systems 
are maximised is $9,806.17 and when the standard deviation is minimised, the 
corresponding figure for the port security risk is $22,972.01.   
It is important to note that these two solutions represent the extremes of the efficient 
solutions which can be obtained and that all the points along the line in chart 4.1 are 
efficient, each point representing a different portfolio of the three security systems 
with corresponding results for expected performance and risk that the security 
solutions do not perform as they should to mitigate the security threatIn the next 
chapter, both the Markowitz theory of portfolio selection and the portfolio 
optimization method as described above will be applied to the data gathered in the 
research.   
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Chart 4.1 – Port security simulation: the expected return – standard deviation efficient 
frontier for the performance of the security systems 
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1 Access Control 90.00%
2 Biometrics 5.00%
3 Detection 5.00%
Standard deviation 18.49%
Expected return 77.00%
Maximum Expected Return
1 Access Control 5.00%
2 Biometrics 20.60%
3 Detection 74.40%
Standard deviation 7.68%
Expected return 46.12%
Minimum Standard Deviation
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Chapter 5 – Findings 
The chapter begins with the estimates for physical damage and business interruption 
to Port facility A resulting from the prescribed security incidents from the interview 
with the Director of Security on 24 March 2009.  As has already been mentioned, the 
data for the insured values of port facility Equipment and infrastructure was provided 
by the Director of Security only for port facility A.  Therefore, estimates of the 
equivalent figures for the other terminals were extrapolated based on the quay length 
and number of quay cranes in the other terminals. The data for the insured values is 
not subject to any excess which may be applicable for each and every loss or in the 
aggregate.  This is because the use of insurance data is intended as a guide for 
potential loss in US Dollar terms for each of the prescribed security incidents. 
Subsequently, each port facility is presented in turn.  The findings for each port 
facility consist of four data tables and a chart showing the expected performance-
standard deviation efficient frontier.  The first table contains the estimates of physical 
damage, business interruption and the expected gross loss to the port facility 
following the seven prescribed security incidents.  The table includes the 
underwriter’s assessment of the probability of the occurrence of the security incident.  
In the first table, the expected loss of each security incident is calculated as the 
product of the combined physical damage and business interruption amounts and the 
probability of occurrence.   
The second table shows the company security officer’s subjective assessment of the 
performance of the port facility’s security systems (access control, biometrics and 
detection) in the face of the prescribed security scenarios.   The table includes the 
means and standard deviations of the performances of each security system.   
The third table shows the calculation of the port facility’s residual risk after the 
application of security measures.  The fourth table contains the correlations of the 
performances of the port facility’s security systems.  Correlations that are significant 
at the 0.01 or 0.05 level are marked accordingly.   
It is appropriate to mention at this juncture one key assumption, namely that security 
investment diverted from an underperforming security system to one which performs 
better will result in an overall improvement in the performance of the portfolio of 
security systems as a whole.  This is, after all, one of the key tenets of portfolio 
theory.   
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Next, the portfolio optimization is performed which examines the performances of the 
216 possible portfolios consisting of the three security systems across the six port 
facilities.  The chapter concludes with an explanation for the clustering effect 
encountered in the portfolio optimization; and then presents the data gathered from a 
follow-up telephone interview with the second CSO which is used to calculate 
Cronbach’s measure for data reliability (Cronbach, 1951; Forza, 2002).  
 
5.1 Estimates for Physical Loss and Business Interruption from the 
Prescribed Security Incidents 
In this section the estimates for physical loss and business interruption from the seven 
different prescribed security threats are presented.  For each prescribed security 
incident the potential losses of physical damage and business interruption are 
estimated in US$ terms and consideration is given to the likely location and severity 
of each prescribed security incident within the port facility. 
For the bomb introduced by person on foot, The Director of Security estimated that 
the physical loss would be $5,375,000, with a breakdown by area of loss in table 5.1.  
This consists chiefly of destruction of the security hut and main security gate with 
replacement costs of biometric equipment and a certain amount of damage to the 
CCTV systems.  It also contains a figure for other unspecified infrastructure damage.  
The total business interruption figure he estimated to be $10,000,000: representing 
$5,000,000 from business interruption and $5,000,000 from increased direct and 
indirect insurance costs. 
 
security hut                             250,000  
main security gate                              50,000  
Biometrics                              50,000  
CCTV systems                              25,000  
Infrastructure                          5,000,000  
                           5,375,000  
Table 5.1 – Estimated physical loss arising from a bomb introduced by foot 
 
For the car bomb, he estimated that the physical loss would be $36,769,695, with a 
breakdown by area of loss in table 5.2.  This consists chiefly of destruction of the 
security hut and main security gate with replacement costs of biometric equipment 
and a certain amount of damage to the CCTV systems.  It also contains a figure for 
the destruction of the operations building and a figure for other unspecified 
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infrastructure damage.  The total business interruption figure he estimated to be 
$45,000,000, representing $30,000,000 business interruption and $15,000,000 in 
increased direct and indirect insurance costs. 
 
security hut                             250,000  
main security gate                              50,000  
Biometrics                              50,000  
CCTV systems                              25,000  
Operations building                        11,394,695  
Infrastructure                        25,000,000  
                         36,769,695  
Table 5.2 – Estimated physical loss arising from a car bomb 
 
For the truck bomb, he estimated that the physical loss would be $125,012,575, with a 
breakdown by area of loss in table 5.3.  This consists chiefly of destruction of the 
security hut and main security gate with replacement costs of biometric equipment 
and a certain amount of damage to the CCTV systems.  It also contains a figure for 
the destruction of the operations building and extensive damage to the wharf and 
cargo handling equipment.  The total business interruption figure he estimated to be 
$92,112,118 representing $62,122,118 business interruption and $30,000,000 in 
increased direct and indirect insurance costs. 
 
security hut                             250,000  
main security gate                              50,000  
Biometrics                              50,000  
CCTV systems                              25,000  
Operations building                        11,394,695  
Wharf                        32,318,501  
Cargo handling equip                        80,924,379  
                       125,012,575  
Table 5.3 – Estimated physical loss arising from a truck bomb 
For a biological agent attack on the terminal on foot, he estimated that the loss would 
be $16,902,973 which chiefly consists of total loss of the main security gate, security 
hut, operations building and its contents and a figure for the replacement of biometric 
equipment.  While the loss is not physical in terms of blast damage, it is deemed that 
the loss is of such a nature that replacement or demolition and reconstruction may be 
required.  The total business interruption figure he estimated to be $102,112,118 
representing $62,122,118 business interruption; $30,000,000 in increased direct and 
indirect insurance costs; and an additional $10,000,000 cost for decontamination. 
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Security hut                             250,000  
Main security gate                              50,000  
Biometrics                              50,000  
Building contents                          5,158,278  
Operations building                        11,394,695  
                         16,902,973  
Table 5.4 – Estimated loss arising from a biological agent attack on the terminal on foot 
 
For a biological agent attack on the terminal by car, he estimated that the physical 
damage loss would be $87,432,657 which chiefly consists of total loss of the main 
security gate, security hut, operations building and its contents and a figure for the 
replacement of biometric equipment.  While the loss is not physical in terms of blast 
damage, it is deemed that the loss is of such a nature that replacement or demolition 
and reconstruction may be required.  The total business interruption figure he 
estimated to be $122,112,118 representing $62,122,118 business interruption; 
$30,000,000 in increased direct and indirect insurance costs; and an additional 
$30,000,000 cost for decontamination. 
 
security hut                              50,000  
main security gate                              50,000  
biometrics                              50,000  
Building contents                          5,158,278  
Wharf                          1,000,000  
Cargo handling equip                        80,924,379  
  
                       87,432,657  
Table 5.5 – Estimated loss arising from a biological agent attack on the terminal by car 
 
For the mining of port infrastructure, he estimated a physical damage loss of 
$56,000,000 being $16,000,000 damage to the wharf and $40,000,000 damage to 
cargo handling equipment, based on a blast radius of 300 metres.  The total figure for 
business interruption is $92,122,118 consisting of a business interruption loss of 
$62,122,118 and increased direct and indirect insurance costs of $30,000,000. 
 
For the vessel attacked by a suicide boat, he estimated a physical damage loss of 
damage of $113,242,880 being $32,318,501 damage to the wharf and $80,924,379 
damage to cargo handling equipment, effectively a total loss.  The total figure for 
business interruption is $122,122,118 consisting of a business interruption loss of 
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$62,122,118; increased direct and indirect insurance costs of $30,000,000; and a 
wreck removal expense of $30,000,000. 
 
While the data for the insured values of the wharfs and cargo handling equipment of 
the other port facilities can be estimated through extrapolation, the figures for 
business interruption are difficult to quantify.  In theory it could be feasible to 
extrapolate the business interruption figures based on the TEU throughput of the port 
facility but as port facility charges, profit margins and other unknowns are at play, it 
was felt that pure extrapolation could potentially introduce further errors into the data.  
Therefore, it was decided that the figures for business interruption across all the port 
facilities would remain the same as for the data for port facility A.  While this is not 
ideal, it is the gap in the empirical data which has necessitated this approach.   
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5.2 Port Facility A 
 
The estimates for the physical damage, business interruption and expected gross loss 
for port facility A are in table 5.6.  The port facility is rated by the underwriters to 
have the highest terrorist risk of all of the port facilities in this study.  The probability 
assigned to a possible terrorist attack on the container terminal at 0.522% is 34 times 
greater than the equivalent figure for port facility B.  This high figure for the 
probability of a terrorist attack results in a large figure for the expected loss, in the 
absence of any security measures, being $5,525,216 on an annualised basis.   
 
 
 
Table 5.6 –Port facility A estimates of physical damage, business interruption and gross expected loss 
 
 
Security Systems’ Performance 
The access control measures (see table 5.7) have a mean performance of 72.86% 
which is the second highest among the six terminals and a standard deviation of 
15.77% which is the second lowest among the terminals.  The access control measures 
are also the cheapest of the six terminals, being $187,826.  The biometric systems 
have a mean performance of 63.57% which is the fourth highest and a standard 
deviation of 43.47% which is also the fourth highest among the terminals.  The 
biometric systems are also the third cheapest at $33,637, compared with the other 
systems.  Of the detection systems, the mean performance is 68.57% which is the 
second highest and the standard deviation of 12.82% is the second lowest compared 
with the five other terminals.  The cost of the detection systems at $261,999 are also 
the second cheapest of the detection systems across the six terminals.  Overall, the 
access control and detection systems compare very favourably on both performance 
and cost when compared with the other terminals.   
Port Facility A Infrastructure Damage and Business Interruption Expected Loss
Type of Security Incident Physical damage Business interruption Total $ ProbabilityExpected Loss
Bomb introduced by person on foot 5,375,000              10,000,000                   15,375,000          0.522% 80,258         
Car Bomb 36,769,695            45,000,000                   81,769,695          0.522% 426,838       
Truck bomb 125,012,575          92,122,118                   217,134,693        0.522% 1,133,443     
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 16,902,973            102,122,118                 119,025,091        0.522% 621,311       
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 87,432,657            122,122,118                 209,554,775        0.522% 1,093,876     
Mining of port infrastructure 56,000,000            92,122,118                   148,122,118        0.522% 773,197       
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 113,242,880          122,122,118                 235,364,998        0.522% 1,228,605     
1,026,346,370      Total 5,357,528     
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Table 5.7 – Port facility A security system performances, including means and standard deviations 
 
Security Performance Ratios 
Two ratios are now introduced for port security: a benefit-cost ratio and a residual risk 
: expected loss ratio. 
The application of the security measures results in a reduction in the expected loss of 
$3,444,899 to $1,912,629.  Given that the overall expenditure on security is $483,462, 
the residual risk reduction : security expenditure (benefit-cost) ratio is 7.13.  This 
means that for every $1 spent on security, the residual security risk is reduced by 
$7.13.  
The residual risk : expected loss ratios for the different types of security incident are 
lowest for the truck bomb and the biological agent attack by vehicle at 16.7% (see 
table 5.8).  This means that the terminal is best placed to thwart attacks of that type 
compared to the other types of security incident. 
 
 
Table 5.8 –Port facility A residual security risk calculations 
Port Facility A Residual Risk Calculations
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection Total
 Residual 
Risk/Expected 
Loss 
Bomb introduced by person on foot 5,351                      2,675          6,688         14,714       18.3%
Car Bomb 28,456                     14,228        35,570       78,254       18.3%
Truck bomb 56,672                     56,672        75,563       188,907      16.7%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 41,421                     20,710        51,776       113,907      18.3%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 54,694                     36,463        91,156       182,313      16.7%
Mining of port infrastructure 128,866                   257,732      128,866      515,465      66.7%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 204,768                   409,535      204,768      819,070      66.7%
Residual Risk 520,227                   798,016      594,387      1,912,629   
Security Cost 187,826                   33,637        261,999      483,462      
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Markowitz Portfolio Analysis 
Recalling the Markowitz methodology as set out in section 4.2.1, the application of 
Markowitz theory of portfolio selection requires the calculation of the expected 
performance of the ith security system; the standard deviation of the performance of 
the ith security system; and the correlations between the performances of the ith and jth 
security systems in each port facility, which yields the covariances between them.   
The correlations between the security systems are set out in table 5.9.  All of them are 
positive and significant at the 0.01 level.   
 
 
Correlations  
 Access Control   Biometrics   Detection  
                  1.000   0.985**  0.992** 
 Access Control  
 0.985**           1.000  0.983** 
 Biometrics  
 0.992**   0.983**          1.000 
 Detection  
**Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 5.9 – Port facility A security system performance correlations 
 
The Markowitz efficient frontier is calculated from the data in tables 5.7 and 5.9 and 
the efficient expected return-standard deviation frontier is plotted in chart 5.1.  The 
application of Markowitz theory yields a maximum expected return of 72.18% with a 
standard deviation of 16.97%.  This is based on 90% of the security spend being 
invested in access control measures with 5% respectively invested in biometrics and 
detection.  This results in a revised figure for the residual risk of $1,490,464, which is 
a reduction of $422,165. 
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Chart 5.1 – Markowitz expected return-standard deviation efficient frontier for Port 
Facility A 
 
The results of the minimum standard deviation with accompanying expected return 
are 68.53% for the performance and the figure for the standard deviation is 14.46%.  
This is derived by diverting 90% of the security spend on detection with only 5% 
investment in both access control measures and biometrics.  This results in a revised 
figure for the residual risk of $1,686,014 which is a reduction of $226,615. 
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1 Access Control 90.00%
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3 Detection 5.00%
Standard deviation 16.97%
Expected return 72.18%
Maximum Expected Return
1 Access Control 5.00%
2 Biometrics 5.00%
3 Detection 90.00%
Standard deviation 14.46%
Expected return 68.53%
Minimum Standard Deviation
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5.3 Port Facility B  
The port facility is rated by the underwriters to have the lowest terrorist risk of all of 
the port facilities in this study.  The probability assigned to a possible terrorist attack 
on the container terminal is just 0.0152%.  This low figure for the probability of a 
terrorist attack results in a low figure for the expected loss, in the absence of any 
security measures, being $160,888 an annualised basis.  The estimates for the physical 
damage, business interruption and expected gross loss for port facility B are in table 
5.10.   
 
 
Table 5.10 – Port facility B estimates of physical damage, business interruption and gross expected loss 
 
The detection systems for waterborne attack scenarios are more sophisticated than in 
other terminals.  The company has recently installed cameras along the quay walls 
which are linked to the local port authority and are used by the terminal as a security 
detection measure and by the port authority to supplement their traffic management 
systems.  The terminal’s main concern had been the prevention of canoeists who 
frequent the channel from landing at the port facility.  Furthermore, the high level of 
detection rates results from a reciprocal use of port authority cameras by the port 
facility and also the fact that the port facility Authority will warn the terminal before 
an attempt has been made to gain access to the terminal.     
From the point of view of the access control measures concerning the seaward attacks 
scenarios, the access control measure results of 50% reflect the presence of the 
waterborne patrols by local coast guard. 
 
Security Systems’ Performance 
The access control measures (see table 5.11) have a mean performance of 76.43% 
which is the highest among the six terminals and a standard deviation of 18.42% 
which is the third lowest among the terminals.  The cost of the access control 
Port Facility B Infrastructure Damage and Business Interruption Expected Loss
Type of Security Incident Physical damage Business interruption Total $ ProbabilityExpected Loss
Bomb introduced by person on foot 5,375,000              10,000,000                   15,375,000          0.0152% 2,337           
Car Bomb 36,769,695            45,000,000                   81,769,695          0.0152% 12,429         
Truck bomb 125,012,575          92,122,118                   217,134,693        0.0152% 33,004         
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 11,744,695            97,122,118                   108,866,813        0.0152% 16,548         
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 92,472,157            132,122,118                 224,594,275        0.0152% 34,138         
Mining of port infrastructure 113,242,880          92,122,118                   205,364,998        0.0152% 31,215         
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 113,242,880          92,122,118                   205,364,998        0.0152% 31,215         
1,058,470,472      Total 160,888       
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measures are also the third highest of the six terminals, being $715,000.  The 
biometric systems have a mean performance of 65.71% which is the third highest and 
a standard deviation of 45.04% which is also the third highest among the terminals.  
The biometric systems are the second cheapest at $8,000, compared with the other 
systems.  Of the detection systems, the mean performance is 87.86% which is the 
highest and the standard deviation of 7.56% is the lowest compared with the five other 
terminals.  The cost of the detection systems at $2,756,325 is by far the greatest 
amount spent on detection systems across the six terminals.  Overall, the access 
control and detection systems compare very favourably on performance but not 
necessarily on cost when compared with the other terminals.   
 
 
Table 5.11 – Port facility B security system performances, including means and standard deviations 
 
Security Performance Ratios 
The application of the security measures results in a reduction in the expected loss of 
$113,389 to $47,499.  Given that the overall expenditure on security is $3,479,325, 
the residual risk reduction : security expenditure ratio is 0.0325.  This means that for 
every $1 spent on security, the residual security risk is reduced by $0.0325.  
The residual risk : expected loss ratios for the different types of security incident are 
lowest for the bomb introduced by person on foot, the car bomb and the biological 
agent attack on foot at 6.7% (see table 5.12).  This means that the terminal is best 
placed to thwart attacks of this type compared to the other types of security incident. 
 
 
Port Facility B Security system performance
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection
Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 95%
Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%
Truck bomb 80% 85% 80%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 95%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 90%
Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%
Mean 76.43% 65.71% 87.86%
Standard deviation 18.42% 45.04% 7.56%
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Table 5.12 –Port facility B residual security risk calculations 
 
Markowitz Portfolio Analysis 
The correlations between the security systems are set out in table 5.13.  The 
correlations of the performances of access control and biometrics are positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level while the correlations of the performances of access 
control and detection and biometrics and detection are positive and significant at the 
0.05 level.   
 
Correlations  
 Access Control   Biometrics   Detection  
                  1.000   0.993**  0.834* 
 Access Control  
 0.993**           1.000  0.764* 
 Biometrics  
 0.834*   0.764*          1.000 
 Detection  
**Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table 5.13 – Port facility B security system performance correlations 
 
The Markowitz efficient frontier is calculated from the data in tables 5.11 and 5.13 
and the efficient expected return-standard deviation frontier is plotted in chart 5.2.  
The application of Markowitz theory yields only one solution: an expected return of 
86.18% with a standard deviation of 9.5%.  This is based on 90% of the security 
spend being invested in detection measures with 5% respectively invested in access 
control and biometrics.  This results in a revised figure for the residual risk of 
$22,235, which is a reduction of $25,264. 
 
 
 
Port Facility B Residual Risk Calculations
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection Total
 Residual 
Risk/Expected 
Loss 
Bomb introduced by person on foot 78                           39              39              156            6.7%
Car Bomb 414                         207             207            829            6.7%
Truck bomb 2,200                      1,650          2,200         6,051         18.3%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 552                         276             276            1,103         6.7%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 1,707                      1,138          1,138         3,983         11.7%
Mining of port infrastructure 5,203                      10,405        2,081         17,689       56.7%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 5,203                      10,405        2,081         17,689       56.7%
Residual Risk 15,356                     24,120        8,022         47,499       
Security Cost 715,000                   8,000          2,756,325   3,479,325   
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Chart 5.2 – Markowitz expected return-standard deviation efficient frontier for Port 
Facility B 
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5.4 Port facility C 
 
The port facility is rated by the underwriter to have a probably of 0.018% for the 
occurrence of any of the prescribed security incidents.  The resulting figure for the 
gross expected loss to the port facility without any security measures being in place is 
$223,878. 
The estimates for the physical damage, business interruption and expected gross loss 
for port facility C are shown in table 5.14.   
 
 
Table 5.14 – Port facility C estimates of physical damage, business interruption and gross expected loss 
 
Security Systems’ Performance 
The access control measures (see table 5.15) have a mean performance of 59.29% 
which is the third highest among the six terminals and a standard deviation of 40.56% 
which is the second highest among the terminals.  The cost of the access control 
measures are also the third lowest of the six terminals, being $412,734.  The biometric 
systems have a mean performance of 66.43% which is the second highest and a 
standard deviation of 45.43% which is also the second highest among the terminals.  
The biometric systems are the cheapest by far at $2,680, compared with the other 
systems.  Of the detection systems, the mean performance is 51.43% which is the 
third highest and the standard deviation of 35.20% is the second lowest compared 
with the five other terminals.  The cost of the detection systems at $51,538 is also the 
cheapest across the six terminals.  Overall, the biometric systems compare very 
favourably on both performance and cost when compared with the other terminals and 
the detection systems compare fairly well on both performance and cost.   
 
Port Facility C Infrastructure Damage and Business Interruption Expected Loss
Type of Security Incident Physical damage Business interruption Total $ ProbabilityExpected Loss
Bomb introduced by person on foot 5,375,000              10,000,000                   15,375,000          0.018% 2,768           
Car Bomb 36,769,695            45,000,000                   81,769,695          0.018% 14,719         
Truck bomb 176,226,244          92,122,118                   268,348,362        0.018% 48,303         
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 11,744,695            97,122,118                   108,866,813        0.018% 19,596         
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 124,126,575          132,122,118                 256,248,693        0.018% 46,125         
Mining of port infrastructure 164,456,549          92,122,118                   256,578,667        0.018% 46,184         
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 164,456,549          92,122,118                   256,578,667        0.018% 46,184         
Total 223,878       
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Table 5.15 – Port facility C security system performances, including means and standard deviations 
 
Security Performance Ratios 
The application of the security measures results in a reduction in the expected loss of 
$109,860 to $114,018.  Given that the overall expenditure on security is $466,952, the 
residual risk reduction : security expenditure ratio is 0.235.  This means that for every 
$1 spent on security, the residual security risk is reduced by $0.235.  
The residual risk : expected loss ratios for the different types of security incident are 
lowest for the car and the biological agent attack by vehicle at 15.0% (see table 5.16).  
This means that the terminal is best placed to thwart attacks of this type compared to 
the other types of security incident. 
 
 
Table 5.16 – Port facility C residual security risk calculations 
 
 
Markowitz Portfolio Analysis 
The correlations between the security systems are set out in table 5.17.  All of them 
are positive and significant at the 0.01 level.   
Port Facility C Security system performance
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection
Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 70%
Car Bomb 85% 95% 75%
Truck bomb 85% 95% 70%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 70%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%
Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 0%
Mean 59.29% 66.43% 51.43%
Standard deviation 40.56% 45.43% 35.20%
Port Facility C Residual Risk Calculations
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection Total
 Residual 
Risk/Expected 
Loss 
Bomb introduced by person on foot 185                         92              277            554            20.0%
Car Bomb 736                         245             1,227         2,208         15.0%
Truck bomb 2,415                      805             4,830         8,050         16.7%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 1,306                      653             1,960         3,919         20.0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 2,306                      769             3,844         6,919         15.0%
Mining of port infrastructure 15,395                     15,395        15,395       46,184       100.0%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 15,395                     15,395        15,395       46,184       100.0%
Residual Risk 37,738                     33,354        42,926       114,018      
Security Cost 412,734                   2,680          51,538       466,952      
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Correlations  
 Access Control   Biometrics   Detection  
                  1.000   1.000**  0.999** 
 Access Control  
 1.000**           1.000  .0999** 
 Biometrics  
 0.999**   0.999**          1.000 
 Detection  
**Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 5.17 – Port facility C security system performance correlations 
 
 
 
The Markowitz efficient frontier is calculated from the data in tables 5.15 and 5.17 
and the efficient expected return-standard deviation frontier is plotted in chart 5.3.  
The application of Markowitz theory yields a maximum expected return of 65.32% 
with a standard deviation of 44.67%.  This is based on 90% of the security spend 
being invested in biometrics with 5% respectively invested in access control and 
detection.  This results in a revised figure for the residual risk of $77,641 which is a 
reduction of $36,377. 
 
 
Chart 5.3 - Markowitz expected return-standard deviation efficient frontier for Port 
Facility C 
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For the Markowitz minimum standard deviation with accompanying expected return, 
the figure for the expected return is 52.57% and the figure for the standard deviation 
is 35.98%.  This is derived by diverting 90% of the security spend on detection with 
only 5% investment in both access control measures and biometrics.  This results in a 
revised figure for the residual risk of $106,185 which is a reduction of $7,833. 
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5.5 Port facility D 
 
The port facility is rated by the underwriter to have a probably of 0.07% for the 
occurrence of any of the prescribed security incidents.  The resulting figure for the 
gross expected loss to the port facility without any security measures being in place is 
$758,988.  The estimates for the physical damage, business interruption and expected 
gross loss for port facility D are shown in table 5.18.   
 
 
Table 5.18 – Port facility D estimates of physical damage, business interruption and gross expected loss 
 
 
Security Systems’ Performance 
The access control measures (see table 5.19) have a mean performance of 22.86% 
which is the lowest among the six terminals and a standard deviation of 7.56% which 
is also the lowest among the terminals.  However, the cost of the access control 
measures are the second highest of the six terminals, being $829,730.  The biometric 
systems have a mean performance of 34.29% which is the lowest and a standard 
deviation of 15.12% which is also the lowest among the terminals.  The biometric 
systems are only the third lowest at $12,200, compared with the other systems.  Of the 
detection systems, the mean performance is 20.00% which is the second lowest and 
the standard deviation of 20.00% is the third highest compared with the five other 
terminals.  The cost of the detection systems at $787,670 are the second highest across 
the six terminals.  Overall, all three security systems perform poorly compared to the 
other terminals and yet are among the most expensive. 
 
 
Port Facility D Infrastructure Damage and Business Interruption Expected Loss
Type of Security Incident Physical damage Business interruption Total $ ProbabilityExpected Loss
Bomb introduced by person on foot 5,375,000              10,000,000                   15,375,000          0.070% 10,763         
Car Bomb 36,769,695            45,000,000                   81,769,695          0.070% 57,239         
Truck bomb 133,092,200          92,122,118                   225,214,318        0.070% 157,650       
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 11,744,695            97,122,118                   108,866,813        0.070% 76,207         
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 94,032,032            132,122,118                 226,154,150        0.070% 158,308       
Mining of port infrastructure 121,322,505          92,122,118                   213,444,623        0.070% 149,411       
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 121,322,505          92,122,118                   213,444,623        0.070% 149,411       
Total 758,988       
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Table 5.19 – Port facility D security system performances, including means and standard deviations 
 
Security Performance Ratios 
The application of the security measures results in a reduction in the expected loss of 
$183,315 to $575,673.  Given that the overall expenditure on security is $1,629,600 
the residual risk reduction : security expenditure ratio is 0.112.  This means that for 
every $1 spent on security, the residual security risk is reduced by $0.112.  
The residual risk : expected loss ratios for the different types of security incident are 
lowest for the bomb introduced by person on foot, the biological agent attack on foot 
and the mining of the port infrastructure at 66.7% (see table 5.20).  However, these 
figures are much higher than for any other terminal.  
 
 
 
Table 5.20 – Port facility D residual security risk calculations 
 
Markowitz Portfolio Analysis 
The correlations between the security systems are set out in table 5.21.  The 
correlation between the performances of access control and biometrics are perfectly 
Port Facility D Security system performance
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection
Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 40% 40%
Car Bomb 20% 40% 0%
Truck bomb 20% 40% 0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 40% 40%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 40% 0%
Mining of port infrastructure 20% 40% 40%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%
Mean 22.86% 34.29% 20.00%
Standard deviation 7.56% 15.12% 20.00%
Port Facility D Residual Risk Calculations
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection Total
 Residual 
Risk/Expected 
Loss 
Bomb introduced by person on foot 2,870                      2,153          2,153         7,175         66.7%
Car Bomb 15,264                     11,448        19,080       45,791       80.0%
Truck bomb 42,040                     31,530        52,550       126,120      80.0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20,322                     15,241        15,241       50,805       66.7%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 42,215                     31,662        52,769       126,646      80.0%
Mining of port infrastructure 39,843                     29,882        29,882       99,607       66.7%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 29,882                     49,804        39,843       119,529      80.0%
Residual Risk 192,436                   171,719      211,518      575,673      
Security Cost 829,730                   12,200        787,670      1,629,600   
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negative, while the correlation between access control and detection and biometrics 
and detection are zero. 
 
 
Correlations  
 Access Control   Biometrics   Detection  
                  1.000   -1.000**  0.000 
 Access Control  
 -1.000**           1.000  0.000 
 Biometrics  
 0.000   0.000          1.000 
 Detection  
**Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 5.21 – Port facility D security system performance correlations 
 
The Markowitz efficient frontier is calculated from the data in tables 5.19 and 5.21 
and the efficient expected return-standard deviation frontier is plotted in chart 5.4.  
The application of Markowitz theory yields a maximum expected return of 33.00% 
with a standard deviation of 13.27%.  This is based on 90% of the security spend 
being invested in biometrics with 5% respectively invested in access control and 
detection.  This results in a revised figure for the residual risk of $508,522 which is a 
reduction of $67,151. 
 
Chart 5.4 - Markowitz expected return-standard deviation efficient frontier for Port 
Facility D 
Single period
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For the Markowitz minimum standard deviation with accompanying expected return, 
the figure for the expected return is 26.34% and the figure for the standard deviation 
is 1.00%.  This is derived by diverting 63.33% of the security spend on access control; 
31.67% of the security spend on biometrics and 5% invested in detection.  This results 
in a revised figure for the residual risk of $559,071 which is a reduction of $16,602. 
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5.6 Port facility E 
The port facility is rated by the underwriter to have a probably of 0.03% for the 
occurrence of any of the prescribed security incidents.  The resulting figure for the 
gross expected loss to the port facility without any security measures being in place is 
$416,525.  The estimates for the physical damage, business interruption and expected 
gross loss for port facility E are in table 5.22.   
 
 
Table 5.22 – Port facility E estimates of physical damage, business interruption and gross expected loss 
 
Security Systems’ Performance 
The access control measures (see table 5.23) have a mean performance of 58.57% 
which is the third lowest among the six terminals and a standard deviation of 35.79% 
which is the third highest among the six terminals.  The cost of the access control 
measures are the second lowest of the six terminals, being $207,000.  The biometric 
systems have a mean performance of 57.14% which is the second lowest and a 
standard deviation of 39.04% which is also the second lowest among the terminals.  
However, the biometric systems are the second most expensive at $84.000, compared 
with the other systems.  Of the detection systems, the mean performance is 10.00% 
which is the lowest of all and the standard deviation of 19.15% is the third lowest 
compared with the five other terminals.  The cost of the detection systems at $453,000 
are the third highest across the six terminals.  Overall, none of the three security 
systems performs particularly well when compared with the peers, especially not 
detection given its cost in comparison with others. 
 
Port Facility E Infrastructure Damage and Business Interruption Expected Loss
Type of Security Incident Physical damage Business interruption Total $ ProbabilityExpected Loss
Bomb introduced by person on foot 5,375,000              10,000,000                   15,375,000          0.030% 4,613           
Car Bomb 36,769,695            45,000,000                   81,769,695          0.030% 24,531         
Truck bomb 211,302,016          92,122,118                   303,424,134        0.030% 91,027         
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 11,744,695            97,122,118                   108,866,813        0.030% 32,660         
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 163,548,848          132,122,118                 295,670,966        0.030% 88,701         
Mining of port infrastructure 199,532,321          92,122,118                   291,654,439        0.030% 87,496         
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 199,532,321          92,122,118                   291,654,439        0.030% 87,496         
Total 416,525       
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Table 5.23 – Port facility E security system performances, including means and standard deviations 
 
Security Performance Ratios 
The application of the security measures results in a reduction in the expected loss of 
$159,390 to $257,135.  Given that the overall expenditure on security is $744,000 the 
residual risk reduction : security expenditure ratio is 0.214.  This means that for every 
$1 spent on security, the residual security risk is reduced by $0.214.  
The residual risk : expected loss ratios for the different types of security incident are 
lowest for the car bomb, the truck bomb and the biological agent attack by vehicle at 
43.3% (see table 5.24).  However, these figures do not compare favourably with the 
other terminals.  
 
 
Table 5.24 –Port facility E residual security risk calculations 
 
Markowitz Portfolio Analysis 
The correlations between the security systems are set out in table 5.25.  The 
correlation between the performance of access control and biometrics are positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The correlation of the performances of access control 
Port Facility E Security system performance
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection
Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 80% 0%
Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%
Truck bomb 90% 80% 0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 80% 0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 80% 0%
Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%
Mean 58.57% 57.14% 10.00%
Standard deviation 35.79% 39.04% 19.15%
Port Facility E Residual Risk Calculations
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection Total
 Residual 
Risk/Expected 
Loss 
Bomb introduced by person on foot 615                         308             1,538         2,460         53.3%
Car Bomb 818                         1,635          8,177         10,630       43.3%
Truck bomb 3,034                      6,068          30,342       39,445       43.3%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 4,355                      2,177          10,887       17,419       53.3%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 2,957                      5,913          29,567       38,437       43.3%
Mining of port infrastructure 26,249                     29,165        14,583       69,997       80.0%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 26,249                     29,165        23,332       78,747       90.0%
Residual Risk 64,276                     74,433        118,426      257,135      
Security Cost 207,000                   84,000        453,000      744,000      
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and detection is negative and significant at the 0.05 level; while the correlation of the 
performance of biometrics and detection is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
Correlations  
 Access Control   Biometrics   Detection  
                  1.000   0.927**  -0.827* 
 Access Control  
 0.927**           1.000  -0.892** 
 Biometrics  
 -0.827*   -0.892**          1.000 
 Detection  
**Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table 5.25 – Port facility E security system performance correlations 
The Markowitz efficient frontier is calculated from the data in tables 5.23 and 5.25 
and the efficient expected return-standard deviation frontier is plotted in chart 5.5.  
The application of Markowitz theory yields a maximum expected return of 56.07% 
with a standard deviation of 33.23%.  This is based on 90% of the security spend 
being invested in access control measures with 5% respectively invested in biometrics 
and detection.  This results in a revised figure for the residual risk of $182,979 which 
is a reduction of $74,156. 
 
Chart 5.5 - Markowitz expected return-standard deviation efficient frontier for Port 
Facility E 
Single period
Port Facility E expected return-standard deviation
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1 Access Control 90.00%
2 Biometrics 5.00%
3 Detection 5.00%
Standard deviation 33.23%
Expected return 56.07%
Maximum Expected Return
1 Access Control 5.00%
2 Biometrics 27.56%
3 Detection 67.44%
Standard deviation 5.94%
Expected return 25.42%
Minimum Standard Deviation
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For the Markowitz minimum standard deviation with accompanying expected return, 
the figure for the expected return is 25.42% and the figure for the standard deviation 
is 5.94%.  This is derived by diverting 67.44% of the security spend on detection with 
27.56% investment in biometrics and 5% invested in access control.  This results in a 
revised figure for the residual risk of $310,644 which is an increase of $53,509.  On 
this occasion the application of portfolio theory has resulted in a portfolio with a 
higher level of residual risk than the status quo. 
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5.7 Port Facility F 
The underwriter has assigned a probably of 0.023% for the occurrence of any of the 
prescribed security incidents.  The resulting figure for the gross expected loss to the 
port facility without any security measures being in place is $269,702. The estimates 
for the physical damage, business interruption and expected gross loss for port facility 
F are in table 5.26.   
 
 
Table 5.26 – Port facility F estimates of physical damage, business interruption and gross expected loss 
 
Security Systems’ Performance 
The access control measures (see table 5.27) have a mean performance of 45.71% 
which is the second lowest among the six port facilities and a standard deviation of 
42.37% which is among the highest.  The cost of the access control measures are the 
highest of the six port facilities, being $1,324,312.  The biometric systems have a 
mean performance of 67.86% which is the highest and a standard deviation of 46.36% 
which is also the highest among the terminals.  The cost of the biometric systems are 
also the highest at $275,600, compared with the other terminals.  Of the detection 
systems, the mean performance is 41.43% which is the third lowest and the standard 
deviation of 40.18% is the highest compared with the five other terminals.  The cost 
of the detection systems at $349,777 are the third lowest across the six terminals.  
Overall, the biometrics system is the best performer but also the most expensive; 
access control systems do not perform particularly well and are also the most 
expensive and the detection systems are average when compared to the other 
terminals. 
 
 
Port Facility F Infrastructure Damage and Business Interruption Expected Loss
Type of Security Incident Physical damage Business interruption Total $ ProbabilityExpected Loss
Bomb introduced by person on foot 5,375,000              10,000,000                   15,375,000          0.023% 3,536           
Car Bomb 36,769,695            45,000,000                   81,769,695          0.023% 18,807         
Truck bomb 157,352,430          92,122,118                   249,474,548        0.023% 57,379         
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 11,744,695            97,122,118                   108,866,813        0.023% 25,039         
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 109,599,262          132,122,118                 241,721,380        0.023% 55,596         
Mining of port infrastructure 145,582,735          92,122,118                   237,704,853        0.023% 54,672         
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 145,582,735          92,122,118                   237,704,853        0.023% 54,672         
Total 269,702       
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Table 5.27 – Port facility F security system performances, including means and standard deviations 
 
Security Performance Ratios 
The application of the security measures results in a reduction in the expected loss of 
$114,163 to $155,539.  Given that the overall expenditure on security is $1,949,689 
the residual risk reduction : security expenditure ratio is 0.059.  This means that for 
every $1 spent on security, the residual security risk is reduced by $0.059.  
The residual risk : expected loss ratio for the different types of security incident are 
lowest for the bomb introduced by person on foot at 11.7%. 
 
 
Table 5.28 –Port F residual security risk calculations 
 
 
Markowitz Portfolio Analysis 
The correlations between the security systems are set out in table 5.29.  The 
correlations of the performances of the security systems differ greatly from the other 
port facilities with no significant positive or negative correlations.   
 
Port Facility F Security system performance
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection
Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 80%
Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%
Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 95% 80%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 0%
Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%
Mean 45.71% 67.86% 41.43%
Standard deviation 42.37% 46.36% 40.18%
Port Facility F Residual Risk Calculations
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection Total
 Residual 
Risk/Expected 
Loss 
Bomb introduced by person on foot 118                         59              236            413            11.7%
Car Bomb 627                         313             6,269         7,209         38.3%
Truck bomb 1,913                      956             19,126       21,995       38.3%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 7,512                      417             1,669         9,598         38.3%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 16,679                     927             18,532       36,137       65.0%
Mining of port infrastructure 18,224                     18,224        3,645         40,093       73.3%
Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 12,757                     18,224        9,112         40,093       73.3%
Residual Risk 57,829                     39,121        58,589       155,539      
Security Cost 1,324,312                275,600      349,777      1,949,689   
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Correlations  
 Access Control   Biometrics   Detection  
                  1.000           0.495  -0.368 
 Access Control  
                  0.495           1.000  -0.401 
 Biometrics  
 -0.368   -0.401          1.000 
 Detection  
Table 5.29 – Port F security system performance correlations 
 
 
The Markowitz efficient frontier is calculated from the data in tables 5.27 and 5.29 
and the efficient expected return-standard deviation frontier is plotted in chart 5.6.  
The application of Markowitz theory yields a maximum expected return of 65.43% 
with a standard deviation of 42.03%.  This is based on 90% of the security spend 
being invested in biometrics with 5% respectively invested in access control and 
detection.  This results in a revised figure for the residual risk of $93,236 which is a 
reduction of $62,303. 
 
Chart 5.6 - Markowitz expected return-standard deviation efficient frontier for Port 
Facility F 
 
 
Single period
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1 Access Control 5.00%
2 Biometrics 90.00%
3 Detection 5.00%
Standard deviation 42.03%
Expected return 65.43%
Maximum Expected Return
1 Access Control 27.52%
2 Biometrics 24.18%
3 Detection 48.30%
Standard deviation 20.66%
Expected return 49.00%
Minimum Standard Deviation
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For the Markowitz minimum standard deviation with accompanying expected return, 
the figure for the expected return is 49.00% and the figure for the standard deviation 
is 20.66%.  This is derived by diverting 48.30% of the security spend on detection 
with 27.52% invested in access control and 24.18% invested in biometrics.  This 
results in a revised figure for the residual risk of $137,548 which is a reduction of 
$17,991. 
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5.8 Findings Summary 
 
A summary of the findings is presented below.   
 
5.8.1 Mean and Standard Deviation of the Security Systems 
Table 5.30 contains a summary of the port facilities’ security systems’ performances.  
The best performing port facility for access control is port facility B with a mean of 
76.43% and with a standard deviation (s.d.) of 18.42% followed closely by port 
facility A with mean of 72.86% and s.d. of 15.77% respectively.  However, port 
facility B’s access control system cost $715,000 whereas port facility A’s is only 
$187,826.  The worst performing access control system belongs to port facility D with 
a mean of 22.86% and a s.d. of 7.56%. 
In terms of biometrics, port facility F was the best performing with a mean of 67.86% 
and a s.d. of 46.36% followed closely by both port facility C (mean 66.43% & s.d. of 
45.43%) and port facility B (mean 65.71% and s.d. of 45.04%).  However, the cost of 
the biometrics systems varies considerably.  The worst performing port facility for 
biometrics was port facility D with a mean of 34.29% and a s.d. of 15.12%. 
In terms of detection, port facility B was the best performing with a mean of 87.86% 
and a s.d. of 7.56%.  The detection systems in port facility E were worst with a mean 
of only 10.00% and a s.d. of 19.15%.  What is of interest is the size of the difference 
in the performance of the detection systems in port facility F where the mean is 
41.43% and the s.d. is 40.18% compared to port facility B given that the size of the 
investment in both port facilities’ detection systems are quite similar. 
 
 
 
Table 5.30 – Summary of the Port Facilities’Security Systems’ Performances 
 
5.8.2 Security Benefit-Cost Ratios 
The findings also showed some interesting results concerning the port facilities’ 
security benefit-cost ratios which show by how much each port facility’s residual 
mean s.d. Cost $ mean s.d. Cost $ mean s.d. Cost $
A 72.86% 15.77% 187,826    63.57% 43.47% 33,637   68.57% 12.82% 261,999    
B 76.43% 18.42% 715,000    65.71% 45.04% 8,000     87.86% 7.56% 2,756,325 
C 59.29% 40.56% 412,734    66.43% 45.43% 2,680     51.43% 35.20% 51,538      
D 22.86% 7.56% 829,730    34.29% 15.12% 12,200   20.00% 20.00% 787,670    
E 58.57% 35.79% 207,000    57.14% 39.04% 84,000   10.00% 19.15% 453,000    
F 45.71% 42.37% 1,324,312 67.86% 46.36% 275,600 41.43% 40.18% 1,949,689 
Access Control Biometrics DetectionPort Facility
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security risk is reduced for every $1 spent on security.  The figures for the security 
benefit-cost ratios are shown in table 5.31. 
 
 
 
Table 5.31 – Port Facilities’ Security Benefit-cost Ratios 
 
While most of the ratios range from 0.0325 for port facility B to 0.235 for port facility 
C, the corresponding figure for port facility A is 7.13.  It is possible that the size of 
this figure may reflect the higher level of terrorist threat that exists in that country.  
However, the figure for Port facility D is lower than for Port facility C where the 
terrorist threat is lower so it would be premature to try to draw such a conclusion.  
 
 
5.8.3 Residual Risk / Expected Loss Ratios 
An analysis of the ratios for residual risk : expected loss per type of prescribed 
security incident show which of the port facilities are best placed to prevent such an 
attack.  These are shown in table 5.32. 
 
 
Table 5.32 – Port Facilities’ Residual Risk : Expected Loss Ratios by per type of 
Security Incident 
 
For the bomb introduced by person on foot, the best performing port facility is port 
facility B at 6.7% while the worst performing is port facility D at 66.7%.  This means 
that for a given attempt on port facility B, only 6.7% are expected to be successful 
whereas in port facility D, two thirds of attempted attacks are expected to be 
successful. 
A 7.13
B 0.0325
C 0.235
D 0.112
E 0.214
F 0.059
Port Facility Security Performance Ratio
A 18.30% 18.30% 16.70% 18.30% 16.70% 66.70% 66.70%
B 6.70% 6.70% 18.30% 6.70% 11.70% 56.70% 56.70%
C 20.00% 15.00% 16.70% 20.00% 15.00% 100.00% 100.00%
D 66.70% 80.00% 80.00% 66.70% 80.00% 66.70% 80.00%
E 53.30% 43.30% 43.30% 53.30% 43.30% 80.00% 90.00%
F 11.70% 38.30% 38.30% 38.30% 65.00% 73.30% 73.30%
Bomb 
introduced by 
person on foot
Car 
Bomb
Truck 
bomb
Biological agent 
attack on terminal 
- on foot
Biological agent 
attack on terminal 
- by vehicle
Mining of 
port 
infrastructure
Vessel 
attacked by a 
suicide boat
Port Facility
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For the car bomb, port facility B again scores the highest with 6.7% and port facility 
D is again the worst performing with only a fifth of attempted attacks being thwarted.   
For the truck bomb scenario, it is port facility A and port facility C that perform equal 
best at 16.7% and port facility D is again the worst performer at 80%. 
In the case of the biological agent attack on the port facilities either by on foot or by 
vehicle, port facility B is again the best performing with port facility D the worst 
performing.   
However, for both the mining of the port infrastructure and the vessel attacked by a 
suicide boat, while port facility B is again the best performing, the worst performing 
being port facility C, which was judged to be unable to prevent any kind of attack 
from the water.  This highlights that while port facility C is relatively good at 
preventing attacks that have their origins on the land, the port facility is very 
vulnerable to any waterborne threats.   
 
5.8.4 Residual Security Risk Ex-ante and Ex-post Markowitz Portfolio 
Analysis  
One of the key findings of the research is how the application of Markowitz theory of 
portfolio selection has reduced each port facility’s residual security risk.  A summary 
of ex-ante and ex-post application of portfolio theory can be found in table 5.33.  The 
figures reproduced are the ones which maximise the expected return, rather than 
minimise the standard deviation of the ex-post portfolio. 
The ex-post application of portfolio theory has the largest impact on port facility A in 
terms of a US$ reduction in residual security risk of $422,165.  However, the range of 
reduction in residual security risk for the other port facilities is between $25,000 and 
$75,000.  The largest ex-post percentage reduction is port facility B with 53.2%.  
 
 
Table 5.33 – Summary of Ex-ante and Ex-post Markowitz Portfolio Analysis 
 
Ex-ante Markowitz Ex-post Markowitz Difference % Change
A 1,912,629            1,490,464            422,165   -22.1%
B 47,499                 22,235                 25,264    -53.2%
C 114,018               77,641                 36,377    -31.9%
D 575,673               508,522               67,151    -11.7%
E 257,135               182,979               74,156    -28.8%
F 155,539               93,236                 62,303    -40.1%
Residual Risk US$Port Facility
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5.9 Portfolio Optimization 
The portfolio optimization resulted in an examination of all 216 (6³) possible 
portfolios constructed from the 3 security systems in each of the 6 port facilities, as 
listed in appendix D.  The portfolios were analysed in terms of their security 
investment and their residual security risk, based on the same methodology as 
described in section 2.1.  An optimum portfolio is defined as one which yields either 
the lowest residual security risk or the lowest security investment compared to the 
status quo.  An alternative portfolio is defined as one which has either a lower residual 
security risk or lower security investment than the status quo.  
The 216 possible portfolios were then plotted on a chart and the charts are reproduced 
within the context of each port facility.  In the analysis, the possible portfolio 
combinations of the port facilities’ security systems which result in both a reduction in 
residual security risk and security investment were selected.  In some instances, there 
are only a handful of alternative portfolios which have a reduction in both residual 
security risk and security investment and their details are reproduced in full.  In other 
instances, there are many alternative portfolios of security systems which meet the 
criteria.  In these cases, only the top ten performing portfolios are reproduced.  The 
optimum and alternative portfolio combinations of security systems are presented first 
on minimising residual security risk and secondly on minimising security investment.   
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5.9.1 Port Facility A 
 
 
Chart 5.7: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port Facility A 
 
Port facility A has a security investment of $483,462 and a residual risk of 
$1,912,629.  Following the portfolio analysis there exists only one alternative 
portfolio which results in both a reduced residual risk and a reduction in security 
investment and the details can be found in table 5.34 and as shown in chart 5.7. 
 
Portfolio Portfolio 
No. 
Security 
Cost 
Security 
Cost 
Reduction 
Residual 
Risk 
Residual 
Risk 
Reduction 
A1-B3-D1 13 452,505 30,957 1,849,503 63,136 
 
 
Table 5.34 - Optimal Security System Portfolio for Port Facility A 
 
This can be achieved by maintaining the existing access control and detection systems 
in port facility A but substituting the existing biometrics system for the system used in 
port facility C.   
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5.9.2 Port Facility B 
 
 
Chart 5.8: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility B 
 
Port facility B has a security investment of $3,479,325 and a residual risk of $47,499.  
Following the portfolio analysis, there are three alternative portfolios where both the 
residual risk and the security investment are less than the status quo.  Their details can 
be found in table 5.35 and in chart 5.8. 
 
Portfolio Portfolio 
No. 
Security 
Cost 
Security 
Cost 
Reduction 
Residual 
Risk 
Residual 
Risk 
Reduction 
A1-B3-D2 14 2,946,831 532,494 46,638 861 
A1-B6-D2 32 3,219,751 259,574 46,323 1,176 
A2-B3-D2 50 3,474,005 5,320 46,144 1,355 
Table 5.35 –Optimal and Alternative Security System Portfolios for Port Facility B 
 
The portfolio which minimises the residual risk is number 50, which consists of the 
access control and detection systems from port facility B and the biometrics system 
from port facility C.  The portfolio which minimises the security investment is 
number 14 which consists of the access control system from port facility A, the 
biometrics system from port facility C and the detection system from port facility B.  
However, it is interesting to note that all three portfolios include port facility B’s 
detection system which is selected above any of the other detection systems from the 
other port facilities. 
115 
 
5.9.3 Port Facility C 
 
 
Chart 5.9: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port Facility C 
 
Port facility C has a security investment of $466,952 and a residual risk of $114,018.  
There are 10 alternative portfolios which yield reductions in residual risk and their 
details can be found in table 5.36.  A selection of these portfolios are also shown in 
chart 5.9. 
 
 
Table 5.36 - Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios for Port Facility C 
(Residual Risk Reduction) 
 
The optimum portfolio for residual risk reduction is portfolio number 13, which 
represents the access control system from port facility A, the biometrics system from 
port facility C and the detection system from port facility A.  The top two portfolios 
Portfolio Portfolio 
No.
Security 
Cost
Security 
Cost 
Reduction
Residual Risk Residual Risk 
Reduction
A1-B3-D1 13              452,505        14,447           81,491               32,527               
A1-B2-D1 7               457,825        9,127             84,115               29,903               
A1-B3-D3 15              242,044        224,908         98,869               15,149               
A1-B4-D1 19              462,025        4,927             99,070               14,948               
A1-B2-D3 9               247,364        219,588         101,493              12,525               
A1-B1-D3 3               273,001        193,951         101,493              12,525               
A1-B5-D3 27              323,364        143,588         105,071              8,947                
A5-B3-D3 159            261,218        205,734         110,611              3,407                
A5-B2-D3 153            266,538        200,414         113,235              783                   
A5-1B-D3 147            292,175        174,777         113,235              783                   
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include both the access control and detection systems from port facility A and the top 
7 portfolios include the access control system from port facility A.  The 10 alternative 
portfolios which yield reduced security investment can be found in table 5.37. 
 
 
Table 5.37 – Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios (Security 
Investment Reduction) for Port Facility C 
 
 
The optimum portfolio for reduction in security investment is portfolio number 15, 
which represents the access control system from port facility A and both the 
biometrics and the detection system from port facility C.  It is interesting to note that 
the top 7 portfolios include the detection system from port facility C. 
 
  
Portfolio Portfolio 
No.
Security 
Cost
Security 
Cost 
Reduction
Residual Risk Residual Risk 
Reduction
A1-B3-D3 15              242,044        224,908         98,869               15,149               
A1-B2-D3 9               247,364        219,588         101,493              12,525               
A5-B3-D3 159            261,218        205,734         110,611              3,407                
A5-B2-D3 153            266,538        200,414         113,235              783                   
A1-B1-D3 3               273,001        193,951         101,493              12,525               
A5-1B-D3 147            292,175        174,777         113,235              783                   
A1-B5-D3 27              323,364        143,588         105,071              8,947                
A1-B3-D1 13              452,505        14,447           81,491               32,527               
A1-B2-D1 7               457,825        9,127             84,115               29,903               
A1-B4-D1 19              462,025        4,927             99,070               14,948               
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5.9.4 Port Facility D 
 
 
Chart 5.10: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port Facility D 
 
Port facility D has a security investment of $1,629,600 and a residual risk of 
$575,673.   There are 154 alternative portfolios which yield reductions in both 
security investment and residual risk.  The top ten alternative portfolios for residual 
risk reduction can be found in table 5.38. 
 
 
Table 5.38 - Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios (Residual Risk 
Reduction) for Port Facility D 
 
The portfolio which provides the greatest reduction in residual security risk is 
portfolio number 67, which combines the access control system from port facility B, 
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the biometrics system from port facility F and the detection system from port facility 
A.  It is interesting to note that the top 10 alternative portfolios for residual risk 
reduction consist of the detection system from port facility A. 
The top ten alternative portfolios for reduction in security investment are in table 5.39. 
 
 
Table 5.39 - Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios for (Security 
Investment Reduction) Port Facility D 
 
The portfolio which yields the greatest saving in security investment is portfolio 
number 15, which consists of the access control system from port facility A and the 
biometrics and detection systems from port facility C.  Furthermore, all of the top 10 
alternative portfolios for security investment reduction consist of the detection system 
from port facility C. 
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5.9.5 Port Facility E 
 
 
Chart 5.11: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port facility E 
 
 
Port facility E has a security investment of $744,000 and a residual risk of $257,135.  
There are 50 alternative portfolios which yield reductions in both security cost and 
residual risk.  The top ten alternative portfolios for residual risk reduction can be 
found in table 5.40. 
 
Table 5.40 - Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios (Residual Risk 
Reduction) for Port Facility E 
 
The optimum portfolio for reduction of residual risk is portfolio number 31 which 
consists of the access control system from port facility A, the biometrics system from 
port facility F and the detection system from port facility A.  However, it is interesting 
to note that the top 5 alternative portfolios consist of both the access control and the 
120 
 
detection systems from port facility A.  The top ten alternative portfolios for reduction 
in security investment are in table 5.41. 
 
 
Table 5.41 - Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios (Security 
Investment Reduction) for Port Facility E 
 
The optimum portfolio is number 15 which consists of the access control system from 
port facility A and both the biometrics and detection systems from port facility C.  As 
in previous instances , all of the top 10 alternative portfolios for security investment 
reduction contain the detection system from port facility C. 
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5.9.6 Port Facility F 
 
 
Chart 5.12: Optimum Portfolio Analysis: Port Facility F 
 
Port facility F has a security investment of $1,949,689 and a residual risk of $155,539.  
There are 105 alternative portfolios which yield reductions in both security cost and 
residual risk.  The top ten alternative portfolios for residual risk reduction can be 
found in table 5.42. 
 
 
Table 5.42 - Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios (Residual Risk 
Reduction) for Port Facility F 
 
The optimum portfolio for reduction of residual risk is portfolio number 67 which 
consists of the access control system from port facility B, the biometrics system from 
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port facility F and the detection system from port facility A.  However, it is interesting 
to note that the top 10 alternative portfolios contain the detection systems from port 
facility A.  The top ten optimum portfolios for reduction in security investment are in 
table 5.43. 
 
 
Table 5.43 - Optimum and Alternative Security System Portfolios (Security 
Investment Reduction) for Port Facility F 
 
As for port facility E above, the top performing portfolio is number 15 which consists 
of the access control system from port facility A and both the biometrics and detection 
systems from port facility C.  As in previous instances , all of the top 10 alternative 
portfolios for security investment reduction contain the detection system from port 
facility C. 
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5.10 Sensitivity Analysis 
It is necessary to conduct a sensitivity analysis to account for the bias which is 
introduced when working with a small sample.  The sensitivity analysis concerns the 
two dimensions of the security investment – residual security risk relationship.  In 
order to compensate for this bias, two simulations are conducted.  The first simulation 
models a 10% reduction in the cost of the individual security systems (access control, 
biometrics and detection) and the second simulation models a 10% improvement in 
the performance of the individual security systems, aimed at reducing residual 
security risk.   
Consideration was given to a third simulation to vary the underwriter’s pure premium 
probability assessment of the risks of the prescribed security incidents.  It is 
acknowledged that the small sample of terrorism probabilities used in the research 
may result in the introduction of anchoring effects into the data and that a simulation 
of a 10% increase or decrease in the terrorism probabilities may serve to address this 
bias.  However, given that the underwriter allocated only one probability to cover all 
of the prescribed security incidents in the six port facilities, rather than individual 
probabilities for each threat scenario, the process of modelling different terrorism 
threat probabilities for each prescribed security incident may unintentionally introduce 
further errors or bias into the model.  Therefore, it is decided to conduct only the 
aforementioned simulations but nevertheless it is important to highlight the limitations 
of working with limited terrorism probabilities from only one source.  
  
5.10.1 Sensitivity Analysis Methodology  
The objective of running the two simulations is to assess the extent to which the 
portfolio optimization exercise is affected, specifically in relation to how the optimum 
and alternative portfolios differ for each port facility ex-post the simulations.  The 
methodology behind the simulations is presented in the following steps. 
 
The first step is to revisit the breakdown in costs of the three security system 
components (access control, biometrics and detection) for each of the 216 possible 
portfolios.  In each of the possible portfolios a simulation of a 10% reduction is 
conducted in turn for each of the three security systems and a calculation is made of 
the reduction of the cost of the 216 individual portfolios.  For example, for portfolio 
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#1, the cost of the access control systems is $187,826; the cost of biometrics is 
$33,637; and the cost of the detection systems is $261,999.  The total cost of portfolio 
#1 is therefore $483,462.  By reducing the cost of the access control systems by 10% 
to $169,043, the overall cost of the portfolio is now $464,679 which represents a 
reduction of 3.89% compared to the original.  This process is then repeated for 
biometrics which results in a reduction of 0.7% of the overall cost of the portfolio and 
the corresponding figure for the reduction in the cost of the portfolio following a 10% 
reduction in the cost of detection systems is 5.42%.  When the cost of the access 
control system was simulated to decrease by 10%, the mean reduction in the overall 
portfolio was 4.92%.  When the cost of the biometrics system was simulated to 
decrease by 10%, the mean reduction in the overall portfolio was 0.62%.  When the 
cost of the detection system was simulated to decrease by 10%, the mean reduction in 
the overall portfolio was 4.46%.  The inbalance between the three figures is explained 
by the fact that in this portfolio the cost of biometric systems is less than that of either 
access control or detection.  This process is then repeated a further 215 times for all of 
the other possible portfolios. 
 
The second step is to conduct a simulation along similar lines but for a 10% increase 
in the performance of each of the three security systems and to make calculations of 
the corresponding figures for the overall portfolios’ reduction in the residual security 
risk.  Considering all of the 216 possible portfolios, the mean increase in the 
performance of access control systems is 3.15%; the mean increase in the 
performance of biometrics systems is 3.28% and the corresponding figure for 
detection systems is 3.57%.  The results of simulating the 10% reduction in cost and 
10% improvement in performance of the security systems are listed in appendix H. 
 
The third step is to apply the sensitivity analysis to each of the six port facilities in 
turn, including the data on the simulations of the 10% reduction in cost and the 10% 
improvement in performance.  For each port facility, the aim is to identify any 
alternative portfolios (additional to the ex-ante portfolio optimization) ex-post the 
simulation where both the security cost and residual security risk are lower than the 
port facility’s actual portfolio of security systems.  The results for the six port 
facilities are set out in the tables 5.44 - 5.49. 
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5.10.2 Sensitivity Analysis Results 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented below by port facility.  In each 
table, the portfolio shown first in bold is the actual portfolio of port security systems 
for that port facility.  The portfolio(s) listed below it is(are) the ex-post additional 
alternative portfolios which exhibit a reduction in both security cost and residual risk 
compared to the port facility’s actual portfolio.   
 
5.10.2.1 Port Facility A 
 
Table 5.44: Port Facility A – additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations 
 
In the ex-ante portfolio optimization in section 5.9.1, only portfolio number 13 
resulted in both a reduction in residual risk and a reduction in security investment 
compared to portfolio 1 (port facility A).  Following the sensitivity analysis, portfolio 
number 7 is added as an alternative portfolio where ex-post the simulation, 
combinations of security investment and residual security risk are less than those for 
portfolio 1.  For example, the figure for the security cost for portfolio number 7 when 
access control costs are reduced by 10% is $439,042.  This is less than all three of the 
ex-post simulations for security costs for portfolio 1.   
Furthermore, the ex-post simulation of the biometrics and detection systems of 
portfolio 7 result in figures of residual security risk which are less than or equal to the 
corresponding figures for portfolio 1.  However, the ex-post simulation of a 10% 
improvement in the performance of the access control systems in portfolio 7 results in 
an overall figure for the residual security risk which is equal to the equivalent figure 
for portfolio 1 but greater than portfolio 1’s ex-post simulation of a 10% improvement 
in the performance of the biometrics or detection systems.  This results in an ex-post 
simulation overlap between portfolios 1 and 7.  Where this occurs, the overlapping 
portfolio figures are shown in italics.   
 
  
5.10.2.2 Port Facility B 
Additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations:
1 A1-B1-D1 483,462     1,912,629   464,679         480,098         457,262        1,860,607      1,832,828         1,853,191         
7 A1-B2-D1 457,825     1,912,629   439,042         457,025         431,625        1,860,607     1,832,828         1,853,191         
Ex-post 
simulation 
security costs: 
access control 
cost - 10%
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
residual risk
Portfolio
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
detection cost 
- 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
access control 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
biometrics 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
detection 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security costs: 
biometrics cost 
- 10%
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
security 
costs
Portfolio No
126 
 
 
Table 5.45: Port Facility B – additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations 
 
In the ex-ante portfolio optimization in section 5.9.2, portfolios 14, 32 and 50 are 
judged to be alternative portfolios where both the residual security risk and security 
investment are less than the status quo.  Following the sensitivity analysis, a further 
three portfolios can be included: portfolios 8, 2 and 38.  All three portfolios had 
higher security costs and residual security risk ex-ante the simulations than portfolio 
44 but ex-post the simulations, combinations of security cost and residual security risk 
for the three portfolios can be found which are both less than the ex-post simulation 
for portfolio 44.  As in table 5.44, there is overlap between the four portfolios  
 
 
5.10.2.3 Port Facility C 
 
Table 5.46: Port Facility C – additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations 
 
In the ex-ante portfolio optimization in section 5.9.3, there were 10 portfolios judged 
to be alternative portfolios where both the residual security risk and security 
investment are less than the status quo.  Following the sensitivity analysis, a further 
four portfolios can be included: portfolios 157, 151, 163 and 1.  All four portfolios 
had higher security costs and residual security risk ex-ante the simulations than 
portfolio 87 but ex-post the simulations, combinations of security cost and residual 
security risk for the four portfolios can be found which are both less than the ex-post 
Additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations:
44 A2-B2-D2 3,479,325       47,499            3,407,825        3,478,525      3,203,693      45,957             45,103          46,686         
8 A1-B2-D2 2,952,151       48,514            2,933,368        2,951,351      2,676,519      46,920            46,068          47,704         
2 A1-B1-D2 2,977,788       48,514            2,959,005        2,974,424      2,702,156      46,920            46,068          47,704         
38 A2-B1-D2 3,504,962       48,021            3,433,462        3,501,598     3,229,330      46,481             45,570          47,209         
Ex-post 
simulation 
security costs: 
access control 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
biometrics 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
detection cost 
- 10%
Portfolio
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
access control 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
biometrics 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
detection 
performance 
+10%
Portfolio 
No
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
security costs
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
residual risk
Additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations:
87 A3-B3-D3 466,952          114,018      425,679         466,684      461,798      110,245        110,744      109,663      
157 A5-B3-D1 471,679          93,233       450,979         471,411     445,479      89,778          89,989       90,609       
151 A5-B2-D1 476,999          95,857       456,299         476,199     450,799      92,408          92,340       93,238       
163 A5-B4-D1 481,199          110,813      460,499         479,979     454,999      107,493        105,573      108,291      
1 A1-B1-D1 483,462          84,115       464,679         480,098     457,262      81,827          80,606       81,501       
Ex-post 
simulation 
security costs: 
access control 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
biometrics 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
detection 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
access control 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
biometrics 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
detection 
performance 
+10%
Portfolio 
No
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
security costs
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
residual risk
Portfolio
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simulation for portfolio 44.  As in table 5.44, there is overlap between the five 
portfolios.  
 
 
5.10.2.4 Port Facility D 
 
Table 5.47: Port Facility D – additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations 
 
In the ex-ante portfolio optimization in section 5.9.4, there were 154 portfolios judged 
to be alternative portfolios where both the residual security risk and security 
investment are less than the status quo.  Following the sensitivity analysis, a further 
nine portfolios can be included, as listed in table 5.47.  All nine portfolios had higher 
security costs and residual security risk ex-ante the simulations than portfolio 130 but 
ex-post the simulations, combinations of security cost and residual security risk for 
the four portfolios can be found which are both less than the ex-post simulation for 
portfolio 130.  As in table 5.44, there is overlap between the 10 portfolios.  
 
5.10.2.5 Port Facility E 
 
Table 5.48: Port Facility E – additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations 
Additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations:
130 A4-B4-D4 1,629,600       575,673  1,546,627        1,628,380 1,550,833 556,715             558,283       554,455      
112 A4-B1-D4 1,651,037       521,528  1,568,064        1,647,673 1,572,270 502,296             510,132       500,003      
213 A6-B6-D3 1,651,450       411,851  1,519,019        1,623,890 1,646,296 395,554             401,268       397,546      
205 A6-B5-D1 1,670,311       378,351  1,537,880        1,661,911 1,644,111 362,139             365,381       369,698      
198 A6-B3-D6 1,676,769       436,328  1,544,338        1,676,501 1,641,791 420,325             425,768       419,259      
192 A6-B2-D6 1,682,089       445,176  1,549,658        1,681,289 1,647,111 429,181             433,714       428,115      
204 A6-B4-D6 1,686,289       499,321  1,553,858        1,685,069 1,651,311 483,599             481,881       482,552      
136 A4-B5-D4 1,701,400       534,239  1,618,427        1,693,000 1,622,633 515,027             521,529       512,737      
186 A6-B1-D6 1,707,726       445,176  1,575,295        1,704,362 1,672,748 429,181             433,714       428,115      
210 A6-B5-D6 1,758,089       457,887  1,625,658        1,749,689 1,723,111 441,914             445,108       440,851      
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
access control 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
biometrics 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
detection 
performance 
+10%
PortfolioPortfolio No
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
security costs
Ex-ante 
simulation
: residual 
risk
Ex-post 
simulation 
security costs: 
access control 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
biometrics 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
detection 
cost - 10%
Additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations:
173 A5-B5-D5 744,000          257,135  723,300          735,600     698,700     250,941     250,083          244,668       
175 A5-B6-D1 744,599          174,409  723,899          717,039     718,399     167,910     168,403          169,472       
97 A3-B5-D1 758,733          193,238  717,460          750,333    732,533     186,222     185,855          188,313       
51 A2-B3-D3 769,218          185,304  697,718          768,950    764,064    181,106     179,153          177,122       
45 A2-B2-D3 774,538          189,195  703,038          773,738    769,384    184,993     182,667          181,005       
57 A2-B4-D3 778,738          217,297  707,238          777,518    773,584    213,282     207,408          209,472       
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual 
risk: access 
control 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
biometrics 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
detection 
performance 
+10%
PortfolioPortfolio No
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
security costs
Ex-ante 
simulation
: residual 
risk
Ex-post 
simulation 
security costs: 
access control 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
biometrics 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
detection 
cost - 10%
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In the ex-ante portfolio optimization in section 5.9.5, there were 50 portfolios judged 
to be alternative portfolios where both the residual security risk and security 
investment are less than the status quo.  Following the sensitivity analysis, a further 
five portfolios can be included, as listed in table 5.48.  All five portfolios had higher 
security costs and residual security risk ex-ante the simulations than portfolio 173 but 
ex-post the simulations, combinations of security cost and residual security risk for 
the four portfolios can be found which are both less than the ex-post simulation for 
portfolio 173.  As in table 5.44, there is overlap between the six portfolios.  
 
 
5.10.2.6 Port Facility F 
 
Table 5.49: Port Facility F – additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations 
 
In the ex-ante portfolio optimization in section 5.9.6, there were 105 portfolios judged 
to be alternative portfolios where both the residual security risk and security 
investment are less than the status quo.  Following the sensitivity analysis, not one 
portfolio can be included.  Portfolio number 215 is listed in the table 5.49 to illustrate 
only that it nearly qualified as an alternative portfolio in that the ex-post simulation of 
10% reduction in access control costs is less than the ex-post simulation for portfolio 
216 in respect of a 10% reduction in the cost of the biometrics systems.   
 
 
5.10.3 Sensitivity Analysis Discussion 
The sensitivity analysis consisted of two simulations: a 10% reduction in security cost 
of each security system and a 10% improvement in performance.  The sensitivity 
analysis has shown that in five out of six of the port facilities, the number of 
alternative portfolios which (ex-post the simulation) resulted in both a reduction in 
residual risk and a reduction in security investment compared to the status quo was 
Additional alternative portfolios ex-post the simulations:
216 A6-B6-D6 1,949,689       155,539    1,817,258     1,922,129 1,914,711 149,812       151,820     149,431          
215 A6-B6-D5 2,052,912       174,093    1,920,481     2,025,352 2,007,612 168,411       170,403     166,057         
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
access 
control 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual 
risk: 
biometrics 
performance 
+10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
residual risk: 
detection 
performance 
+10%
PortfolioPortfolio No
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
security costs
Ex-ante 
simulation: 
residual 
risk
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
access 
control cost - 
10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
biometrics 
cost - 10%
Ex-post 
simulation 
security 
costs: 
detection 
cost - 10%
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five or less.  In the case of port facility F, there were no alternative portfolios found 
ex-post the simulation; in port facility A there was only one alternative portfolio 
found ex-post the simulation; in port facility C there were four alternative portfolios 
found ex-post the simulation; and in port facility E there were five alternative 
portfolios found ex-post the simulation.  
From this it can be inferred that the results of the original (ex-ante) portfolio 
optimization exercise appear to be robust.  Only in the case of port facility D were 
there nine alternative portfolios identified by the simulations, but it should be borne in 
mind that the nine portfolios are in addition to 154 portfolios ex-ante the simulations 
where both the residual security risk and security investment .    
However, the appearance of robustness of the original portfolio optimization exercise 
can be affirmed by plotting the results of the portfolio optimization ex-post the 
sensitivity analysis.  The ex-post simulation results for port facility A are shown in 
chart 5.13.  When compared with chart 5.7, which represents the portfolio 
optimization exercise for port facility A ex-ante the sensitivity analysis, the overall 
pattern remains similar.  As the clustering of the mapped points of the portfolios ex-
post the sensitivity analysis is similar for all of the port facilities, it is not necessary to 
re-draw charts 5.8 to 5.12 to illustrate this. 
 
 
Chart 5.13 – Optimum Portfolio Analysis (Port Facility A) ex-post the sensitivity 
analysis 
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5.11 Results of the Portfolio Optimization 
The portfolio optimization has produced some interesting results.  The results are 
presented in two parts: first, the optimum and alternative portfolios which are most 
successful in reducing residual security risk; and secondly, the optimum and 
alternative portfolios which are most successful in reducing the security investment.  
Thirdly, a Venn Diagram shows the combination of the two.  Finally, an explanation 
for the clustering effect found in the portfolio optimization will be made. 
 
5.11.1 Reducing Residual Security Risk 
The optimum portfolio for minimising the residual risk for both port facility A and 
port facility C is portfolio number 13, which consists of access control from port 
facility A, biometrics from port facility C and detection system from port facility A.  
The optimum portfolio for minimising the residual risk in both port facility D and port 
facility F is portfolio number 67, which consists of access control from port facility B, 
biometrics from port facility F and detection from port facility A.  The optimum 
portfolios for minimising the residual risk in port facility B and port facility E are 
portfolio numbers 50 (A2-B3-D2) and 31 (A1-B6-D1) respectively.  Overall, the 
security systems which make up the optimum portfolios for the reduction of residual 
risk across all of the port facilities consist of the following (in various combinations): 
- Access control from either port facility A (A1) or port facility B (A2) 
- Biometrics from either port facility C (B3) or port facility F (B6) 
- Detection from either port facility A (D1) or port facility B (D2) 
  
5.11.2 Reducing Security Investment 
The optimum portfolio for minimising the security investment for port facility C, port 
facility D, port facility E and port facility F is portfolio number 15, which consists of 
access control from port facility A and biometrics and detection from port facility C.  
It is particularly interesting that one optimum portfolio of security systems is so 
dominant in minimising security investment.  The portfolio for minimising the 
security investment in port facility A is portfolio number 13 (see above); and the 
corresponding portfolio for port facility B is number 14, which consists of access 
control from port facility A, biometrics from port facility C and detection from port 
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facility B.  Overall, the security systems which make up the best performing portfolios 
for the reduction of security investment across all of the port facilities consist of the 
following (in various combinations): 
- Access control from port facility A (A1) 
- Biometrics from port facility C (B3) 
- Detection from port facility A (D1), port facility B (D2) or port facility C (D3) 
 
5.11.3 Reducing both Residual Security Risk and Security Investment 
The security systems which are common to both the optimum portfolios for reduction 
in residual security risk and security investment are A1, B3, D1 and D2 as depicted in 
the intersection in the Venn Diagram in figure 5.1.  They represent the access control 
and detection systems from port facility A, the biometrics system from port facility C 
and the detection system from port facility B. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Venn Diagram of Optimum Portfolios for Reduction of both Security 
Investment and Residual Security  Risk 
 
5.12 Explanation for Clustering Effect 
An explanation is offered for the clustering effect highlighted by the portfolio 
optimization.  The clear division in the figures for the security investment between the 
two clusters makes the process relatively straightforward.   The left hand cluster in 
charts 1 to 6 ends where the security investment is $2,387,582 (in portfolio #14) and 
the right hand cluster begins where the security investment is $2,946,811 (in portfolio 
#214).   An examination of the portfolios where the security investment is $2,946,811 
or greater yielded one common denominator: the inclusion in every alternative 
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portfolio in the right hand cluster of the security system D2, namely the detection 
system from port facility B.  The evidence for this is shown in table 5.50.  However, 
in order to be able to prove conclusively that security system D2 is responsible for the 
clustering, an analysis was conducted of the other 180 alternative portfolios and none 
were found to contain the security system D2.  It is therefore shown that the clustering 
effect is entirely down to the inclusion in the alternative portfolios of the security 
system D2.  
 
Table 5.50 – Cluster Analysis of Alternative Portfolios where the Security Investment 
is $2,946,831 or greater. 
 
  
Portfolio 
number Cost
212 A6 B6 D2 4,356,237 
206 A6 B5 D2 4,164,637 
182 A6 B1 D2 4,114,274 
200 A6 B4 D2 4,092,837 
188 A6 B2 D2 4,088,637 
194 A6 B3 D2 4,083,317 
140 A4 B6 D2 3,861,655 
68 A2 B6 D2 3,746,925 
134 A4 B5 D2 3,670,055 
110 A4 B1 D2 3,619,692 
128 A4 B4 D2 3,598,255 
116 A4 B2 D2 3,594,055 
122 A4 B3 D2 3,588,735 
62 A2 B5 D2 3,555,325 
38 A2 B1 D2 3,504,962 
56 A2 B4 D2 3,483,525 
44 A2 B2 D2 3,479,325 
50 A2 B3 D2 3,474,005 
104 A3 B6 D2 3,444,659 
98 A3 B5 D2 3,253,059 
176 A5 B6 D2 3,238,925 
32 A1 B6 D2 3,219,751 
74 A3 B1 D2 3,202,696 
92 A3 B4 D2 3,181,259 
80 A3 B2 D2 3,177,059 
86 A3 B3 D2 3,171,739 
170 A5 B5 D2 3,047,325 
26 A1 B5 D2 3,028,151 
146 A5 B1 D2 2,996,962 
2 A1 B1 D2 2,977,788 
164 A5 B4 D2 2,975,525 
152 A5 B2 D2 2,971,325 
158 A5 B3 D2 2,966,005 
20 A1 B4 D2 2,956,351 
8 A1 B2 D2 2,952,151 
14 A1 B3 D2 2,946,831 
Security system
133 
 
5.13 Results of the Reliability Test using Cronbach’s Alpha 
The final result to be presented in this chapter is the measure of Cronbach’s Alpha as 
described in section 3.4 above.  In a 40 minute telephone call follow-up interview 
held on 21 October 2009, the second CSO was asked to repeat the exercise of 
providing his subjective assessments of the performances of the security systems for 
port facilities E and F.  While the CSO was aware that the telephone call would take 
place, he was not made aware beforehand of the content of the call.   
The results are shown in table 5.51. 
 Table 5.51 – Subjective assessments of Security system performance provided by the second CSO 
when re-interviewed on 21 October 2009 for Port Facility E and Port Facility F 
 
The subjective assessments of the performances of the security systems from the 
telephone interview were compared with the data obtained in the interviews in March 
2009 and the correlations are shown in table 5.52.   
 
 
Table 5.52 – Correlations of security system performances for Port facility E and Port F used for 
calculating Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Port Facility E
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection
Bomb introduced by person on foot 70% 80% 0%
Car Bomb 100% 80% 0%
Truck bomb 75% 80% 0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 80% 0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 0% 0% 0%
Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%
Port Facility F
Type of Security Incident Access Control Biometrics Detection
Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 90%
Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%
Truck bomb 90% 90% 0%
Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 80%
Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 80%
Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%
Security system performance
Security system performance
Cronbach's Alpha Calculation: Correlations 
  A5 first B5 first D5 first A6 first B6 first D6 first
A5 second 0.974
B5 second 1
D5 second 1
A6 second 0.996
B6 second 1
D6 second 0.726
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In the follow-up telephone interview, the second CSO stated that he did not have a 
copy of the data which he had given in the first interview in March 2009 but 
nevertheless the results are astonishing in how closely correlated they are: they yield a 
figure for Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.9912.  Given that the figure for Alpha is over 0.8, 
this means that the data can be considered to be very reliable (Forza, 2002, p177.)  
This means that there is no need to revise the subjective assessments of the 
performance of the port facilities’ security systems given by the CSOs and that the 
data supplied by them in the earlier interviews is still valid for the purposes of this 
research.  
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Chapter 6 – Discussion 
The chapter begins with an overview of the research findings, including linking the 
results to the literature.  Next, the discussion compares the two approaches, the 
Markowitz method and the portfolio optimization approach.  Finally, the discussion 
addresses the contribution which this thesis makes to academic research and makes 
suggestions for areas of future research.   
 
 
6.1 Overview of the Research Findings 
The research has focussed on the modelling of efficiency in port security systems and 
has addressed the research questions introduced in section 1.4.  The efficient 
relationship between port security residual security risk and security investment has 
been discovered through the application of Markowitz theory of portfolio selection.   
Furthermore, the structured nature of the research enables direct comparisons to be 
made between the security systems in the port facilities.  Recalling the security 
performance results in tables 5.30, 5.31 and 5.32, some interesting conclusions can be 
drawn about the findings.  Table 5.30 allows a direct comparison between the port 
facilities as to how the security systems perform and their costs.  This is useful for a 
CSO to understand better where the strengths and weaknesses in the port facilities’ 
security systems lie.   
The benefit-cost ratios in table 5.31 enable a CSO to compare how much the residual 
risk is reduced in the port facilities given the security investment.  This ratio can be 
used to identify by how much the residual risk would reduce given the introduction of 
new technology. 
The residual risk : expected loss ratios in table 5.32 allow a comparison of how well 
the port facilities overall security systems perform in the face of the prescribed 
security threats.  It is from this table that a CSO can draw some conclusions regarding 
how secure the port facilities are: the lower the ratio, the higher the level of security.       
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6.2 Research Findings – Links to the Literature 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the research findings in the light of the 
literature.  The four main areas linked to the existing literature are: security 
investment; security incident costs; port security risk sources; and port security 
benefit-cost analysis. 
6.2.1 Security Investment  
The figures for security investment for Port facility A (table 5.8), Port facility C (table 
5.16) and Port facility E (table 5.24) compare favourably with the average security 
investments in both Dekker and Stevens (2007) and Benamara and Asariotis (2007) in 
section 2.7.  However, the literature only provides the average security investments 
and running costs for different types of port facilities and does not include all of the 
results.  Therefore, it is difficult to know how the three remaining port facilities 
compare. 
6.2.2 Security Incident Costs 
The figures for the security incident costs provided by the Director of Security and 
reproduced in section 5.1 appear to be on a comparable scale to the figures provided 
in the OECD (2003) report in section 2.7 and focus explicitly on the port facility 
rather than try to estimate the economic impact on the economy as a whole.  This 
addition to the literature is useful in that it provides a subjective assessment by a port 
security expert on the potential losses arising from certain prescribed terrorist attacks.   
6.2.3 Port Security Risk Sources 
The one weakness with this research has been the inability to address, in their entirety, 
the port security risk sources adapted from Juttner et al (2003) as described in section 
2.3.2: the research was limited to sources of terrorism risk by the limitations of the 
data available.   Consideration must be given to wider environmental, network-related 
and organisational risk sources for future research of this nature to be of greater value.  
6.2.4 Port Security Benefit-Cost Analysis 
The benefit-cost analysis described by Willis and LaTourette (2008) in section 2.9 
refers to a regulation being justified if the incremental cost of implementing the 
regulation is exceeded by the incremental benefit generated by the regulation.  The 
security benefit-cost ratios in table 5.31 tell us that this principle is upheld only in the 
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example of Port facility A where $1 of investment in security results in a $7.13 
reduction in residual security risk.  In the other five examples , the security 
performance ratios are well below 1 and in the case of Port facility B it is particularly 
low at 0.0325.  This suggests that the ISPS Code would not qualify as a justified 
regulation in the sense that Willis and LaTourette (2008) intended.   
   
6.3 Markowitz Portfolio Selection Approach 
As has been shown in Talas & Menachof (2009), a conceptual model of the 
application of portfolio selection theory can be applied to port security.  However, the 
conceptual model in the paper and the application of Markowitz theory of portfolio 
selection in this research differs in one key aspect:  the conceptual model assumes that 
the portfolio of security systems is sufficiently diversified for the application of 
portfolio theory to work.   
In this research, the very close correlations between the performances of the security 
systems in three of the port facilities: A, B and C means that the application of the 
Markowitz theory may lose some of its value for these port facilities, though the 
application of the methodology is still valid.   
However, this still begs the question: why are the performances of the security 
systems so closely correlated for port facilities A, B and C?  
There does not appear to be any clear answer to the question.  However, the 
interviews conducted with the two CSOs divide the six port facilities into two groups: 
the port facilities for which the first CSO was interviewed are, coincidentally port 
facilities A, B and C; while the second CSO was interviewed about port facilities D, E 
and F.  No firm conclusions can be drawn at this stage regarding the differences 
between the subjective assessments given by the two CSOs but scope exists for 
further research into this phenomenon, perhaps beginning with Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) work on cognitive bias and the phenomenon of anchoring. 
 
6.4 Portfolio Optimization Approach 
The portfolio optimization approach follows a robust methodology.  Its application 
has shown the optimum and alternative portfolios which result in both a reduction in 
residual security risk and security investment.  This is significant because it tells us a 
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great deal about the performance of the security systems and how to combine them in 
the most efficient manner.  The Venn Diagram in figure 5.1 shows the security 
systems which form the optimum portfolios for reducing both residual security risk 
and security investment.  It is interesting to note that two of the security systems 
belong to port facility A, the port facility with the highest benefit-cost ratio. 
Furthermore, the distribution of optimum and alternative portfolios in charts 5.7 to 
5.12 in themselves give rise to a solution of the efficient relationship between a port 
facility’s residual security risk and the security investment, an illustration of which is 
shown in chart 6.1.  Given the existing levels of security threats to the port facilities 
and the existing security systems with their associated levels of performance in view 
of the security threats, the efficient frontier marks the boundary of what is achievable 
in terms of the efficient relationship between residual risk and security investment and 
the 216 possible portfolios lie either on the curve or to the right of the curve.  This 
addresses the problem the research set out to address in section 1.2.  
 
 
Chart 6.1: An illustration of the residual security risk – security investment efficient 
frontier 
 
As in Chopra and Sodhi (2004), it is possible to move along the curve and for the port 
facility still to have an efficient relationship between residual security risk and 
security investment.   However, what is interesting is what causes the efficient frontier 
curve to shift up and down and by how much.  The curve might shift downwards if a 
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new technology were to be introduced which causes a security system to perform 
better than the status quo.  However, the curve might shift upwards if the background 
threat level deteriorates.  The key outcome of the research is that movements in and 
along the efficient frontier curve are quantifiable and their significance can be 
understood in financial terms.  This can be particularly useful for decision makers 
without a background in security who can, nonetheless appreciate the change in such 
terms. 
 
6.5 A Comparison of the Markowitz Method and Portfolio Optimization 
One of the outcomes of the research has been the ability to compare the ability of the 
two approaches in the reduction of residual security risk in a port facility.  The 
Markowitz approach works by efficiently rearranging the existing security systems as 
a portfolio and the portfolio optimization approach works by theoretically importing 
better performing security systems from other port facilities and modelling how the 
new portfolio of security systems works compared with the status quo.  A comparison 
of the results shows that there is no clear winner between the two approaches.  For 
port facility A, the Markowitz approach reduces risk by $422,165 while the portfolio 
optimization approach produces a reduction in risk of only $63,136.  Similarly, for 
port facility B, the Markowitz approach reduces risk by $25,264 while the portfolio 
optimization approach manages only a $1,355 reduction in risk.  For port facility C, 
the results are much closer as the Markowitz approach reduces risk by $67,151 and 
the portfolio optimization approach reduces risk by $32,527. 
However, for port facility D, the positions are reversed.  The Markowitz approach 
reduces risk by $67,151 but the portfolio optimization approach reduces risk by 
$309,837 which is a considerable difference.  Similarly, for port facility E, the 
Markowitz approach reduces risk by $74,156 while the portfolio optimization 
approach reduces risk by $104,730.  Finally, the comparison of the two methods for 
port facility F is similar to port facility C in that the Markowitz approach reduces risk 
by $62,303 and the portfolio optimization approach reduces risk by $59,379. 
In attempting an explanation for these differences, it is perhaps useful to examine the 
positions of the six port facilities’ portfolios in relation to the frontier in chart 6.1. 
The positions of port facilities A and B are very close to the frontier, ie their security 
systems are already quite efficient and in both instances , the Markowitz approach 
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was clearly more successful in risk reduction.  Considering port facilities C and F, 
they can be described as being near to the frontier and in both instances , the two 
approaches are comparable in their ability to reduce risk.  However, what is clear is 
that for port facilities D and E, which lie much further away from the efficient 
frontier, the portfolio optimization approach produces the much larger reduction in 
risk, compared to the Markowitz approach.  Further research could be carried into 
producing a definitive explanation for this phenomenon.   
   
6.6 Contribution 
The use of Markowitz theory of portfolio selection and portfolio optimization to 
arrive at the efficient relationship between residual security risk and security 
investment for port facilities is significant on three accounts.  First, the methods can 
be employed in the development of Greenfield sites to guide a Company Security 
Officer to implement a security system which best suits his/her requirements in terms 
of both residual security risk and security investment and to do so efficiently.  
Secondly, the proposed introduction of new port security technology with an 
enhanced performance in an existing port facility can be modelled to learn the extent 
to which the residual security risk might be reduced, for a new given level of security 
investment.  Thirdly, a change in the background security threat to a port facility can 
be quantified in terms of a change to the residual security risk.  CSOs can use this 
information to help them decide on a possible course of action to address the change 
in threat.  Furthermore, the quantifiable nature of the measure of residual security risk 
will enable executives from outside of the security department to understand the 
impact of security investment generally and to enable CSOs to justify their security 
spend.  Fourthly, a theoretical contribution is derived through the adaptation of the 
Markowitz model from the field of finance, including stock markets, to the field of 
port security, in both cases with different sets of assumptions.  
Finally, the research has yielded new definitions of port security and port security risk 
as well as providing the tools to measure two port security ratios: the security benefit-
cost ratio which can be used when conducting a benefit-cost analysis; and the residual 
risk : expected loss ratio which enables a CSO or PFSO to compare the effectiveness 
of port security systems against prescribed security incidents. 
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6.7 Areas for Further Research 
There are a three main areas for further research.  The first concerns  the implications 
of the cross-disciplinary application of Markowitz theory of portfolio selection and 
portfolio optimization.  The second area continues the work of Gleason (1980) and 
examines probability distributions for terrorism which are not explained by Poisson.  
The third area for further research is concerned with the use of new data sources.  
Each of the three areas will be examined briefly below. 
The first area for further research would be to collect empirical data on the change in 
performance of a port facility’s security systems through the introduction of new 
technology or working practices.  Further research could also include the application 
of the theory in the selection of a new security system for a Greenfield site.  A further 
suggestion could be an attempt to discover whether the application of the ISPS Code, 
or some of the other security initiatives outlined in chapter II, can be made to be more 
efficient, in line with Willis and LaTourette’s (2008) test for justified security 
legislation.   
The second area of further research is to continue the work in this research which 
builds on Gleason’s (1980) research on the probability distributions which may 
describe terrorism events.  While this research has demonstrated that between 1968 
and 2007, terrorist attacks against ports or against shipping in ports follows a Poission 
distribution, there is no evidence to suggest that terrorist attacks against non-port 
targets or other non-port maritime targets follow a Poisson distribution.  Therefore, 
there is scope to research terrorist attacks of both marine and non-marine locations in 
order to discover the nature of the probability distributions which best describe them. 
The third area of further research is the use of new sources of data.  Such sources 
include ISPS Code compliant port facilities which are not container terminals, or other 
nodes in the supply chain such as warehouses or logistics parks which have adopted 
security systems and practices which are aligned with the ISPS Code.    Furthermore, 
new sources of data can also include different forms of risk, not limited to terrorism 
alone, such as in this research.  This would serve to address the gap in the literature 
described by Juttner et al (2003). 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
The research has focussed on the field of port security, an area of increasing interest 
to academics and was based on an industry example, namely six container port 
facilities owned by Dubai Ports (DP) World.  The existing literature has been 
examined and new definitions of security, port security, port security risk and port 
security risk management have been proposed.  Furthermore, a model of port security 
risk has been developed, based on Willis et al’s (2005) definition of terrorist risk. 
The main research question considered how ISPS Code compliant port facilities can 
discover the efficient relationship between residual security risk and security 
investment.  In order to address the main research question, it was broken down into 
two further research questions which addressed what it means for a port facility to be 
ISPS Code compliant and how the efficient relationship between residual security risk 
and security investment can be calculated.  The latter was tackled by means of asking 
a further five questions concerning security threats to port facilities; estimated gross 
losses to the port facilities following prescribed security threats; the security systems 
present in the port facilities; the performance of the security systems in the face of the 
prescribed security threats; and the security systems’ costs.  In order to tackle the 
main research question, an adaptive research strategy was employed, which  
combined contemporary empirical data in an industry example with a theory from the 
field of finance to produce a solution to the current problem.  The research 
methodology employed mixed methods, which included survey questionnaires to 
assess the six DP World port facilities’ security systems and costs; structured 
interviews with two of DP World’s company security officers for their subjective 
evaluations of the performance of the security systems; and an interview with a 
Lloyd’s Underwriter of terrorism risks.   
The research has intentionally not produced any new theory about port security but 
has shown how company security officers can assess whether a port facility’s security 
systems are efficient.  This has been achieved in two ways: first, the Markowitz 
approach has treated a port facility’s security systems as a portfolio in order to arrive 
at an efficient solution based on the risk-return (expected performance – standard 
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deviation) efficient frontier of the performance of the port facilities’ security systems 
in the face of prescribed security threats.   
The second approach was a portfolio optimization approach which theoretically 
constructed an optimum portfolio drawn from the security systems in the different 
port facilities in order to arrive at the best solution for risk reduction for that port 
facility, in much the same way as one might construct a ‘fantasy cricket team’ drawn 
from the best players in a cricket league.  The portfolio optimization approach 
produced the efficient solution for the relationship between risk and security 
investment drawn from all 216 possible combinations of security system portfolios 
from among the three security systems (access control, biometrics and detection) 
across the six port facilities.  The issue of the use of a relatively small dataset was 
addressed by conducting a sensitivity analysis using a simulation whereby the costs of 
the security systems were individually reduced by 10% while at the same time the 
performance of the individual security systems were individually improved by 10%.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis showed that following the simulation, the initial 
results of the portfolio optimization were still valid. 
The main difference between the two approaches is that Markowitz method can be 
applied to a port facility in isolation, whereas the portfolio optimization approach 
relies on data from more than one port facility. 
These two approaches were then compared and the results were mixed as to which 
method was more effective in reducing port security risk, though it appears that for 
those portfolios of security systems which lie closest to the efficient frontier solution, 
the Markowitz approach would be best suited to reduce risk and vice versa for the 
portfolios that lie furthest away from the efficient frontier. 
Furthermore, the results of the research are generalizable to any ISPS Code compliant 
port facility or to any other type of node in the supply chain, such as a warehouse or 
logistics park, which consists of similar security systems and follows a similar 
security regime as that described in the ISPS Code. 
The work by Gleason (1980) was extended to include more contemporary data on 
terrorist attacks on ports and on shipping in ports and these attacks were also shown to 
follow a Poisson distribution.  This means that it is possible to arrive at a probability 
for a terrorist attack on a port or on shipping in a port in any given year, though with 
two key assumptions, namely that all attacks are independent and all port facilities are 
equally likely to be attacked.  However, these two assumptions may be too great to 
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bear and thus it is still necessary to rely on the expert opinion of maritime terrorism 
underwriters from Lloyd’s of London or other reputable underwriting establishments.   
Furthermore, the research has produced two new port security ratios: the residual risk 
reduction : security expenditure ratio; and the residual risk : expected loss ratio.  
These ratios can be of use to port security personnel and company security officers 
when evaluating their security systems.  The research contribution also includes a 
roadmap for developing security systems for Greenfield sites based on knowledge of 
existing security systems and the modelling of changes in background security risk 
and the introduction of new technology.   
Finally, there is scope to extend the research in the future to include many more types 
of security threat, not only including the threat from terrorists, in order to build a more 
comprehensive model which will be of interest to academics and practitioners alike. 
 
  
145 
 
References 
 
Abkowitz, M.D. (2003) “Transportation Risk Management: A New Paradigm”, 
Proceedings of the Transportation Research Board 82nd Annual Meeting, January 11-
16 
 
ABS Consulting (2003) “Port Security Guide”, 
http://www.absconsulting.com/resources/Port_Security_Guide.pdf accessed 12 
December 2007 
 
Angelides, P. (2001) “The development of an efficient technique for collecting and 
analyzing qualitative data: the analysis of critical incidents”, Qualitative Studies in 
Education, Vol. 14, No. 3, 429-442 
 
Anyanova, E (2007) “The EC and Enhancing Ship and Port Facility Security”, 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, Vol 2, 1 
 
Arora, A., Hall, D., Pinto, A., Ramsey, D. & Telang, R. (2004) “Measuring the Risk-
Based Value of IT Security Solutions”, IEEE IT Professional 6: 35-42  
 
Aryasinha, R. (2001) “Terrorism, the LTTE and the conflict in Sri Lanka”, Conflict, 
Security and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.25-50 
 
Banomyong, R. (2005) “The impact of port facility And trade security initiatives on 
maritime supply-chain management”, Journal of Maritime Policy & Management, 
Jan-Mar 2005, vol. 32, no. 1, 3–13 
 
Baldwin, D.A. (2005) “The Concept of Security” in Diehl, P.F. (ed.) “War”, vol. 1, 
pp. 1-24, London: Sage 
 
Barnes, P & Oloruntoba, R (2005) “Assurance of Security in Maritime Supply 
Chains: Conceptual Issues of Vulnerability and Crisis Management”, Journal of 
International Management 11(4) 
 
Barry, J. (2004) “Supply chain risk in an uncertain global supply chain environment”, 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management,  Vol. 34 No. 
9, pp. 695-697 
 
Bedford T. & Cooke, R (2001) “Probabilistic Risk Analysis: Foundations and 
Methods”, Cambridge University Press  
 
Benamara, H. & Asariotis, R. (2007) “ISPS Code implementation in ports: costs and 
related financing” in Bichou, K., Bell, M.G.H. & Evans, A., Eds. (2007) “Risk 
management in port operations, logistics and supply chain security”, Informa, London 
 
Bichou, K. (2004) “The ISPS Code and The Cost of Port facility Compliance: An 
Initial Logistics and Supply Chain Framework for Port Security Assessment and 
Management”, Journal of Maritime Economics & Logistics, 6, (322–348)  
 
146 
 
Bichou, K. (2009) “Security and risk-based models in shipping and ports: review and 
critical analysis” in OECD/ITF Roundtable 144 “Terrorism and international 
transport: towards risk-based security policy”, OECD/ITF Transport Research Centre 
 
Bichou, K. & Evans, A. (2007) “Maritime security and regulatory risk-based models: 
review and critical analysis” in Bichou, K., Bell, M.G.H. & Evans, A., Eds. (2007) 
“Risk management in port operations, logistics and supply chain security”, Informa, 
London 
 
Bichou, K. & Gray, R (2004) “A logistics and supply chain management approach to 
port performance measurement”, Journal of Maritime Policy and Management, 
January-March 2004, Vol 31 no 1, pp 47-67  
 
Billington, CJ. (2001) “Managing risks in ports” In: (ed). “Managing Risks in 
Shipping: A Practical Guide” The Nautical Institute: London. pp. 57–69. 
 
Broder, J. (2006) “Risk Analysis and the Security Survey”, Boston, 3rd Edition 
 
Bryman, A. (2004) “Social Research Methods”, Oxford, 2nd Edition 
 
Burke, R.J. (2005) “International terrorism and threats to security”, Journal of 
Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 14 No. 5, pp. 639-643 
 
Buzan, Barry (1991) “People, states and fear: an agenda for international security 
studies in the post cold-war era”, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 
 
Byrne, P. & Lee, S. (1994) “Computing Markowitz Efficient Frontiers Using a 
Spreadsheet Optimizer”, Journal of Property Finance, Vol. 5, No.1, pp58-66 
 
Chopra, S. & Sodhi, M.S. (2004) “Managing Risk to Avoid Supply Chain 
Breakdown”, MIT Sloan Management Review 
 
Christopher, M. (2005) “Logistics and Supply Chain Management”, 3rd Edition, FT 
Prentice Hall 
 
Clark L. & Watson D., “Constructing Validity: Basic Issues in Objective Scale 
Development”, Psychological Assessment. 7(3):309-319, September 1995 
 
Clemen, R.T. and Winkler, R.L. (1999), “Combining Probability Distributions from 
Experts in Risk Analysis,” Risk Analysis, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp.187-203  
 
Closs, D. & McGarrell, F. (2004) “Enhancing Security Throughout the Supply 
Chain”, IBM Center for the Business of Government Special Report Series, April 
2004 
 
Containerisation International (2003) “Security versus supply chain” pp. 49–53. 
 
Cremers, P and Chawla, P. (1999) “Shipboard management and safety standards” 
BIMCO Review, 7th Edition, 234–237. 
 
147 
 
Cronbach, L.J. (1951) “Coefficient Alpha and the internal structure of tests”, 
Psychometrika, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp 297-334 
 
De Rugy, V. (2004) “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research working paper #107 
 
De Vaus, D. (2002) “Surveys in Social Research” 5th Ed, London: Routledge 
 
Dekker, S. & Stevens, H. (2007) “Maritime security in the European Union – 
empirical findings on financial implications for port facilities”, Maritime Policy and 
Management, Vol. 34, No. 5, 485-499 
 
Dorfman, R. (1993) “An introduction to benefit–cost analysis” In: Stavins, RN (ed). 
“Economics of the Environment” 4th Edition, Norton & Co: New York, NY. pp. 297–
322 
 
Drewry Shipping Consultants. (1998) “Cost of quality shipping: The financial 
implications of the current regulatory environment” London, November 1998 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. & Lowe, A. (1991) “Management Research: an 
Introduction”, Sage Publications, London 
 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989) “Building Theories from Case Study Research”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 14, No.4, pp 532-550 
 
Eisenhardt, K. (1991) “Better stories and better constructs: the case for rigor and 
comparative logic”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 620-627 
 
Eisenhardt, K. & Graebner, M. (2007) “Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities 
and Challenges”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp 25-32 
 
Farrow, S. & Shapiro, S (2009) “The benefit-cost analysis of security focussed 
regulations”, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 6, No. 
1, Article 25 
 
Fischer, R. J. & Green, G. (2004) “Introduction to security”, 7th ed., Boston: 
Butterworth Heinemann 
 
Forza, C. (2002) “Survey research in operations management: a process-based 
perspective”, International Journal of Operations and Production Management, Vol. 
22, No. 2, pp 152-194 
 
Fredouet, C-H. (2007) “Global Supply-Chain Securitization as Applied to Port 
Operations: A Knowledge-based Approach”, Journal of International Logistics and 
Trade, Vol 5, Number 1, pp 57-73 
 
Gaonkar, R. & Viswanadham, N. (2004) “A conceptual and analytical framework for 
the managing of risks in supply chains”, Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International 
Conference on Robotics and Automation, April 26-May 1, Vol. 3, pp2699-2704 
 
148 
 
Gardela, K. & Hoffman, B. (1990) “The RAND Chronology of International 
Terrorism for 1986”, RAND Corporation 
 
Gardela, K. & Hoffman, B. (1991) “The RAND Chronology of International 
Terrorism for 1987”, RAND Corporation 
 
Gardela, K. & Hoffman, B. (1992) “The RAND Chronology of International 
Terrorism for 1988”, RAND Corporation 
 
Gerencser, M., Weinberg, J. & Vincent, D. (2003) “Port Security War Game”, Booz 
Allen Hamilton 
 
Gill, J. (2002) “Bayesian Methods: A Social and Behavioural Sciences Approach”, 
Chapman & Hall/CRC 
 
Gleason, J. M.(1980) 'A Poisson model of incidents of international terrorism in the 
United States', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 4: 1, 259 — 265 
 
Gordon, P., Moore II, J., Richardson, H. & Pan, Q. (2005) “The Economic Impact of  
a Terrorist Attack on the Twin Ports of Los Angeles-Long Beach”, Center for Risk 
and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events report facility Draft #05-012, University 
of Southern California 
 
Goulielmos, A. & Anastasakos, A. (2005) “Worldwide security measures for 
shipping, seafarers and ports: an impact assessment of the ISPS Code”, Journal of 
Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 14 No. 4, 2005 
 
Greenberg, M, Chalk, P, Willis, H, Khilko, I & Ortiz, D (2006) “Maritime Terrorism: 
Risk and Liability”, RAND Corporation Centre for Terrorism and Risk Management 
Policy 
 
Guerrero, H., Murray, D. & Flood, R. (2008) “A model for supply chain and vessel 
traffic restoration in the event of a catastrophic port facility Closure”, Journal of 
Transportation Security, 1:71-80 
 
Gutierrez, X., Hintsa, J., Wieser, P. & Hameri, A-P. (2007) “Voluntary supply chain 
security impacts: an empirical study with BASC members companies”, World 
Customs Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp31-48 
 
Harrald, J. (2005) “Sea trade and security: An assessment of the post-9/11 reaction”, 
Journal of International Affairs, 59: 157 – 178. 
 
Harrald, J., Stevens, H.W. & vanDorp, J.R. (2004) “A framework for sustainable port 
security”, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management , Vol. 1 (2): 
Article 12. 
 
Haubrich, D. (2006) “Modern Politics in an Age of Global Terrorism: New 
Challenges for Domestic Public Policy” Journal of Political Studies, Vol 54, 399-423 
 
149 
 
Haveman, J.D., & Shatz, H.J. (2006) “Financing Port Security” in Havemen, J.D. & 
Shatz, H.J. (Eds.) “Protecting the Nation’s Ports: Balancing Security and Cost”, 
Public Policy Institute of California 
 
Heimer, C. (1988) “Social structure, psychology and the estimation of risk”, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 14:491-519 
 
Helmick, J.S. (2008) “Port facility and maritime security: a research perspective”, 
Journal of Transportation Security, 1:15-28 
 
Hesse, H. & Charalambous, N.L. (2004) “New Security Measures for the 
International Shipping Community”, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2004, Vol. 3, 
No.2, 123–138 
 
Hilmola, O-P., Hejazi, A. & Ojala, L. (2005) “Supply Chain Management Research 
Using Case Studies: A Literature Analysis”, International Journal of Integrated 
Supply Management, Vol. 1, No. 3 
 
Hoaglund, R. & Gazda, W. (2007) “Assessment of Performance Measures for 
Security of the Maritime Transportation Network, Port Security Metrics: Proposed 
Measurement of Deterrence Capability”, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Research Innovative Technology Administration  
 
International Maritime Organisation (2003) “International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code”, IMO: London 
 
International Organisation for Standardisation, (2005) “ISO 28000”, Technical 
Committee ISO/TC8 (Ships and Marine Technology), Geneva 
 
Jenkins, B., Cordes, B., Gardela, K. & Petty, G. (1983) “A Chronology of Terrorist 
Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets”, RAND Corporation  
 
Jones, S. (2006) “Maritime Security: A Practical Guide”, The Nautical Institute 
 
Juttner, U. (2005) “Supply chain risk management – understanding the business 
requirements from a practitioner perspective”, International Journal of Logistics 
Management, 16, 1: 120-141 
 
Juttner, U., Peck, H. and Christopher, M. (2003) “Supply chain risk management: 
outlining an agenda for future research”, International Journal of Logistics: Research 
and Applications, Vol. 6 No.4, pp. 199-213 
 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979) “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk”, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 263-292. 
 
Kunreuther, H., Meszaros, J., Hogarth, R. & Spranca, M., (1995)  “Ambiguity and 
Underwriter Decision Processes”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
Vol. 26, 337-352 
 
150 
 
Kunreuther, H., Hogarth, R. & Meszaros, J (1993) “Insurer ambiguity and market 
failure”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 71-87. 
 
Lafree, G. & Dugan, L. (2007) “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database”, Journal 
of Terrorism and Political Violence, 19:181–204 
 
Lambert, J.H. (2007) “Risk-cost-benefit analysis for port facility Environmental 
security investments” in Linkov, I. et al (eds.) “Managing Critical Infrastructure 
Risks”, pp299-307, Springer 
 
Lee, H. and Whang, S., "Higher Supply Chain Security with Lower Cost: Lessons 
from Total Quality Management" (October 19, 2003). Stanford GSB Research Paper 
No. 1824  
 
Lee, H.L. & Wolfe, M. (2003) “Supply chain security without tears”, Supply Chain 
Management Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp 12-21  
 
Lewis, B., Erera, A. & White III, C. (2007) “Optimization approaches for efficient 
container security operations at transhipment ports”, Journal of the Transportation 
Research Board, Vol. 1822, pp 1-8 
 
Lowrance, W.W. (1980) “The nature of risk”, in Schwing, R.C. and Albers, W.A. 
(Eds) How Safe is Safe Enough?, Plenum Press, New York 
 
Ma, S. (2002) “Economics of maritime safety and environment regulations” In: 
Grammenos, CT (ed). “The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business” LLP: 
London. pp. 399–426 
 
Mangan, J., Lalwani, C. & Gardner, B. (2004) “Combining quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies in logistics research”, International Journal of Physical 
Distribution and Logistics Management, Vol. 34, No. 7, pp565-578 
 
March, J.G. & Shapira, Z. (1987) “Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk 
Taking”, Management Science, Vol. 33, No. 11, pp. 1404-1418 
 
Markowitz, H (1952) “Portfolio Selection” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
pp77-91 
 
Martz, H. & Johnson, M. (1987) “Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks”, Risk Analysis 
Vol 7, No 1 
 
Maslow, A.H. (1942) “The Dynamics of Psychological Security-Insecurity”, Journal 
of Personality, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 331-334 
 
Merrick, J.R. & van Dorp, R. (2006) “Speaking the truth about maritime risk 
assessment”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp.223-237 
 
Miller, M.D. (1994) “Marine War Risks”, Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd, 2nd Edition 
 
151 
 
Miller, N. & Talas, R. (2007) “War, terrorism and associated perils in marine 
insurance” in Marangos, H. L. (ed.) “War Risks and Terrorism”, Insurance Institute of 
London Research Study Group 258 
 
Nincic, D. (2005) “The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification, 
WMD and Regime Response” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 619-
644 
 
OECD (1996) “Competitive advantages obtained by some shipowners as a result of 
non-observance of applicable international rules and standards” OECD/GD 96: 1–31. 
 
OECD (2003) “Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact”, 
Maritime Transport facility Committee, Directorate for Science, Technology and 
Industry 
 
Ouchi, F. (2004) “A Literature Review on the Use of Expert Opinion in Probabilistic 
Risk Analysis”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3201, February 2004 
 
Palac-McMiken, E. (2004) “Combating terrorism in the transport sector: economic 
costs and benefits”, Economic Analytical Unit, Australian Govt Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
Panayides, P. (2006) “Maritime Logistics and Global Supply Chains: Towards a 
Research Agenda”, Journal of Maritime Economics and Logistics, 8, 3-18 
 
Parfomak, P. & Frittelli, J. (2007) “Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and 
Protection Priorities”, CRS Report for Congress, 9 January 2007 
 
Peachey, JH. (2001) “Managing risk through legislation” In: The Nautical Institute 
(ed). “Managing Risks in Shipping: A Practical Guide” The Nautical Institute: 
London. pp. 92–105. 
 
Peck, H. (2006) “Reconciling supply chain vulnerability, risk and supply chain 
management”, International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, pp. 127-142 
 
Pinto, C.A. & Talley, W.K. (2006) “The Security Incident Cycle of Ports”, Maritime 
Economics & Logistics, 8 (267-286) 
 
Price, W (2004) “Reducing the Risk of Terror Events at Ports”, Review of Policy 
Research 21 (3), 329-349 
 
Prokop, D. (2004) “Smart and Safe Borders: The Logistics of Inbound Cargo 
Security”, International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 15, No. 2 
 
Pyzdek, T. (2003) “The Six Sigma Handbook”, McGraw-Hill 
 
Raymond, C.Z. (2006) “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment”, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:2, 239-257 
 
152 
 
Rice, J. & Spayd, P (2005) “Investing in Supply Chain Security: Collateral Benefits”, 
Special Report Series, IBM Center for The Business of Government  
 
Rao, S. & Goldsby, T.J. (2009) “Supply chain risks: a review and typology”, 
International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 20, No.1, pp97-123 
 
Robinson, P. (2008) “Dictionary of International Security”, Polity Press: Cambridge 
 
Rosoff, H. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2005) “A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty 
Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach”, Center for Risk and 
Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events report facility Draft #05-027 
 
Sheffi, Y. (2001) “Supply Chain Management Under the Threat of International 
Terrorism”, International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 12, No. 2 
 
Siggelkow, N. (2007) “Persuasion with Case Studies”, Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 50, No.1, 20-24 
 
Stasinopoulos, D. (2003) “Maritime Security – The Need for a Global Agreement”, 
Maritime Economics & Logistics, Vol. 5, pp311-320 
 
Stecke, K. & Kumar, S. (2008) “Sources of Supply Chain Disruptions, Factors that 
breed Vulnerability and Mitigating Strategies”, Journal of Marketing Channels, 
forthcoming 
 
Stock, J. (1997) “Applying Theories From Other Disciplines to Logistics”, 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 27, No. 
9/10 
 
Sunstein, C. (2003) “Terrorism and Probability Neglect”, Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 26:2/3; 121-136 
 
Talley, W. K. (1994) “Performance Indicators and Port Performance Evaluation,” 
Logistics and Transportation Review, 30: 339-352. 
 
Talley, W. K., (1998) “Optimum Throughput and Performance Evaluation of Marine 
Terminals,” Maritime Policy and Management, 15: 327-331. 
 
Talas, R. & Menachof, D. (2008) “The efficient trade off between security and cost 
for sea ports: a case study of an international ports company” in Lyons, A. (ed.), 
Logistics Research Network Conference Proceedings, University of Liverpool, 10-12 
September 2008 
Talas, R. & Menachof, D. (2009) “The efficient trade off between security and cost 
for sea ports: a conceptual model”, International Journal of Risk Assessment and 
Management, Vol. 13, No. 1 
 
Tang, S. (2006) “Robust strategies for mitigating supply chain disruptions”, 
International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 33–
45 
153 
 
 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D (1974) “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases”, Science, 185, 1124-1131 
 
UNCTAD (2007) “Maritime Security: ISPS Code Implementation, Costs and Related 
Financing”, UNCTAD Secretariat, accessed on 3/08/2009 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20071_en.pdf  
 
Williams, Z., Lueg, J.E. & LeMay, S.A. (2008) “Supply chain security: an overview 
and research agenda”, International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 19 No. 2, 
2008 
 
Willig, C. (2003) “Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in 
Theory and Method”, Open University Press, Buckingham 
 
Willis, H. & LaTourette, T. (2008) “Using Probabilistic Terrorism Risk-Modelling for 
Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis: Application to the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative in the Land Environment”, Risk Analysis 28 (2)325-339 
 
Willis, H., Morral, A., Kelly, T. & Medby, J. (2005) “Estimating Terrorism Risks”, 
RAND Corporation 
 
Woo, G. (2003) “Insuring against al-Qaeda”, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Meeting 
 
Woolcot, H.F. (1990) “Writing Up Qualitative Research”, Newbury Park, California: 
Sage 
 
Yates, J.F, Stone, E.R. (1992), "The risk construct", in Yates, J.F (Eds),Risk Taking 
Behaviour, Wiley, New York, NY, pp.1-25. 
 
Yin, R. (1994) “Case Study Research: Design and Methods”, 2nd Ed., Sage 
 
Yap, W.Y. & Lam, J.S.(2004) “An interpretation of inter-container port relationships 
from the demand perspective”, Maritime Policy & Management, 31:4,337-355 
 
Zsidisin, G.A., Ellram, L.M., Carter, J.R. & Cavinato, J.L. (2004) “An analysis of 
supply risk assessment techniques”, International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, Vol. 34, No.5, pp397-413 
 
  
154 
 
Appendix A – ISPS Code Port Facility Security Equipment Checklist 
 
  
 ISPS Port Facility Security Equipment 
Checklist 
ISPS 
Part/ 
Section 
Referenc
e 
PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN TOPIC ISPS CATEGORY EQUIPMENT 
CATEGORY 
EQUIPMENT REQUIRED 
  
A.16.3.2 The plan shall address measures designed to 
prevent unauthorised access to the port facility, 
ships at the facility & restricted areas 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL FENCING / GATES 
B.16.17.1 At security level 1, the plan should establish 
control points for the following:restricted areas, 
which should be bounded by fencing or other 
barriers to a standard which should be 
approved by the Contracting Government 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL FENCING / GATES 
B.16.19.2 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional measures: limiting the number of 
access points to the port facility, and identifying 
those to be closed and the means of adequately 
securing them 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL FENCING / GATES 
B.16.28.7 At security level 2, the plan should address: 
establishing and restricting access to areas 
adjacent to the restricted areas 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL FENCING / GATES 
B.16.27.2 At security level 1, the plan should address: 
provision of access points controlled by security 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL GATES 
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guards when not locked. 
B16.25.4 Restricted areas may include: locations where 
security-sensitive information, including cargo 
documentation, is held. 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL LOCKED PREMISES 
B.16.29.1 At security level 3, the plan should address: 
setting up additional restricted areas within the 
port facility in proximity to the security incident, 
to which access is denied; 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL MOBILE BARRIERS 
B.16.27.1 At security level 1, the plan should address: 
provision of permanent or temporary barriers to 
surround the restricted area of a Government 
approved standard 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL RESTRICTED AREA 
BARRIERS: FENCING / 
GATES 
B.16.28.1 At security level 2, the plan should address: 
enhancing the effectivenes of the barriers or 
fencing surrounding restricted areas, including 
the use of patrols or automatic intrusion-
detection devices; 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL RESTRICTED AREA 
BARRIERS: FENCING / 
GATES 
B.16.38.3 The security measures in the plan relating to 
the delivery of ships stores should prevent 
tampering 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL RESTRICTED AREA 
BARRIERS: FENCING / 
GATES 
B.16.19.3 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional measures: providing for means of 
impeding movement through the remaining 
access points eg security barriers 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL SECURITY BARRIERS 
A.16.3.12 The plan shall address measures designed to 
ensure effective security of cargo and the cargo 
handling equipment at the port facility 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL 
B.16.20.1 At security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which address the 
suspension of access to all or part of the port 
facility 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL / 
COMMS 
AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARM SYSTEMS / PA / 
VHF UHF 
B.16.20.2 At security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which address the granting 
of access only to those responding to security 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
ACCESS CONTROL / 
COMMS / BIOMETRICS 
ID PASSES 
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incident or threat thereof 
B16.8.13 At all security levels, the procedures for 
assisting ship security officers in confirming the 
identity of those seeking to board the ship when 
requested 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
BIOMETRICS ID PASSES 
B.16.8.14 At all security levels, procedures for facilitating 
shore leave for ships' crews, or crew changes, 
or legitimate social & welfare visitors? 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
BIOMETRICS ID PASSES 
A.16.3.15 The plan shall address procedures for 
facilitating shore leave for ship's crews or crew 
changes, or legitimate welfare and social ship 
visitors 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
BIOMETRICS ID PASSES 
B.16.17.2 At security level 1, the plan should establish 
control points for the following: checking identity 
of all persons seeking entry to the port facility in 
connection with a ship including passengers, 
ship's personnel and visitors, and confirming 
their reasons for doing so by checking, for 
example, joining instructions, passenger tickets, 
boarding party, work orders etc. 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
BIOMETRICS ID PASSES 
A.16.3.5 The plan shall address procedures for 
evacuation in case of security threat or 
breaches 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
COMMS ALARM SYSTEMS 
B.16.20.5 At security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which address the 
suspension of port operation within all or part of 
the port facility 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
COMMS AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARM SYSTEMS / 
GATES / PA / VHF UHF 
B.16.20.7 At security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which address evacuation of 
all or part of the port facility 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
COMMS AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARM SYSTEMS / PA / 
VHF UHF 
B.16.20.3 At security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which address the 
suspension of pedestrian or vehicular 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
COMMS / ACCESS 
CONTROL 
AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARM SYSTEMS / 
GATES / PA / VHF UHF 
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movement within all or part of the facility; 
B.16.17.4 At security level 1, the plan should identify 
control points for the verification of the identity 
of port facility personnel and those within the 
port facility and their vehicles 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
DATA RECORDING / 
BIOMETRICS 
ID PASSES / VEHICLE 
PASSES 
B.16.27.6 At security level 1, the plan should address: 
providing automatic intrusion detection devices, 
surveillance equipment, or systems designed to 
prevent unauthorised access into or movement 
within restricted areas 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
INTRUSION DETECTION DEVICE / CCTV / ACCESS 
CONTROL 
B.16.50 When used, automatic intrusion-detection 
devices should activate an audible and/or visual 
alarm at a location that is continuously attended 
or monitored 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
INTRUSION 
DETECTION DEVICES / 
AUDIO & VISUAL 
ALARMS 
INTRUSION DETECTION 
DEVICES / AUDIO & 
VISUAL ALARMS 
B.16.28.8 At security level 2, the plan should address: 
enforcing restrictions on access by 
unauthorised craft to the waters adjacent to 
ships using the port facility 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
PATROL VESSELS PATROL VESSELS 
B.16.17.3 At security level 1, the plan should identify 
control points for the following: checking 
vehicles used by those seeking entry to the port 
facility in connection with a ship 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
B.16.17.6 At security level 1, the plan should identify 
control points for the undertaking of searches of 
persons, personal effects, verhicles & their 
contents 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
B.16.19.4 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional measures: increasing the frequency 
of searches of persons, personal effects, and 
vehicles; 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
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B.16.45 The plan should establish routines for screening 
unaccompanied baggage and personnel 
effects, whether of passengers or crew, before 
it enters the port facility, and if the storage 
arrangements dictate, before it is transferred 
between port facility and ship.  At Security Level 
1, the PFSP should allow for some Xray 
screening: at Security level 2, 100% Xray 
screening should be invoked 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
X-RAY 
A.16.3.1 The plan shall address measures designed to 
prevent weapons or any other dangerous 
substances & devices whose carriage is not 
authorised from entering the port facility or ship 
ACCESS TO PORT 
FACILITY 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
X-RAY SCANNERS 
B.16.44 The plan should detail the security measures 
which could be taken by the port facility, which 
may include preparation for restriction or 
suspension, of the delivery of ship's stores 
within all, or part, of the port facility 
DELIVERY OF SHIP'S 
STORES 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
B.16.8.10 At all security levels procedures covering the 
delivery of ships' stores 
DELIVERY OF SHIP'S 
STORES 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
HAND HELD SCANNER 
B.16.40.3 At security level 1, the security measures in the 
plan relating to the delivery of ships stores 
should ensure the searching the delivery 
vehicle 
DELIVERY OF SHIP'S 
STORES 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
B.16.41 At security level 1, the use of 
scanners/detection equipment, mechanical 
devices and dogs, may be used for checking of 
ship's stores? 
DELIVERY OF SHIP'S 
STORES 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
B.16.42.1 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional security measures to be applied to 
enhance the control of the delivery of ship's 
stores, which may include detailed checking of 
ship's stores 
DELIVERY OF SHIP'S 
STORES 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
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B.16.42.2 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional security measures to be applied to 
enhance the control of the delivery of ship's 
stores, which may include detailed searches of 
the delivery vehicles 
DELIVERY OF SHIP'S 
STORES 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
B.16.37.1 At security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which could be taken by the 
port facility in cooperation with those 
responding and the ships, which may include: 
restriction or suspension of cargo movements 
or operations within all or part of the facility or 
specific ships 
HANDLING OF CARGO COMMS AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARMS / VHF UHF 
B.16.35.4 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional security measures to be applied 
during cargo handling to enhance control, which 
may include: increased frequency and detail in 
checking of seals and other methods used to 
prevent tampering 
HANDLING OF CARGO E-SEAL INTEGRITY 
CHECKING 
EQUIPMENT 
E-SEAL INTEGRITY 
CHECKING EQUIPMENT 
B.16.32.4 At security level 1, the plan should address 
security measures to be applied during cargo 
handling which may include: checking of seals 
and other methods used to prevent tampering 
upon entering the port facility and upon storage 
within the port facility 
HANDLING OF CARGO E-SEAL INTEGRITY CHECKING EQUIPMENT 
B.16.32.3 At security level 1, the plan should address 
security measures to be applied during cargo 
handling which may include: searches of 
vehicles 
HANDLING OF CARGO SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
B.16.35.3 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional security measures to be applied 
during cargo handling to enhance control, which 
may include: intensified searches of vehicles 
HANDLING OF CARGO SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT 
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B.16.32.1 At security level 1, the plan should address 
security measures to be applied during cargo 
handling which may include: routine checking of 
cargo, cargo transporters and cargo storage 
areas within the port facility prior to and during 
cargo handling 
HANDLING OF CARGO SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT / X-RAY 
B.16.35.1 At security level 2, the plan should establish 
additional security measures to be applied 
during cargo handling to enhance control, which 
may include: detailed checking of cargo, cargo 
transporters, and cargo storage areas within the 
port facility 
HANDLING OF CARGO SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
MOBILE SCANNING 
EQUIPMENT / X-RAY 
B.16.48.1 The plan should stipulate that at Security Level 
3, unaccompanied baggage should be subject 
to more extensive screening, for example x-
raying it from at least two different angles 
HANDLING OF 
UNACCOMPANIED 
BAGGAE 
SCREENING 
EQUIPMENT 
X-RAY 
B.16.8.7 At all security levels, procedures to assess the 
continuing effectiveness of security measures, 
procedures & equipment, including identification 
of & response to equipment failure or 
malfunction; 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
BACKUP SYSTEMS 
B.16.51 The plan should establish procedures and 
equipment needed at each Security Level and 
the means of ensuring that monitoring 
equipment will be able to perform continually, 
including consideration of the possible effects of 
weather conditions or of power disruptions? 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
BACKUP SYSTEMS 
B.16.28.5 At security level 2, the plan should address: use 
of continuously monitored & recording 
surveillance equipment 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
CCTV CCTV 
B.16.54.2 For security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which could be taken by the 
port facility which may include: switching on of 
all surveillance equipment capable of recording 
activities within, or adjacent to, the port facility  
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
CCTV CCTV 
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B.16.54.3 For security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which could be taken by the 
port facility which may include: maximising the 
length of time such surveillance equipment can 
continue to record  
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
CCTV / DATA 
RECORDING 
CCTV / DATA 
RECORDING 
A.16.3.14 The plan shall address procedures for 
responding in case the ship security alert 
system of a ship at the port facility has been 
activated 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARM SYSTEMS / UHF 
VHF 
A.16.3.3 The plan shall address procedures for 
responding to security threats or breaches of 
security, including provisions for maintaining 
critical operations of ship or ship/port interface 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARM SYSTEMS / VHF 
UHF 
A.16.3.4 The plan shall address procedures for 
responding to any security instructions the 
contracting government may give at Security 
Level 3 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS AUTOMATIC ALERTS / 
ALARM SYSTEMS / VHF 
UHF / PA 
B.16.57 The plan should establish the procedures to be 
followed when, on the instructions of the 
Contracting Government, the PFSO requests a 
DoS or when a DoS is requested by a ship 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS EMAIL ALERT 
B.16.3.2 Links and communications arrangements with 
ships in port facility And other relevant 
authorities 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
B.16.8.4 At all security levels a communications system 
which allows effective & continuous 
communication between port facility security 
personnel & ships & national or local security 
authorities 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
A.16.3.7 The plan shall address procedures for 
interfacing with ship security activities 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
B.16.20.6 At security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which address the direction 
of vessel movements relating to all or part of the 
port facility 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
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B.16.27.7 At security level 1, the plan should address: 
control of the movement of vessels in the 
vicinity of ships using the port facility. 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
B.16.56.1 The plan should establish procedures and 
security measures the port facility should apply 
when it is interfacing with a ship which has been 
at a port of a State which is not a Contracting 
Government 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
B.16.56.2 The plan should establish procedures and 
security measures the port facility should apply 
when it is interfacing with a ship to which the 
Code does not apply 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
B.16.56.3 The plan should establish procedures and 
security measures the port facility should apply 
when it is interfacing with fixed or floating 
platforms or mobile offshore drilling unit on 
location? 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS VHF / UHF 
B16.8.12 At all security levels, the means of alerting & 
obtaining waterside patrols & specialist search 
teams including bomb & underwater; 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
COMMS / PATROL 
VESSELS / IED 
DETECTION 
EQUIPMENT 
VHF UHF / PATROL 
VESSELS / IED 
DETECTION EQUIPMENT 
A.16.7 If the plan is kept in an electronic format, it shall 
be protected by procedures aimed at preventing 
its unauthorised deletion, destruction, or 
amendment 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
DATA RECORDING DATA PROTECTION 
SYSTEM 
B.16.8.6 At all security levels protection of security 
information held in paper or electronic format 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
DATA SECURITY FIRE PROOF CABINET / 
ENCRYPTED SOFTWARE
A.16.8 The plan shall be protected from unauthorized 
access or disclosure  
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
DATA SECURITY FIRE PROOF CABINET / 
ENCRYPTED SOFTWARE
A.16.3.11 The plan shall address measures to ensure the 
security of the information in the plan 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
DATA SECURITY FIREPROOF SAFE / 
ENCRYPTION 
SOFTWARE 
B.16.7 Guidance on the bearing and use of firearms (if 
appropriate) 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
FIREARMS CABINETS FIREARMS CABINETS 
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B.16.49.3 The plan should include as means of monitoring 
the port facility day and night, and the ships and 
areas surrounding them,  the following 
measures: automatic intrusion-detection 
devices and surveillance equipment 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
INTRUSION 
DETECTION DEVICES / 
CCTV 
INTRUSION DETECTION 
DEVICES / CCTV 
B.16.49.1 The plan should include as means of monitoring 
the port facility day and night, and the ships and 
areas surrounding them,  the following 
measures: lighting 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
LIGHTING LIGHTING 
B.16.54.1 For security level 3, the plan should detail the 
security measures which could be taken by the 
port facility which may include: switching on of 
all lighting within, or illuminating the vicinity of, 
the port facility 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
LIGHTING LIGHTING 
B.16.52.2 For Security Level 1, the plan should establish 
the security measures to be applied, which may 
be a combination of lighting, security guards or 
use of security and surveillance equipment to 
allow port facility security personnel to observe 
access points, barriers and restricted areas 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
LIGHTING / CCTV LIGHTING / CCTV 
B.16.53.1 For security level 2, the plan should establish 
the security levels to be applied for increasing 
the coverage and intensity of lighting and 
surveillance equipment, including the provision 
of additional lighting and surveillance coverage 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
LIGHTING / CCTV LIGHTING / CCTV 
B.16.52.1 For Security Level 1, the plan should establish 
the security measures to be applied, which may 
be a combination of lighting, security guards or 
use of security and surveillance equipment to 
allow port facility security personnel to observe 
the general port facility area, including shore 
and waterside accesses to it 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
LIGHTING / CCTV / 
RADAR 
LIGHTING / CCTV / 
RADAR 
B.16.19.6 At security level 2, the plan should establish the 
additional measures: using patrol vessels to 
enhance water-side security 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
PATROL VESSELS PATROL VESSELS 
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B.16.28.6 At security level 2, the plan should address: 
enhancing the number and frequency of patrols, 
including water-side patrols, undertaken on the 
boundaries of the restricted areas & within the 
areas 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
PATROL VESSELS PATROL VESSELS 
B.16.49.2 The plan should include as means of monitoring 
the port facility day and night, and the ships and 
areas surrounding them,  the following 
measures: security guards including foot, 
vehicle and waterborne patrols 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
PATROL VESSELS PATROL VESSELS 
B.16.53.2 For security level 2, the plan should establish 
the security levels to be applied for increasing 
the frequency of foot, vehicle and waterborne 
patrols 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
PATROL VESSELS PATROL VESSELS 
B.16.52.3 For Security Level 1, the plan should establish 
the security measures to be applied, which may 
be a combination of lighting, security guards or 
use of security and surveillance equipment to 
allow port facility security personnel to monitor 
areas and movements adjacent to ships using 
the port facility, including augmentation of 
lighting provided by ships themselves 
MONITORING SECURITY 
OF PORT FACILITY 
RADAR RADAR 
B.16.27.3 At security level 1, the plan should address: 
providing compulsorily displayed restricted area 
passes. 
RESTRICTED AREAS BIOMETRICS ID PASSES 
B.16.27.4 At security level 1, the plan should address: 
clearly marking vehicles allowed access to 
restricted areas. 
RESTRICTED AREAS BIOMETRICS VEHICLE MARKINGS 
B.16.25.7 Restricted areas may include: areas where 
security & surveillance equipment are located. 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE LOCKED PREMISES 
B.16.25.1 Restricted areas may include: shore and 
waterside areas immediately adjacent to the 
ship 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE SIGNS 
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B.16.25.2 Restricted areas may include: embarkation and 
disembarkation areas, passenger and ship's 
personnel holding & processing areas, including 
search points. 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE SIGNS 
B.16.25.3 Restricted areas may include: areas where 
loading, unloading or storage of cargo and 
stores is undertaken. 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE SIGNS 
B.16.25.5 Restricted areas may include: areas where 
dangerous goods and hazardous substances 
are held. 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE SIGNS 
B.16.25.8 Restricted areas may include: essential 
electrical, radio & terlecommunication, water & 
other utility installations. 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE SIGNS 
B.16.25.9 Restricted areas may include: other locations in 
the port facility where access by vessels, 
vehicles and individuals shbould be restricted. 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE SIGNS 
B16.25.6 Restricted areas may include: VTM system 
control rooms, aids to navigation & port facility 
Control buildings, including security & 
surveillance control rooms. 
RESTRICTED AREAS SIGNAGE / SECURITY 
CONTROL ROOM 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
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Appendix B -  Copy of Confidential Questionnaire on Port 
Security 
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Confidential Questionnaire on Port Security 
 
 
1)   Please enter the name of your Port 
 
               ____________________________________________________________ 
 
2)   Please enter the name of the Port Facility 
 
               ____________________________________________________________ 
 
3)   Please select your job position from the list below  
 
                Port Security Officer 
                Port Facility Security Officer 
                Other (please specify) 
 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
4)   Please select the principal activity of the port facility 
 
                Container Terminal 
                Passenger Terminal 
                Oil /  Oil Products Terminal 
                Ro-Ro Terminal 
                LNG /  LPG Terminal 
                Bulk Terminal 
                General Cargo Terminal 
                Car Terminal 
                Other (please specify) 
 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
5)   Please select the type of perimeter fencing in the port facility 
 
                Chain link 
                Expanded metal 
                Steel pallisades 
                Weldmesh 
                Opaque 
                Other (please specify) 
 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6)   Please indicate the costs of the perimeter fencing in question 5 
 
 
Cost of installation  ___________________________________ 
Annual cost of maintenance  ___________________________________ 
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7)   What is the height of the perimeter fence at its lowest point in metres? 
 
               ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8)   What is the approximate overall length of the perimeter fence? 
 
               ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9)   Please select from the list the access control measures in the port facility 
 
                Main security gate 
                Main security gate guardhouse 
                Second security gate 
                Second security gate guardhouse 
                Additional security gates /  guardhouses 
                Mobile security gates 
                Mobile security barriers 
                Other (please specify) 
 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
10)   Please indicate the costs of the access control measures in question 9 
 
 
Installation cost  ___________________________________ 
Annual cost of maintenance  ___________________________________ 
 
 
11)   Please select the types of security detection systems which are present in the 
port facility 
 
                Perimeter intruder detection system 
                Perimeter lighting 
                Lighting of restricted areas 
                Cargo handling lighting 
                Passenger handling lighting 
                Access routes lighting 
                CCTV - main gate 
                CCTV - other gates 
                CCTV - restricted areas 
                CCTV - perimeter 
                CCTV - cargo handling areas 
                CCTV - passenger handling areas 
                CCTV - office buildings 
                Surface radar 
                Underwater sonar 
                Other (please specify) 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
12)   Please indicate the installation costs of the types of security detection 
systems in question 11 
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Perimeter intruder detection system  ___________________________________ 
Perimeter lighting  ___________________________________ 
Lighting of restricted areas  ___________________________________ 
Cargo handling lighting  ___________________________________ 
Passenger handling lighting  ___________________________________ 
Access routes lighting  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - main gate  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - other gates  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - restricted areas  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - perimeter  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - cargo handling areas  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - passenger handling areas  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - office buildings  ___________________________________ 
Surface radar  ___________________________________ 
Underwater sonar  ___________________________________ 
Other (as specified above)  ___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
13)   Please indicate the maintenance /  running costs of the types of security 
detection systems in question 11 
 
 
Perimeter intruder detection system  ___________________________________ 
Perimeter lighting  ___________________________________ 
Lighting of restricted areas  ___________________________________ 
Cargo handling lighting  ___________________________________ 
Passenger handling lighting  ___________________________________ 
Access routes lighting  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - main gate  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - other gates  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - restricted areas  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - perimeter  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - cargo handling areas  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - passenger handling areas  ___________________________________ 
CCTV - office buildings  ___________________________________ 
Surface radar  ___________________________________ 
Underwater sonar  ___________________________________ 
Other (as specified above)  ___________________________________ 
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14)   Please select the options which best describe the security lighting in the port 
facility 
 
 
 Excellent - no 
black spots 
Good - only a 
few black spots
Marginal - 
patchy 
coverage 
Poor - hardly 
any coverage 
Perimeter 
lighting     
Restricted 
access lighting     
Cargo handling 
lighting     
Passenger 
handling 
lighting 
    
Access routes 
lighting     
 
 
 
15)   Please select the biometric security systems which operate in the port facility 
 
                Retinal scans 
                Fingerprint scans 
                Photo ID cards for employees 
                Photo ID cards for regular port facility Contractors /  vendors 
                Instant photo ID cards for visitors 
                Visitor passes (numbered) 
                Vessel crew passes (numbered) 
                Vehicle passes (numbered) 
                Other (please specify) 
 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
16)   Please indicate the installation costs of the biometric security systems in 
question 15 
 
 
Retinal scans  ___________________________________ 
Fingerprint scans  ___________________________________ 
Photo ID cards for employees  ___________________________________ 
Photo ID cards for regular port facility 
Contractors /  vendors 
 ___________________________________ 
Instant photo ID cards for visitors  ___________________________________ 
Visitor passes (numbered)  ___________________________________ 
Vessel crew passes (numbered)  ___________________________________ 
Vehicle passes (numbered)  ___________________________________ 
Other (as specified above)  ___________________________________ 
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17)   Please indicate the maintenance /  running costs of the biometric security 
systems in question 15 
 
 
Retinal scans  ___________________________________ 
Fingerprint scans  ___________________________________ 
Photo ID cards for employees  ___________________________________ 
Photo ID cards for regular port facility 
Contractors /  vendors 
 ___________________________________ 
Instant photo ID cards for visitors  ___________________________________ 
Visitor passes (numbered)  ___________________________________ 
Vessel crew passes (numbered)  ___________________________________ 
Vehicle passes (numbered)  ___________________________________ 
Other (as specified above)  ___________________________________ 
 
 
 
18)   Please select the options which best describe the security patrols in the port 
facility 
 
 
 All 
areas 
Restricted areas 
only 
Other specific 
areas (please 
state below) 
Land side patrols – 
scheduled regular    
Land side patrols – 
scheduled random    
Land side patrols –  
unscheduled    
Water side patrols – 
scheduled regular    
Water side patrols – 
scheduled random    
Water side patrols –  
Unscheduled    
 
 
 
19)   Please select the security communications systems used in the port facility 
 
             VHF radio 
             UHF radio 
             Push-to-Talk radio 
     General audio alarm 
             Visual alarm 
             Public address system 
             Other (please specify) 
 
            I f you selected other please specify:  
            
______________________________________________________________________ 
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20)   Please indicate the costs of the security communications systems used in the 
port facility 
 
 
Installation cost  ___________________________________ 
Annual cost of maintenance /  running costs  ___________________________________ 
 
 
 
21)   Please select the forms of security data communication in the port facility 
 
                Trunk cabling (copper wire) 
                Microwave 
                Fibre optics 
                Other (please specify) 
 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
22)   Please list the number of security personnel employed in the port facility 
 
 
Number of security guards on the access 
gates /  gatehouses 
 ___________________________________ 
Number of security guards on patrols  ___________________________________ 
Number of security personnel in the control 
room 
 ___________________________________ 
Number of security personnel that can 
respond quickly to an incident 
 ___________________________________ 
Other specialised security personnel  ___________________________________ 
 
 
 
23)   Please indicate the average annual cost of security guards /  personnel 
 
 
On the access gates /  guardhouses  ___________________________________ 
Patrolling  ___________________________________ 
In the control room  ___________________________________ 
Other specialised security personnel as 
specified above 
 ___________________________________ 
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24)   Please identify the location and type of cargo security detection equipment in 
the port facility 
 
 
 Fixed 
chemical /  
biological /  
radiological 
detectors 
Mobile 
chemical /  
biological /  
radiological 
detectors 
Fixed X-ray 
scanners 
Mobile X-ray 
scanners 
Other fixed 
scanning 
equipment 
Other mobile 
scanning 
equipment 
Access points       
Cargo 
handling 
terminal 
      
Passenger 
handling 
terminal 
      
Segregated 
areas 
      
Restricted 
areas 
      
 
 
 
25)   Please indicate the installation costs of the cargo security detection 
equipment in question 24 
 
 
Fixed chemical /  biological /  radiological 
detectors 
 ___________________________________ 
Mobile chemical /  biological /  radiological 
detectors 
 ___________________________________ 
Fixed X-ray scanners  ___________________________________ 
Mobile X-ray scanners  ___________________________________ 
Other fixed scanning equipment  ___________________________________ 
Other mobile scanning equipment  ___________________________________ 
 
 
 
26)   Please indicate the maintenance /  running costs of the cargo security 
detection equipment in question 24 
 
 
Fixed chemical /  biological /  radiological 
detectors 
 ___________________________________ 
Mobile chemical /  biological /  radiological 
detectors 
 ___________________________________ 
Fixed X-ray scanners  ___________________________________ 
Mobile X-ray scanners  ___________________________________ 
Other fixed scanning equipment  ___________________________________ 
Other mobile scanning equipment  ___________________________________ 
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27)   Please indicate how the individual security systems are integrated and 
monitored from the central control room 
 
 
 Are the systems integrated? Are they monitored from the 
security control room? 
 Yes No Yes No 
Gatehouse 
alarms 
   
AIDD alarms    
CCTV motion 
detector alarms 
   
Restricted area 
alarms 
   
Cargo handling 
area alarms 
   
Passenger 
handling area 
alarms 
   
General alarms    
CBR detector 
alarms 
   
Container 
scanner alarms 
   
Communication 
systems 
   
Security patrols    
 
 
 
28)   Please indicate an estimate for the overall cost of security systems 
integration  
 
               ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
29)   Please list the crisis management systems which exist in the port facility 
 
                Specialist crisis management software 
                Duplicate (remote) IT system 
                Emergency power supply 
                Other (please specify) 
 
               I f you selected other please specify: 
               
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
30)   Please indicate the costs of the crisis management systems in question 29 
 
 
Installation cost  ___________________________________ 
Annual cost of maintenance /  running costs  ___________________________________ 
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Appendix C – Port Facilities’ Security Costs 
Term inals’ Security System  Costs –  Port  facility A 
 
 
Region 
Business Unit/Site Port facility A 
Perimeter Fencing 
Installation 
cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost in 
US$ 
Chain link $73,170 $1,000 
Expanded metal     
Steel pallisades     
Weldmesh     
Masonry/brick $34,156 $5,000 
Opaque     
Other (Please specify)     
Total $107,326 $6,000 
Height of fence at lowest 
point (meters) 
Length of fence (meters) 
Comments on perimeter 
fencing 
Perimeter on PQA channel water side is 
fenced (510 m) and landside is masonary 
(600 + 457 = 1057 m). 
Access Control 
Installation 
cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost in 
US$ 
Main security gate $7,361 $200 
Main security gate 
guardhouse $7,361 $200 
Second security gate $7,361 $200 
Second security gate 
guardhouse $15,950 $1,329 
Additional security 
gates/guardhouses $4,878 $300 
Mobile security gates     
Mobile security barriers $3,453   
Other (please specify) $19,000 $4,000 
Comments on access 
control 
Total $65,364 $6,229 
Identity Control 
Installation 
cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Retinal scans     
Fingerprint scans $20,320   
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Photo ID cards for 
employees $3,867   
Photo ID cards for regular 
Business Unit  contractors 
/ vendors $3,867   
Instant photo ID cards for 
visitors $1,933   
Visitor passes (numbered) $100 $50 
Vessel crew passes 
(numbered)     
Vehicle passes 
(numbered)   $3,500 
Other (please specify)     
Comments on identity 
control 
Total $30,087 $3,550 
Security Detection 
Installation 
cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Perimeter intruder 
detection system $5,000 $1 
Perimeter lighting $16,250 $4,000 
Lighting of restricted 
areas   $2,500 
Cargo handling lighting $106,250 $12,500 
Passenger handling 
lighting     
Access routes lighting   $3,500 
CCTV - main gate $18,650 $2,700 
CCTV - other gates $18,552 $2,700 
CCTV - restricted areas $37,300 $4,050 
CCTV - perimeter $9,325 $1,350 
CCTV - cargo handling 
areas $9,325 $1,350 
CCTV - passenger 
handling areas     
CCTV - office buildings $3,370   
Surface radar     
Underwater sonar     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
detection 
Total $224,022 $34,651 
Security 
Communications 
Installation 
cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
VHF radio $160 $1 
UHF radio     
Push-to-Talk radio     
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General audio alarm     
Visual alarm     
Public address system $9,500   
Other (please specify) $400 $100 
Comments on security 
communications 
Total $10,060 $101 
Please describe the shift 
pattern at your site 
2007 Annual cost in 
US$ 
Number of security 
guards on the access 
gates / gatehouses 
(included in figure for 
access control)   $2,907 
Number of security 
guards on patrols 
(included in figure for 
detection)   $1,663 
Number of security 
personnel in the control 
room (included in figure 
for detection)   $1,663 
Other specialised security 
personnel   $2,078 
Number of security 
personnel that can 
respond quickly to an 
incident $6,858 
Are your security 
personnel licenced? $100 
Type of license 
Does your site hold their 
training records? $150 
Crisis Management 
Installation 
cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Specialist crisis 
management software     
Duplicate (remote) IT 
system $90,000 $6,000 
Emergency power supply $46,700 $5,000 
Crisis management - 
Service Providers      
Other (please specify)     
Fixed Variable 
Access Control $172,690 $15,136
Biometrics $30,087 $3,550
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Detection $224,022 $37,977
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Term inals’ Security System  Costs –  Port  facility B 
 
Region 
Business Unit/Site Port facility B 
Perimeter Fencing 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost in 
US$ 
Chain link $270,000 $5,000 
Expanded metal     
Steel pallisades     
Weldmesh     
Masonry/brick     
Opaque     
Other (Please specify)     
Total $270,000 $5,000 
Height of fence at lowest 
point (meters) 3m 
Length of fence (meters) 1300m 
Comments on perimeter 
fencing 
Access Control 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost in 
US$ 
Main security gate 
$125,000 $5,000 
Main security gate 
guardhouse 
Second security gate 
Second security gate 
guardhouse 
Additional security 
gates/guardhouses 
Mobile security gates     
Mobile security barriers     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on access 
control 
Total $125,000 $5,000 
Identity Control 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Retinal scans     
Fingerprint scans     
Photo ID cards for 
employees $7,000 $1,000 
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Photo ID cards for regular 
Business Unit  contractors 
/ vendors     
Instant photo ID cards for 
visitors     
Visitor passes (numbered)     
Vessel crew passes 
(numbered)     
Vehicle passes 
(numbered)     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on identity 
control 
Total $7,000 $1,000 
Security Detection 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Perimeter intruder 
detection system     
Perimeter lighting     
Lighting of restricted 
areas     
Cargo handling lighting     
Passenger handling 
lighting     
Access routes lighting     
CCTV - main gate 
$2,223,000 $100,000 CCTV - other gates 
CCTV - restricted areas 
CCTV - perimeter $125,000   
CCTV - cargo handling 
areas     
CCTV - passenger 
handling areas     
CCTV - office buildings $46,325   
Surface radar     
Underwater sonar     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
detection 
Total $2,394,325 $100,000 
Security 
Communications 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
VHF radio $1,200 $200 
UHF radio     
Push-to-Talk radio     
General audio alarm     
Visual alarm     
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Public address system     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
communications 
Total $1,200 $200 
Please describe the shift 
pattern at your site 
2007 Annual cost in 
US$ 
Number of security 
guards on the access 
gates / gatehouses 
(included in figure for 
access control)   $310,000 
Number of security 
guards on patrols 
(included in figure for 
detection)   $186,000 
Number of security 
personnel in the control 
room (included in figure 
for detection)   $76,000 
Other specialised security 
personnel     
Number of security 
personnel that can 
respond quickly to an 
incident 
Are your security 
personnel licenced? 
Type of license 
Does your site hold their 
training records? 
Crisis Management 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Specialist crisis 
management software     
Duplicate (remote) IT 
system $125,000 $15,000 
Emergency power supply 
Crisis management - 
Service Providers      
Other (please specify)     
Fixed Variable 
Access Control $395,000 $320,000
Biometrics $7,000 $1,000
Detection $2,394,325 $362,000
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Term inals’ Security System  Costs –  Port  facility C 
Region 
Business Unit/Site Port facility C 
Perimeter Fencing 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost in 
US$ 
Chain link     
Expanded metal     
Steel pallisades     
Weldmesh $223,222   
Masonry/brick     
Opaque     
Other (Please specify)     
Total $223,222 $0 
Height of fence at lowest 
point (meters) 2.30m 
Length of fence (meters) 250 metres 
Comments on perimeter 
fencing 
Access Control 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost in 
US$ 
Main security gate     
Main security gate 
guardhouse     
Second security gate     
Second security gate 
guardhouse     
Additional security 
gates/guardhouses     
Mobile security gates     
Mobile security barriers     
Other (please specify) $12,000 $2,750 
Comments on access 
control security car security car 
Total $12,000 $2,750 
Identity Control 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Retinal scans     
Fingerprint scans     
Photo ID cards for 
employees $2,480   
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Photo ID cards for regular 
Business Unit  contractors 
/ vendors     
Instant photo ID cards for 
visitors     
Visitor passes (numbered) $100   
Vessel crew passes 
(numbered)     
Vehicle passes 
(numbered) $100   
Other (please specify)     
Comments on identity 
control 
Total $2,680 $0 
Security Detection 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Perimeter intruder 
detection system     
Perimeter lighting     
Lighting of restricted 
areas     
Cargo handling lighting     
Passenger handling 
lighting     
Access routes lighting     
CCTV - main gate 
$13,000 
  
CCTV - other gates   
CCTV - restricted areas   
CCTV - perimeter     
CCTV - cargo handling 
areas     
CCTV - passenger 
handling areas     
CCTV - office buildings $5,250   
Surface radar     
Underwater sonar     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
detection 
Total $18,250 $0 
Security 
Communications 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
VHF radio $150 $60 
UHF radio     
Push-to-Talk radio     
General audio alarm     
Visual alarm     
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Public address system     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
communications 
Total $150 $60 
Please describe the shift 
pattern at your site 
2007 Annual cost in 
US$ 
Number of security 
guards on the access 
gates / gatehouses 
(included in figure for 
access control)   $174,762 
Number of security 
guards on patrols 
(included in figure for 
detection)   $16,644 
Number of security 
personnel in the control 
room (included in figure 
for detection)   $16,644 
Other specialised security 
personnel   $17,116 
Number of security 
personnel that can 
respond quickly to an 
incident 
Are your security 
personnel licenced? 
Type of license 
Does your site hold their 
training records? 
Crisis Management 
Installation cost in US$ 
(2004 - present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance costs in 
US$ 
Specialist crisis 
management software     
Duplicate (remote) IT 
system $115,000 $14,000 
Emergency power supply $20,710 
Crisis management - 
Service Providers      
Other (please specify)     
Fixed Variable 
Access Control $235,222 $177,512
Biometrics $2,680 $0
Detection $18,250 $33,288
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Term inals’ Security System  Costs –  Port  facility D 
 
 
  
Region  
Business Unit/Site Port facility D 
 
  
 
  
Perimeter Fencing 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost 
in US$ 
Chain link $209,840   
Expanded metal     
Steel pallisades     
Weldmesh     
Masonry/brick     
Opaque     
Other (Please specify)     
Total $209,840 $0 
Height of fence at lowest 
point (meters)   
Length of fence (meters)   
Comments on perimeter 
fencing   
 
  
Access Control 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost 
in US$ 
Main security gate 
$369,890 $10,000 Main security gate 
guardhouse 
Second security gate     
Second security gate 
guardhouse     
Additional security 
gates/guardhouses     
Mobile security gates     
Mobile security barriers     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on access 
control   
Total $369,890 $10,000 
Identity Control 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Retinal scans     
Fingerprint scans $10,000 $1,000 
Photo ID cards for 
employees $1,200   
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Photo ID cards for regular 
Business Unit  contractors 
/ vendors     
Instant photo ID cards for 
visitors     
Visitor passes (numbered)     
Vessel crew passes 
(numbered)     
Vehicle passes 
(numbered)     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on identity 
control   
Total $11,200 $1,000 
Security Detection 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Perimeter intruder 
detection system     
Perimeter lighting $625,920 $33,750 
Lighting of restricted 
areas     
Cargo handling lighting     
Passenger handling 
lighting     
Access routes lighting     
CCTV - main gate     
CCTV - other gates     
CCTV - restricted areas     
CCTV - perimeter     
CCTV - cargo handling 
areas     
CCTV - passenger 
handling areas     
CCTV - office buildings $5,000   
Surface radar     
Underwater sonar     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
detection   
Total $630,920 $33,750 
 
  
Security 
Communications 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
VHF radio $400 $50 
UHF radio     
Push-to-Talk radio     
General audio alarm $125 $20 
Visual alarm     
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Public address system $2,200 $100 
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
communications   
Total $2,725 $170 
   
Please describe the shift 
pattern at your site  
2007 Annual cost 
in US$ 
Number of security 
guards on the access 
gates / gatehouses 
(included in figure for 
access control)   $240,000 
Number of security 
guards on patrols 
(included in figure for 
detection)   $123,000 
Number of security 
personnel in the control 
room (included in figure 
for detection)   
Other specialised security 
personnel     
Number of security 
personnel that can 
respond quickly to an 
incident   
Are your security 
personnel licenced?   
Type of license   
Does your site hold their 
training records?   
 
  
Crisis Management 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Specialist crisis 
management software     
Duplicate (remote) IT 
system $97,715   
Emergency power supply $670,000 $36,000 
Crisis management - 
Service Providers      
Other (please specify)     
   
   
 Fixed Variable 
Access Control $579,730 $250,000
Biometrics $11,200 $1,000
Detection $630,920 $156,750
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Term inals’ Security System  Costs –  Port  facility E 
   
Region  
Business Unit/Site Port facility E 
 
  
 
  
Perimeter Fencing 
Installation cost in 
US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost 
in US$ 
Chain link   $8,000 
Expanded metal     
Steel pallisades     
Weldmesh     
Masonry/brick     
Opaque     
Other (Please specify) $18,000   
Total $18,000 $8,000 
Height of fence at lowest 
point (meters)   
Length of fence (meters)   
Comments on perimeter 
fencing   
 
  
Access Control 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost 
in US$ 
Main security gate $11,000 $10,000 
Main security gate 
guardhouse     
Second security gate     
Second security gate 
guardhouse     
Additional security 
gates/guardhouses $79,000   
Mobile security gates     
Mobile security barriers $6,000   
Other (please specify)     
Comments on access 
control   
Total $96,000 $10,000 
Identity Control 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Retinal scans     
Fingerprint scans $73,000 $5,000 
Photo ID cards for 
employees $5,000 $1,000 
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Photo ID cards for regular 
Business Unit  contractors 
/ vendors     
Instant photo ID cards for 
visitors     
Visitor passes (numbered)     
Vessel crew passes 
(numbered)     
Vehicle passes 
(numbered)     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on identity 
control   
Total $78,000 $6,000 
Security Detection 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Perimeter intruder 
detection system     
Perimeter lighting   $10,000 
Lighting of restricted 
areas   $5,000 
Cargo handling lighting $160,000 $20,000 
Passenger handling 
lighting     
Access routes lighting     
CCTV - main gate $28,000 $9,000 
CCTV - other gates $14,000 $5,000 
CCTV - restricted areas $77,000 $15,000 
CCTV - perimeter $14,000 $5,000 
CCTV - cargo handling 
areas $21,000 $8,000 
CCTV - passenger 
handling areas $28,000 $9,000 
CCTV - office buildings     
Surface radar     
Underwater sonar     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
detection   
Total $342,000 $86,000 
 
  
Security 
Communications 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
VHF radio     
UHF radio $141,000 $10,000 
Push-to-Talk radio $11,000 $1,000 
General audio alarm     
Visual alarm     
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Public address system     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
communications   
Total $152,000 $11,000 
   
Please describe the shift 
pattern at your site  
2007 Annual cost 
in US$ 
Number of security 
guards on the access 
gates / gatehouses 
(included in figure for 
access control)   $75,000 
Number of security 
guards on patrols 
(included in figure for 
detection)   $15,000 
Number of security 
personnel in the control 
room (included in figure 
for detection)   $10,000 
Other specialised security 
personnel     
Number of security 
personnel that can 
respond quickly to an 
incident   
Are your security 
personnel licenced?   
Type of license   
Does your site hold their 
training records?   
 
  
Crisis Management 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Specialist crisis 
management software     
Duplicate (remote) IT 
system     
Emergency power supply $73,000 $5,000 
Crisis management - 
Service Providers      
Other (please specify)     
   
   
 Fixed Variable 
Access Control $114,000 $93,000
Biometrics $78,000 $6,000
Detection $342,000 $111,000
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 Term inals’ Security System  Costs –  Port  Facility F 
 
 
  
Region  
Business Unit/Site  Port Facility F 
 
  
 
  
Perimeter Fencing 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost 
in US$ 
Chain link $120,000 $12,000 
Expanded metal     
Steel pallisades     
Weldmesh     
Masonry/brick     
Opaque     
Other (Please specify)     
Total $120,000 $12,000 
Height of fence at lowest 
point (meters)   
Length of fence (meters)   
Comments on perimeter 
fencing   
 
  
Access Control 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance cost 
in US$ 
Main security gate $430,000 $43,000 
Main security gate 
guardhouse     
Second security gate     
Second security gate 
guardhouse     
Additional security 
gates/guardhouses     
Mobile security gates     
Mobile security barriers     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on access 
control   
Total $430,000 $43,000 
Identity Control 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Retinal scans     
Fingerprint scans     
Photo ID cards for 
employees $197,600 $78,000 
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Photo ID cards for regular 
Business Unit  contractors 
/ vendors     
Instant photo ID cards for 
visitors     
Visitor passes (numbered)     
Vessel crew passes 
(numbered)     
Vehicle passes 
(numbered)     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on identity 
control   
Total $197,600 $78,000 
Security Detection 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Perimeter intruder 
detection system 
$317,777 $32,000 
Perimeter lighting 
Lighting of restricted 
areas 
Cargo handling lighting 
Passenger handling 
lighting 
Access routes lighting 
CCTV - main gate 
CCTV - other gates 
CCTV - restricted areas 
CCTV - perimeter 
CCTV - cargo handling 
areas 
CCTV - passenger 
handling areas 
CCTV - office buildings 
Surface radar 
Underwater sonar 
Other (please specify) 
Comments on security 
detection   
Total $317,777 $32,000 
 
  
Security 
Communications 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
VHF radio     
UHF radio     
Push-to-Talk radio     
General audio alarm     
Visual alarm     
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Public address system     
Other (please specify)     
Comments on security 
communications   
Total $0 $0 
   
Please describe the shift 
pattern at your site  
2007 Annual cost 
in US$ 
Number of security 
guards on the access 
gates / gatehouses 
(included in figure for 
access control)   $719,312 
Number of security 
guards on patrols 
(included in figure for 
detection)     
Number of security 
personnel in the control 
room (included in figure 
for detection)     
Other specialised security 
personnel     
Number of security 
personnel that can 
respond quickly to an 
incident   
Are your security 
personnel licenced?   
Type of license   
Does your site hold their 
training records?   
 
  
Crisis Management 
Installation cost 
in US$ (2004 - 
present) 
2007 Annual 
maintenance 
costs in US$ 
Specialist crisis 
management software     
Duplicate (remote) IT 
system     
Emergency power supply $60,000   
Crisis management - 
Service Providers      
Other (please specify)     
   
   
 Fixed Variable 
Access Control $550,000 $774,312
Biometrics $197,600 $78,000
Detection $317,777 $32,000
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Appendix D – List of Possible Portfolio Combinations 
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
1   A1 B1 D1 
    
483,462  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
2   A1 B1 D2 
 
2,977,788 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
3   A1 B1 D3 
    
273,001  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
4   A1 B1 D4 
 
1,009,133 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
5   A1 B1 D5 
    
674,463  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
6   A1 B1 D6 
    
571,240  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
7   A1 B2 D1 
    
457,825  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
8   A1 B2 D2 
 
2,952,151 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
9   A1 B2 D3 
    
247,364  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
10   A1 B2 D4 
    
983,496  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 40%   
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  Car Bomb 80% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
11   A1 B2 D5 
    
648,826  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
12   A1 B2 D6 
    
545,603  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 80% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
13   A1 B3 D1 
    
452,505  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
14   A1 B3 D2 
 
2,946,831 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
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15   A1 B3 D3 
    
242,044  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
16   A1 B3 D4 
    
978,176  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
17   A1 B3 D5 
    
643,506  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
18   A1 B3 D6 
    
540,283  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
19   A1 B4 D1 
    
462,025  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 75%   
  Car Bomb 80% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 50%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
20   A1 B4 D2 
 
2,956,351 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 95%   
  Car Bomb 80% 40% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
21   A1 B4 D3 
    
251,564  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 70%   
  Car Bomb 80% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
22   A1 B4 D4 
    
987,696  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 40%   
  Car Bomb 80% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
23   A1 B4 D5 
    
653,026  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 0%   
  Car Bomb 80% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
24   A1 B4 D6 
    
549,803  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 80%   
  Car Bomb 80% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 80%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
25   A1 B5 D1 
    
533,825  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 75%   
  Car Bomb 80% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
26   A1 B5 D2 
 
3,028,151 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 95%   
  Car Bomb 80% 80% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
27   A1 B5 D3 
    
323,364  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 70%   
  Car Bomb 80% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
28   A1 B5 D4 
 
1,059,496 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 40%   
  Car Bomb 80% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
29   A1 B5 D5 
    
724,826  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 0%   
  Car Bomb 80% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 0%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
30   A1 B5 D6 
    
621,603  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 80%   
  Car Bomb 80% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
31   A1 B6 D1 
    
725,425  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 75%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
32   A1 B6 D2 
 
3,219,751 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 95%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
33   A1 B6 D3 
    
514,964  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 70%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
34   A1 B6 D4 
 
1,251,096 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 40%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 0%   
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  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
35   A1 B6 D5 
    
916,426  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 0%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
36   A1 B6 D6 
    
813,203  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 80%   
  Car Bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
37   A2 B1 D1 
 
1,010,636 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
38   A2 B1 D2 
 
3,504,962 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
39   A2 B1 D3 
    
800,175  
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  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
40   A2 B1 D4 
 
1,536,307 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
41   A2 B1 D5 
 
1,201,637 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
42   A2 B1 D6 
 
1,098,414 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
43   A2 B2 D1 
    
984,999  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
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44   A2 B2 D2 
 
3,479,325 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
45   A2 B2 D3 
    
774,538  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
46   A2 B2 D4 
 
1,510,670 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
47   A2 B2 D5 
 
1,176,000 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
48   A2 B2 D6 
 
1,072,777 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
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Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
49   A2 B3 D1 
    
979,679  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
50   A2 B3 D2 
 
3,474,005 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
51   A2 B3 D3 
    
769,218  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
52   A2 B3 D4 
 
1,505,350 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
53   A2 B3 D5 
 
1,170,680 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
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  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
54   A2 B3 D6 
 
1,067,457 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
55   A2 B4 D1 
    
989,199  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 40% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
56   A2 B4 D2 
 
3,483,525 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 95%   
  Truck bomb 80% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 40% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
57   A2 B4 D3 
    
778,738  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
58   A2 B4 D4 
 
1,514,870 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 40% 0%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 40% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
59   A2 B4 D5 
 
1,180,200 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
60   A2 B4 D6 
 
1,076,977 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
61   A2 B5 D1 
 
1,060,999 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 80% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
            
62   A2 B5 D2 
 
3,555,325 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 95%   
  Truck bomb 80% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 80% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
63   A2 B5 D3 
    
850,538  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 70%   
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  Car Bomb 90% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
64   A2 B5 D4 
 
1,586,670 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 80% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
65   A2 B5 D5 
 
1,252,000 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
66   A2 B5 D6 
 
1,148,777 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
67   A2 B6 D1 
 
1,252,599 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
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68   A2 B6 D2 
 
3,746,925 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 80%   
            
69   A2 B6 D3 
 
1,042,138 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 0%   
            
70   A2 B6 D4 
 
1,778,270 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
71   A2 B6 D5 
 
1,443,600 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 20%   
            
72   A2 B6 D6 
 
1,340,377 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 50% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 50% 0% 50%   
 209 
 
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
73   A3 B1 D1 
    
708,370  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
            
74   A3 B1 D2 
 
3,202,696 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 80%   
            
75   A3 B1 D3 
    
497,909  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 0%   
            
76   A3 B1 D4 
 
1,234,041 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
77   A3 B1 D5 
    
899,371  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
78   A3 B1 D6 
    
796,148  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
79   A3 B2 D1 
    
682,733  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
            
80   A3 B2 D2 
 
3,177,059 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 80%   
            
81   A3 B2 D3 
    
472,272  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 0%   
            
82   A3 B2 D4 
 
1,208,404 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 40%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
83   A3 B2 D5 
    
873,734  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
84   A3 B2 D6 
    
770,511  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 85% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
85   A3 B3 D1 
    
677,413  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
            
86   A3 B3 D2 
 
3,171,739 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 80%   
            
87   A3 B3 D3 
    
466,952  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 75%   
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  Truck bomb 85% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 0%   
            
88   A3 B3 D4 
 
1,203,084 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
89   A3 B3 D5 
    
868,414  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
90   A3 B3 D6 
    
765,191  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
91   A3 B4 D1 
    
686,933  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 75%   
  Car Bomb 85% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
            
92   A3 B4 D2 
 
3,181,259 
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  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 95%   
  Car Bomb 85% 40% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 80%   
            
93   A3 B4 D3 
    
476,472  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 70%   
  Car Bomb 85% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 0%   
            
94   A3 B4 D4 
 
1,212,604 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 40%   
  Car Bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
95   A3 B4 D5 
    
877,934  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 0%   
  Car Bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
96   A3 B4 D6 
    
774,711  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 40% 80%   
  Car Bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
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Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
97   A3 B5 D1 
    
758,733  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 75%   
  Car Bomb 85% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
            
98   A3 B5 D2 
 
3,253,059 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 95%   
  Car Bomb 85% 80% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 80%   
            
99   A3 B5 D3 
    
548,272  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 70%   
  Car Bomb 85% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 0%   
            
100   A3 B5 D4 
 
1,284,404 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 40%   
  Car Bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
101   A3 B5 D5 
    
949,734  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 0%   
  Car Bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
102   A3 B5 D6 
    
846,511  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 80% 80%   
  Car Bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
103   A3 B6 D1 
    
950,333  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 75%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
            
104   A3 B6 D2 
 
3,444,659 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 95%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 80%   
            
105   A3 B6 D3 
    
739,872  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 70%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 0%   
            
106   A3 B6 D4 
 
1,476,004 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 40%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 40%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
107   A3 B6 D5 
 
1,141,334 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 0%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 20%   
            
108   A3 B6 D6 
 
1,038,111 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 80% 95% 80%   
  Car Bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 85% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 80% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 85% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 0% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
109   A4 B1 D1 
 
1,125,366 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
            
110   A4 B1 D2 
 
3,619,692 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 80%   
            
111   A4 B1 D3 
    
914,905  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 75%   
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  Truck bomb 20% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 0%   
            
112   A4 B1 D4 
 
1,651,037 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
113   A4 B1 D5 
 
1,316,367 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
114   A4 B1 D6 
 
1,213,144 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
115   A4 B2 D1 
 
1,099,729 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
            
116   A4 B2 D2 
 
3,594,055 
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  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 80%   
            
117   A4 B2 D3 
    
889,268  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 0%   
            
118   A4 B2 D4 
 
1,625,400 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
119   A4 B2 D5 
 
1,290,730 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
120   A4 B2 D6 
 
1,187,507 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 20% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
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Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
121   A4 B3 D1 
 
1,094,409 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
            
122   A4 B3 D2 
 
3,588,735 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 80%   
            
123   A4 B3 D3 
    
883,948  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 0%   
            
124   A4 B3 D4 
 
1,620,080 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
125   A4 B3 D5 
 
1,285,410 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
126   A4 B3 D6 
 
1,182,187 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
127   A4 B4 D1 
 
1,103,929 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 40% 75%   
  Car Bomb 20% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 40% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
            
128   A4 B4 D2 
 
3,598,255 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 40% 95%   
  Car Bomb 20% 40% 95%   
  Truck bomb 20% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 40% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 40% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 80%   
            
129   A4 B4 D3 
    
893,468  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 40% 70%   
  Car Bomb 20% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 40% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 0%   
            
130   A4 B4 D4 
 
1,629,600 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 40% 40%   
  Car Bomb 20% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 40% 40%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 40% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
131   A4 B4 D5 
 
1,294,930 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 40% 0%   
  Car Bomb 20% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
132   A4 B4 D6 
 
1,191,707 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 40% 80%   
  Car Bomb 20% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
133   A4 B5 D1 
 
1,175,729 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 80% 75%   
  Car Bomb 20% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 80% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
            
134   A4 B5 D2 
 
3,670,055 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 80% 95%   
  Car Bomb 20% 80% 95%   
  Truck bomb 20% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 80% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 80% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 80%   
            
135   A4 B5 D3 
    
965,268  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 80% 70%   
  Car Bomb 20% 80% 75%   
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  Truck bomb 20% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 0%   
            
136   A4 B5 D4 
 
1,701,400 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 80% 40%   
  Car Bomb 20% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 80% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
137   A4 B5 D5 
 
1,366,730 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 80% 0%   
  Car Bomb 20% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
138   A4 B5 D6 
 
1,263,507 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 80% 80%   
  Car Bomb 20% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
139   A4 B6 D1 
 
1,367,329 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 95% 75%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 95% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
            
140   A4 B6 D2 
 
3,861,655 
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  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 95% 95%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 95% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 80%   
            
141   A4 B6 D3 
 
1,156,868 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 95% 70%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 0%   
            
142   A4 B6 D4 
 
1,893,000 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 95% 40%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 95% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
143   A4 B6 D5 
 
1,558,330 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 95% 0%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 20%   
            
144   A4 B6 D6 
 
1,455,107 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 20% 95% 80%   
  Car Bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 20% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 20% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 20% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 20% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 40% 0% 50%   
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Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
145   A5 B1 D1 
    
502,636  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
            
146   A5 B1 D2 
 
2,996,962 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 80%   
            
147   A5 B1 D3 
    
292,175  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 0%   
            
148   A5 B1 D4 
 
1,028,307 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
149   A5 B1 D5 
    
693,637  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
150   A5 B1 D6 
    
590,414  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
151   A5 B2 D1 
    
476,999  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
            
152   A5 B2 D2 
 
2,971,325 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 80%   
            
153   A5 B2 D3 
    
266,538  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 0%   
            
154   A5 B2 D4 
 
1,002,670 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 40%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
155   A5 B2 D5 
    
668,000  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
156   A5 B2 D6 
    
564,777  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
157   A5 B3 D1 
    
471,679  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
            
158   A5 B3 D2 
 
2,966,005 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 80%   
            
159   A5 B3 D3 
    
261,218  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
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  Truck bomb 90% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 0%   
            
160   A5 B3 D4 
    
997,350  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
161   A5 B3 D5 
    
662,680  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
162   A5 B3 D6 
    
559,457  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
163   A5 B4 D1 
    
481,199  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 40% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 40% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
            
164   A5 B4 D2 
 
2,975,525 
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  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 40% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 40% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 40% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 80%   
            
165   A5 B4 D3 
    
270,738  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 40% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 40% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 0%   
            
166   A5 B4 D4 
 
1,006,870 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 40% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 40% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 40% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
167   A5 B4 D5 
    
672,200  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 40% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
168   A5 B4 D6 
    
568,977  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 40% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
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Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
169   A5 B5 D1 
    
552,999  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 80% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 80% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
            
170   A5 B5 D2 
 
3,047,325 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 80% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 80% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 80% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 80%   
            
171   A5 B5 D3 
    
342,538  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 80% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 0%   
            
172   A5 B5 D4 
 
1,078,670 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 80% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 80% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
173   A5 B5 D5 
    
744,000  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 80% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
174   A5 B5 D6 
    
640,777  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 80% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
175   A5 B6 D1 
    
744,599  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 95% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 95% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
            
176   A5 B6 D2 
 
3,238,925 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 95% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 95% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 80%   
            
177   A5 B6 D3 
    
534,138  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 95% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 0%   
            
178   A5 B6 D4 
 
1,270,270 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 95% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 95% 40%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
179   A5 B6 D5 
    
935,600  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 95% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 20%   
            
180   A5 B6 D6 
    
832,377  
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 60% 95% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 60% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 90% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 10% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 10% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
181   A6 B1 D1 
 
1,619,948 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
            
182   A6 B1 D2 
 
4,114,274 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 80%   
            
183   A6 B1 D3 
 
1,409,487 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
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  Truck bomb 90% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 0%   
            
184   A6 B1 D4 
 
2,145,619 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
185   A6 B1 D5 
 
1,810,949 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
186   A6 B1 D6 
 
1,707,726 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
187   A6 B2 D1 
 
1,594,311 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
            
188   A6 B2 D2 
 
4,088,637 
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  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 80%   
            
189   A6 B2 D3 
 
1,383,850 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 0%   
            
190   A6 B2 D4 
 
2,119,982 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
191   A6 B2 D5 
 
1,785,312 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
192   A6 B2 D6 
 
1,682,089 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 90% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 85% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 90% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
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Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
193   A6 B3 D1 
 
1,588,991 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
            
194   A6 B3 D2 
 
4,083,317 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 80%   
            
195   A6 B3 D3 
 
1,378,530 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 0%   
            
196   A6 B3 D4 
 
2,114,662 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
197   A6 B3 D5 
 
1,779,992 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
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  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
198   A6 B3 D6 
 
1,676,769 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 90% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 90% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
199   A6 B4 D1 
 
1,598,511 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 40% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
            
200   A6 B4 D2 
 
4,092,837 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 40% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 40% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 80%   
            
201   A6 B4 D3 
 
1,388,050 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 40% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 40% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 0%   
            
202   A6 B4 D4 
 
2,124,182 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 40% 40%   
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  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
203   A6 B4 D5 
 
1,789,512 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
204   A6 B4 D6 
 
1,686,289 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 40% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 40% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 40% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 40% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 40% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
205   A6 B5 D1 
 
1,670,311 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 80% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
            
206   A6 B5 D2 
 
4,164,637 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 80% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 80% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 80%   
            
207   A6 B5 D3 
 
1,459,850 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 75%   
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  Truck bomb 90% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 80% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 80% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 0%   
            
208   A6 B5 D4 
 
2,195,982 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 80% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
209   A6 B5 D5 
 
1,861,312 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
210   A6 B5 D6 
 
1,758,089 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 80% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 80% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 80% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 80% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
Portfolio 
No. Type of Security Incident   
Security System 
Performance    Cost  
211   A6 B6 D1 
 
1,861,911 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 75%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 95% 75%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
            
212   A6 B6 D2 
 
4,356,237 
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  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 95%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 95%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 95% 95%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 90%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 80%   
            
213   A6 B6 D3 
 
1,651,450 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 70%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 75%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 95% 70%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 75%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 0%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 0%   
            
214   A6 B6 D4 
 
2,387,582 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 40%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 95% 40%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 40%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
215   A6 B6 D5 
 
2,052,912 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 0%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 50%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 20%   
            
216   A6 B6 D6 
 
1,949,689 
  Bomb introduced by person on foot 90% 95% 80%   
  Car Bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Truck bomb 90% 95% 0%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - on foot 10% 95% 80%   
  Biological agent attack on terminal - by vehicle 10% 95% 0%   
  Mining of port infrastructure 0% 0% 80%   
  Vessel attacked by a suicide boat 30% 0% 50%   
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Appendix E - Transcript of interview with Russell Kennedy at Lloyd’s of 
London, 23 April 2009. 
 
 
RK: So I’m going to talk you through this and it will all make sense.  The idea is that you rate each 
individual location on its own technical rate.  So for instance let’s say you were doing….where this 
comes from really is from the all risks, from the property….so let’s say you’ve got a portfolio that is 
exposed to all risks in the States.   
 
RT: Yes 
 
RT: So that means you’ve got exposure for fire, you’ve got exposure for flood, quake and wind.  So you 
would need to effectively price those separately.  So you would need to get a price for the fire and each 
of those.  They would come up in a model for flood, quake and wind.  The fire you would rate separately 
on occupancy so a saw mill has a different rate to a hotel or an office building.  So each one of those is 
rated separately, you would then add on all of your expenses on top of those rates per risk so you have a 
percentage of expenses to be included that you would need to charge for profit and added with profit to 
give you a market price. 
 
RT: So when you work back from the market price and you strip out all of those additional expenses you 
are looking to arrive at the technical rate so effectively the closest to a pure premium rate you can 
actually achieve. 
 
RK: And that is effectively based on your expected losses which is your expected probability.  So that’s 
different to….the difficulty is when you’re rating something that is, for instance this here….I mean it 
may be if you were doing a port then it’s OK as you’ve got an actual set of locations.  Let’s say you’re 
doing ABC and they have ten thousand locations.  Well how do you actually rate each one of those 
individual locations?  How do you come up with a technical rate for that?  I mean it’s a difficult thing to 
get your head round.  So what we’ve done is started off with a rate per country so I’ll just talk you 
through it.  So let’s assume we’re writing a risk, let’s take this one.  I’ll just call this up (on the computer 
screen) so this is….excuse my handwriting it’s terrible….This is XXX Energy Group.  This is 
a….they’re basically underground oil storage.  So they will be in and around terminals.  So, we assume 
twenty percent brokerage, then we have all these other various expenses, then the different ULR’s that 
we’re writing.  We would want to target Y% return on capital, which is quite ambitious.  This really is 
about Z% over the risk-free rate of what we’re trying to target.  So we then divide it by a loss ratio that 
we need to make over the long term.  So this might be a bit confusing.  There are 34 locations over 4 
countries.  South Africa…. 
 
RT: Yes 
 
RK: ….there’s two locations in the Congo which all around they have locations of eleven million each.  
Then there’s seventy five million (US Dollars) in Ashkelon, and then there’s a hundred and fifty million 
which is worldwide.  The schedule which we have for worldwide is Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Norway, and they’ve got this a hundred and fifty million facility which fluctuates depending on how 
much they’ve got in different terminals. 
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RT: Sure 
 
RK: So what I did was, you put in the limits for each of those, and each one of those will have a 
different limit 
 
RT: So where it is on other people’s property, it’s just stocks of oil 
 
RK: Yeah 
 
RT: Alright 
 
RK: It can fluctuate over the year but that’s the maximum amount, in fact, it’s slightly misleading but 
because I saw the amounts they had last year, it was never anything like that but they buy that just in 
case. 
 
RT: Sure 
 
RK: Each one of those is then in excess of a hundred thousand (US Dollars).  A straight hundred 
thousand, no additional deductible.  So we rate per country.  So, South Africa, Belgium, Israel, Congo, 
then we have a sector is....now that sector is divided….comprised of a set of indices that I came up with 
twenty occupancies from our book, divided everything we’ve written into twenty occupancies and then 
came up with an average rate, divided them all up with an average rate…market price for each one of 
those.  Now that was kind of difficult. 
 
RT: So they are professional services, light industry…. 
 
RK: Energy, oil and gas, power, banking, finance….and there is....there is ports and harbours. 
 
RT: Ports and harbours. 
 
RK: Now what I did was, the reason I did that, even they are all market prices is you’re going to have so 
many differences in terms of security, clients, territory.  What it gave me was basically a proportional 
spread so I could see which ones were paying more or less in comparison to each other.  That’s the 
occupancy.  So then I thought how am I going to rate per country?  So I took the Exclusive Analysis 
rating.... 
 
RT: Would that be a minimum country rate? 
 
RK: Yes.  So they give you, on their website, risk maps.  So they give you a risk score for each one of 
these perils, effectively.  So, terrorism, war, civil unrest.  That’s to one decimal place between one and 
ten.  So in my thinking, how was I going to translate that into a risk score?  So, what I did was, I took 
the US to be the midpoint: forty percent of my risks are in the US.  I had to take a midpoint somewhere, 
I think the US in terms of risk....I assumed a base rate for each occupancy of x%....that didn’t come out 
of the book for market price....I took x%  to be my notional base rate...that’s....and that’s not come out of 
nowhere. 
 241 
 
 
RT: Right.  OK.  How would you describe that base rate of x% per annum rate? 
 
RK: So.  This is the key.   This is where everything I’ve thought about stacks up.  It’s a combination of 
finding...in essence what I’m doing here is trying to find a price that I can price that risk at.  And the 
reason I took x% the average fire rate is about y%....notionally it’s a peril where you write all risks 
including terrorism....it makes up a part of that. 
 
RT: And your x% background rate would be unaffected by any movement in terms of how the market is 
moving or the dollar rate. 
 
RK: Yes, that’s right.  It’s just my opinion of what I think, so for instance, energy terminals or oil and 
gas storage....I spoke at length with our energy underwriter, sat down with him for about three 
hours....he described to me, he’s got about forty years of experience, and they write terrorism within 
their programme....he talked me through facilities and actually how impenetrable they are, how difficult 
it is to have a large loss.  And from that, my energy oil and gas rate for terrorism went from....was 
slightly above average and I took it down to being the lowest one.  So it moves over time as different 
information.... 
 
RT: Do you include in that rate the likelihood of a particular industry being targeted? 
 
RK:  I’ll come on to that.  So then I have to get a country rate.  I take the country rate from Exclusive 
Analysis rating and information.  So that is effectively....on an index from one to ten at one decimal 
place.  Most of the rates tend to hang around the one or two mark.  Afghanistan is seven....obviously it’s 
not seven times more likely to get hit than UK, it’s multiples of that, so how do I get.... 
 
RT: It’s almost like a logarithmic scale. 
 
RK: It’s exactly what it is.  So, what I did was I basically took two to the power of the index to elongate 
the scale, so that now gives me....with US as the midpoint....actually Afghanistan is two thousand five 
hundred times more likely to get hit than the US as a notional, you know, for there to be an event, 
whether it’s a pipe bomb or a suicide attack or a....just to give you some indication of risk.  So then 
when you combine, times one by the other....that gives you a technical rate for the country.  So it gives 
you a rate for the occupancy in the territory and a price.   
 
RT: So would you be able to give me country rates for these port locations?  [RT hands RK list of 
locations] 
 
RK: Yes, of course. 
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Appendix F – Attacks on Port Facilities 1968-2007 
 
1 June 1968  
UNITED STATES, GALVESTON, TEXAS 
The Japanese vessel “Mikagasan Maru” was extensively damaged by a bomb allegedly placed by El 
Poder Cubano, a Cuban exile group. 
 
16 September 1968 
UNITED STATES, MIAMI HARBOUR 
El Poder Cubano terrorists fired at the Polish general cargo vessel “Polancia”. 
 
24 January 1970 
ISRAEL 
Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine jointly claim credit for an explosion in an 
ammunition truck unloading in the docks. 
 
19 February 1971 
 TURKEY, ISTANBUL 
A U.S. army passenger vessel was damaged by a bomb. 
 
29 March 1972 
UNITED STATES, BISCAYNE, FLORIDA 
A Soviet research vessel was bombed by the JCN, an anti-Castro Cuban group. 
 
1 December 1972 
CYPRUS 
An attempt by the Black September Organisation to hijack an Italian passenger vessel was thwarted by 
Coast Guard police. 
 
4 March 1973 
LEBANON 
The Greek charter vessel “Sanya” sank in Beirut harbor following an explosion on board.  The official 
investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by a limpet mine.  Black September Organisation 
claimed credit for the attack. 
 
30 December 1973 
UNITED STATES, MIAMI, FLORIDA 
Two bombs damaged the 573 ton “Mereghan II” while moored alongside waiting to lift cargo in Miami 
River docks. 
 
2 February 1974 
PAKISTAN, KARACHI 
Three gunmen, members of the Muslim International Guerrillas seized a Greek general cargo vessel and 
threatened to blow up the ship unless the Greek government free two Arab prisoners. 
 
2 March 1974 
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FRANCE 
The Pierre Overnay brigade attacked the barge “Ouest France” while moored alongside the quay and 
firebombed 180 Renault cars. 
 
May 1974 
UNITED STATES, LOS ANGELES 
The “Caribe Star” was sunk in the harbor by a bomb placed on board.  The 120 ft former ferry had been 
fitted out for Arab interests.  The Jewish Defense League claimed responsibility. 
 
9 April 1974 
PORTUGAL 
The Revolutionary Brigades attacked the Portuguese troop ship “Niassa”.  The vessel’s hull was holed in 
two places on the waterline. 
 
20 July 1974 
IRELAND, BELFAST 
A bomb exploded on board the ferry “Ulster Queen”.  Provisional IRA suspected after coded telephone 
warning to a newspaper. 
 
16 December 1974 
UNITED STATES, MIAMI 
A bomb exploded in the port offices of the Eastern Steamship Lines.  Frente de Liberacion Nacional 
Cubana suspected. 
 
9 March 1975 
IRELAND, GREENCASTLE HARBOUR 
Over 30 incendiary devices were planted on trawlers in the harbour.  Only two exploded, destroying the 
vessels.  Ulster Defence Association suspected. 
 
23 July 1975 
JAPAN, OKINAWA 
A Chilean training vessel and a Kobe University vessel docked at the International Ocean Expo were 
attacked by terrorists using Molotov cocktails.  Radical leftists suspected. 
 
1 August 1975 
ARGENTINA, SANTA FE 
The Montoneros and the People’s Revolutionary Army made lighting bomb strikes on the river port. 
 
2 November 1975 
PUERTO RICO, SAN JUAN 
Russian vessel “Maxim Gorkiy” damaged by two bomb blasts below the waterline while at anchor in the 
port. 
 
28 November 1975 
PUERTO RICO 
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Russian vessel “Maxim Gorkiy” hit by a second attack when a bomb was thrown onboard injuring one 
crew member and causing minor damage. 
 
August 1976 
LEBANON 
The Greek vessel “Tina” was sunk by three limpet mines believed to be by members of a right wing 
Lebanese Christian group while the vessel was part loaded with a cargo of arms for Fatah.  
 
16 September 1976 
UNITED STATES, PORT ELIZABETH, JERSEY 
A Soviet cargo vessel was damaged by a limpet mine planted by an anti-Castro refugee.   
 
23 October 1976 
LEBANON 
Three Greek vessels “Eko”, “Riri” and “Spiro” were attacked in port with limpet mines.  All vessels 
sank at their moorings. 
 
22 July 1977 
PERU 
A Cuban trawler, docked at a port near Lima was bombed and vessel sank.   The International 
Commandos of Zone 6 of CORU claimed responsibility. 
 
30 April 1978 
PHILIPPINES 
The “Don Carlos” was boarded by armed members of a Muslim Separatist rebel group of the South 
Philippines.  Cargo offloaded and passengers taken hostage. 
 
3 October 1978 
ISRAEL 
Israeli Navy sank a bomb laden vessel belonging to Fatah heading for Eilat with the intention of 
destroying the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline and oil tank farms in the port. 
 
March-June 1979 
UNITED STATES, MASSACHUSETTS 
Multiple bomb threats against vessels and petroleum storage site disrupt port operations. 
 
1979 (month unknown) 
PORTUGAL 
Whaler “Sierra” rammed by “Sea Shepherd”.  Perpetrators arrested by escaped – suspected to be 
members of Greenpeace or Fund for Animals. 
 
9 January 1980 
UNITED STATES, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 
Port closed for three days following threats to bomb the Soviet vessel “Nicolay Karamzin” and that the 
harbour had been mined. 
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16 June 1980 
BELGIUM 
Demonstrators smashed navigational and radio equipment onboard “Andrea Smits” while loading 
nuclear waste for disposal in the Atlantic. 
 
29 October 1980 
ITALY, GENOA 
A Libyan vessel under repair almost sank following a limpet mine explosion on the waterline.  Maltese 
National Front suspected. 
 
2 October 1981 
SPAIN, SANTANDER 
A powerful bomb caused a six foot hole in the hull of a destroyer moored in the port.  ETA military 
wing suspected. 
 
2 November 1981 
FRANCE, NANTES 
British hydrographic survey vessel “Hecate” suffered minor explosion on the hull while docked.  Divers 
subsequently found another bomb with 2.2 lbs of plastic explosive which had failed to explode.  Irish 
National Liberation Army terrorists suspected. 
 
2 January 1982 
LEBANON, TRIPOLI 
The Lebanese-registered tanker “Babanaft” is shelled while lifting Iraqi crude in the port.  Fire on deck 
extinguished and vessel sailed immediately. 
 
9 March 1982 
LEBANON, TYRE 
Lebanese general cargo vessel bombed in the port despite strict security. 
 
16 March 1982 
BRAZIL, RIO DE JANEIRO 
Liberian-flagged tanker “Hercules” ordered to leave after a bomb was found onboard.  Outcome 
unknown. 
 
16 December 1982 
PHILIPPINES 
The ferry “Santa Lucia” was damaged while in Pagadian by an explosive device planted by the Moro 
National Liberation Front. 
 
23 February 1983 
IRELAND, LOUGH FOYLE 
A British cargo vessel was seized in an inlet by IRA and the ship was blown up. 
 
5 August 1983 
FALKLAND ISLANDS, PORT STANLEY 
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An ultra-nationalist Argentine group claimed responsibility for an explosion onboard the Danish vessel 
“Kraka” moored in the harbour.  The vessel was unloading granite blocks to be used to build a memorial 
to fallen British soldiers during the Falklands War. 
 
20 March 1984 
NICARAGUA, PUERTO SANDINO 
Explosive device planted at port entrance which damaged a Soviet tanker. 
 
Jan-March 1984 
NICARAGUA, CORINTO, BLUEFIELDS & EL BLUFF 
Mine laying operations in three ports caused a total of 11 ships to sink, including Soviet, Panamanian 
Dutch, Liberian and Nicaraguan Registered.  
 
28 June 1984 
ARGENTINA, BUENOS AIRES 
Two tankers, the “Perito Morena” and “Belgrano” set ablaze by the Sargento Cisneros Commandos. 
 
25 September 1985 
CYPRUS 
Three members of the PLO’s elite Force-17 seized an Israeli yacht on Yom Kippur and killed the three 
inhabitants. 
 
7 October 1985 
EGYPT 
The Italian cruise vessel “Achille Lauro” was seized with 511 passengers onboard by four members of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  An American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer was shot in 
the head and thrown overboard in his wheelchair. 
 
30 January 1986 
ITALY, MESSINA 
Two 135-ton Cypriot-flagged hydrofoils were bombed and sunk while docked for repairs. 
 
14 September 1986 
MOROCCO 
A Spanish vessel was attacked by Polisario guerrillas. 
 
23 January 1987 
MAURITANIA 
Panamanian bulker “Maritime King” attacked with rocket fire by Polisario guerrillas. 
 
1 February 1987 
LEBANON 
Egyptian vessel “Fast Carrier” damaged by two limpet mines placed on the port side. 
 
25 March 1987 
GERMANY, HAMBURG 
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Molotov cocktails thrown at British truck and trailer parked in the port. 
 
14 February 1988 
CYPRUS, LIMASSOL 
A ferry boat damaged by an explosion in the port. 
 
11 July 1988 
GREECE 
Two men preparing an explosive device to attack the vessel “City of Poros” died when the bomb went 
off prematurely in the port.  Middle Eastern gunmen then attacked the “City of Poros” firing automatic 
weapons at the crowd of passengers and throwing grenades. 
 
1 August 1988 
NICARAGUA 
A ferryboat with a 10-person US delegation was ambushed by guerrillas in the south east of the country. 
 
25 December 1993 
ISRAEL, EILAT 
An Israeli vessel “Jrush Shalom” was bombed while docked in the port.   
 
8 July 1994 
ALGERIA, JIJEL 
GIA attackers boarded a cargo vessel moored in the port and murdered seven Italian sailors. 
 
16 January 1995 
TURKEY, TRABZON 
A ferry “Avraysa” hijacked in the port by Turkish-Abkhaz terrorists. 
 
April 1996  
SRI LANKA, COLOMBO 
Van Ommeren vessel docked in the port came under mortar attack by two LTTE gunboats.  Damage to 
accommodation block and two sailors injured. 
 
9 August 1996 
SRI LANKA, TRINCOMALEE 
A Philippine registered vessel was bombed under the waterline by LTTE while loading sand. 
 
1 July 1997 
SRI LANKA, JAFFNA 
The LTTE abducted the Indonesia crew of a ferry and blew up the ship. 
 
7 July 1997 
SRI LANKA, JAFFNA 
LTTE hijack “Morang Bong” and abduct 37 North Korean sailors. 
 
1 September 1997 
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SRI LANKA, TRINCOMALEE 
A Chinese owned vessel is attacked by the LTTE.  Crew members killed, wounded or missing. 
 
9 September 1997 
SRI LANKA, TRINCOMALEE 
LTTE attack vessel “Athena” with a limpet mine while at anchor in the roads.  Main engine room fire 
and vessel was in danger of sinking. 
 
12 October 2000 
YEMEN, ADEN 
USS Cole attacked by suicide boat causing 20ft by 40 ft hole in the port side.  17 sailors killed. 
 
11 September 2001 
UNITED STATES, NEW YORK 
Ports of New York and New Jersey severely disrupted following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Centre. 
 
October 2002 
YEMEN, ADEN 
The French tanker “Limburg” was attacked by a suicide boat while waiting to take on pilot for docking 
in Aden causing explosion and fire.  1 sailor drowned. 
 
15 March 2003 
RUSSIA 
Explosion in Khasan district killed a naval lieutenant and a former military officer. 
 
30 November 2003 
IRAQ 
A Turkish tanker was attacked. 
 
25 May 2004 
PAKISTAN, KARACHI 
A bomb exploded in the port, killing two and injuring two others.   
 
23 June 2004 
PAKISTAN, GWADAR 
Chinese engineers developing deep-sea port came under rocket attack. 
 
31 July 2004 
PAKISTAN, GWADAR 
A series of explosions in the port city with the first occurring by the port. 
 
28 August 2005 
PHILIPPINES, LAMITAN 
A bomb exploded among the LPG tanks on the ferry Dona Ramona” injuring at least 30, including nine 
children. 
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13 May 2006 
CORSICA, BASTIA 
A bomb exploded in the Bastia Maritime Authority complex.   
 
3 March 2007 
INDONESIA, AMBON 
A bomb exploded at the port gates in the Yos Sudarso port in Ambon. 
 
8 September 2007 
ALGERIA, DELLYS 
Coast Guard troops targeted by suicide truck bomber during a flag-raising ceremony. 
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Appendix G – Kolmogorov-Smirnov One Sided Test Critical Values Table 
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Appendix H – Sensitivity Analysis Simulations: Cost Reduction and 
Performance Enhancement of Port Security Systems 
 
  
Sensitivity Analysis: Costs Sensitivity Analysis: Performance 
Portfolio 
No. Access Control Biometrics Detection 
Access 
Control Biometrics Detection 
1 -3.89% -0.70% -5.42% 102.72% 104.17% 103.11% 
2 -0.63% -0.11% -9.26% 103.29% 105.04% 101.67% 
3 -6.88% -1.23% -1.89% 102.27% 103.48% 104.26% 
4 -1.86% -0.33% -7.81% 101.84% 102.82% 105.33% 
5 -2.78% -0.50% -6.72% 101.80% 102.76% 105.44% 
6 -3.29% -0.59% -6.12% 102.08% 103.18% 104.74% 
7 -4.10% -0.17% -5.72% 102.72% 104.17% 103.11% 
8 -0.64% -0.03% -9.34% 103.29% 105.04% 101.67% 
9 -7.59% -0.32% -2.08% 102.27% 103.48% 104.26% 
10 -1.91% -0.08% -8.01% 101.84% 102.82% 105.33% 
11 -2.89% -0.12% -6.98% 101.80% 102.76% 105.44% 
12 -3.44% -0.15% -6.41% 102.08% 103.18% 104.74% 
13 -4.15% -0.06% -5.79% 102.81% 103.97% 103.21% 
14 -0.64% -0.01% -9.35% 103.42% 104.84% 101.74% 
15 -7.76% -0.11% -2.13% 102.33% 103.29% 104.38% 
16 -1.92% -0.03% -8.05% 101.88% 102.66% 105.46% 
17 -2.92% -0.04% -7.04% 101.84% 102.60% 105.57% 
18 -3.48% -0.05% -6.47% 102.13% 103.01% 104.86% 
19 -4.07% -0.26% -5.67% 102.21% 105.26% 102.53% 
20 -0.64% -0.04% -9.32% 102.58% 106.12% 101.31% 
21 -7.47% -0.48% -2.05% 101.90% 104.52% 103.58% 
22 -1.90% -0.12% -7.97% 101.59% 103.79% 104.62% 
23 -2.88% -0.19% -6.94% 101.56% 103.71% 104.73% 
24 -3.42% -0.22% -6.36% 101.77% 104.20% 104.04% 
25 -3.52% -1.57% -4.91% 102.59% 104.44% 102.96% 
26 -0.62% -0.28% -9.10% 103.10% 105.32% 101.58% 
27 -5.81% -2.60% -1.59% 102.18% 103.73% 104.09% 
28 -1.77% -0.79% -7.43% 101.78% 103.05% 105.16% 
29 -2.59% -1.16% -6.25% 101.74% 102.98% 105.27% 
30 -3.02% -1.35% -5.63% 102.00% 103.43% 104.57% 
31 -2.59% -3.80% -3.61% 102.83% 103.94% 103.23% 
32 -0.58% -0.86% -8.56% 103.45% 104.80% 101.75% 
33 -3.65% -5.35% -1.00% 102.34% 103.26% 104.40% 
34 -1.50% -2.20% -6.30% 101.89% 102.63% 105.48% 
35 -2.05% -3.01% -4.94% 101.85% 102.57% 105.59% 
36 -2.31% -3.39% -4.30% 102.14% 102.97% 104.89% 
37 -7.07% -0.33% -2.59% 102.65% 104.21% 103.14% 
38 -2.04% -0.10% -7.86% 103.21% 105.10% 101.69% 
39 -8.94% -0.42% -0.64% 102.20% 103.50% 104.29% 
40 -4.65% -0.22% -5.13% 101.79% 102.84% 105.37% 
41 -5.95% -0.28% -3.77% 101.74% 102.78% 105.48% 
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42 -6.51% -0.31% -3.18% 102.02% 103.21% 104.78% 
43 -7.26% -0.08% -2.66% 102.67% 104.16% 103.17% 
44 -2.05% -0.02% -7.92% 103.25% 105.04% 101.71% 
45 -9.23% -0.10% -0.67% 102.22% 103.45% 104.33% 
46 -4.73% -0.05% -5.21% 101.80% 102.79% 105.41% 
47 -6.08% -0.07% -3.85% 101.76% 102.73% 105.52% 
48 -6.66% -0.07% -3.26% 102.03% 103.16% 104.81% 
49 -7.30% -0.03% -2.67% 102.74% 104.01% 103.25% 
50 -2.06% -0.01% -7.93% 103.34% 104.90% 101.76% 
51 -9.30% -0.03% -0.67% 102.27% 103.32% 104.42% 
52 -4.75% -0.02% -5.23% 101.83% 102.68% 105.49% 
53 -6.11% -0.02% -3.87% 101.78% 102.61% 105.60% 
54 -6.70% -0.03% -3.28% 102.07% 103.03% 104.90% 
55 -7.23% -0.12% -2.65% 102.15% 105.30% 102.55% 
56 -2.05% -0.04% -7.91% 102.51% 106.17% 101.32% 
57 -9.18% -0.16% -0.66% 101.85% 104.55% 103.60% 
58 -4.72% -0.08% -5.20% 101.55% 103.81% 104.65% 
59 -6.06% -0.10% -3.84% 101.51% 103.73% 104.76% 
60 -6.64% -0.11% -3.25% 101.71% 104.22% 104.06% 
61 -6.74% -0.79% -2.47% 102.52% 104.48% 102.99% 
62 -2.01% -0.24% -7.75% 103.03% 105.38% 101.60% 
63 -8.41% -0.99% -0.61% 102.12% 103.76% 104.12% 
64 -4.51% -0.53% -4.96% 101.73% 103.07% 105.20% 
65 -5.71% -0.67% -3.62% 101.69% 103.00% 105.31% 
66 -6.22% -0.73% -3.04% 101.94% 103.45% 104.60% 
67 -5.71% -2.20% -2.09% 102.76% 103.98% 103.27% 
68 -1.91% -0.74% -7.36% 103.37% 104.86% 101.77% 
69 -6.86% -2.64% -0.49% 102.28% 103.28% 104.44% 
70 -4.02% -1.55% -4.43% 101.84% 102.65% 105.52% 
71 -4.95% -1.91% -3.14% 101.79% 102.58% 105.63% 
72 -5.33% -2.06% -2.61% 102.08% 103.00% 104.92% 
73 -5.83% -0.47% -3.70% 103.78% 103.56% 102.65% 
74 -1.29% -0.11% -8.61% 104.44% 104.18% 101.38% 
75 -8.29% -0.68% -1.04% 103.23% 103.04% 103.73% 
76 -3.34% -0.27% -6.38% 102.69% 102.53% 104.78% 
77 -4.59% -0.37% -5.04% 102.63% 102.48% 104.89% 
78 -5.18% -0.42% -4.39% 102.99% 102.82% 104.19% 
79 -6.05% -0.12% -3.84% 103.78% 103.56% 102.65% 
80 -1.30% -0.03% -8.68% 104.44% 104.18% 101.38% 
81 -8.74% -0.17% -1.09% 103.23% 103.04% 103.73% 
82 -3.42% -0.07% -6.52% 102.69% 102.53% 104.78% 
83 -4.72% -0.09% -5.18% 102.63% 102.48% 104.89% 
84 -5.36% -0.10% -4.54% 102.99% 102.82% 104.19% 
85 -6.09% -0.04% -3.87% 103.89% 103.38% 102.73% 
86 -1.30% -0.01% -8.69% 104.59% 103.98% 101.43% 
87 -8.84% -0.06% -1.10% 103.31% 102.87% 103.82% 
88 -3.43% -0.02% -6.55% 102.74% 102.38% 104.88% 
89 -4.75% -0.03% -5.22% 102.68% 102.33% 104.99% 
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90 -5.39% -0.04% -4.57% 103.06% 102.65% 104.29% 
91 -6.01% -0.18% -3.81% 103.16% 104.62% 102.22% 
92 -1.30% -0.04% -8.66% 103.61% 105.26% 101.13% 
93 -8.66% -0.26% -1.08% 102.77% 104.04% 103.19% 
94 -3.40% -0.10% -6.50% 102.36% 103.44% 104.20% 
95 -4.70% -0.14% -5.16% 102.32% 103.38% 104.31% 
96 -5.33% -0.16% -4.51% 102.59% 103.78% 103.63% 
97 -5.44% -1.11% -3.45% 103.63% 103.82% 102.55% 
98 -1.27% -0.26% -8.47% 104.23% 104.45% 101.32% 
99 -7.53% -1.53% -0.94% 103.12% 103.28% 103.60% 
100 -3.21% -0.65% -6.13% 102.61% 102.75% 104.64% 
101 -4.35% -0.88% -4.77% 102.56% 102.69% 104.75% 
102 -4.88% -0.99% -4.13% 102.89% 103.05% 104.06% 
103 -4.34% -2.90% -2.76% 103.91% 103.34% 102.75% 
104 -1.20% -0.80% -8.00% 104.62% 103.94% 101.44% 
105 -5.58% -3.72% -0.70% 103.32% 102.84% 103.84% 
106 -2.80% -1.87% -5.34% 102.75% 102.35% 104.90% 
107 -3.62% -2.41% -3.97% 102.69% 102.30% 105.01% 
108 -3.98% -2.65% -3.37% 103.07% 102.62% 104.31% 
109 -7.37% -0.30% -2.33% 104.92% 102.91% 102.17% 
110 -2.29% -0.09% -7.61% 105.59% 103.31% 101.10% 
111 -9.07% -0.37% -0.56% 104.31% 102.56% 103.13% 
112 -5.03% -0.20% -4.77% 103.69% 102.19% 104.13% 
113 -6.30% -0.26% -3.44% 103.62% 102.15% 104.23% 
114 -6.84% -0.28% -2.88% 104.04% 102.39% 103.56% 
115 -7.54% -0.07% -2.38% 104.92% 102.91% 102.17% 
116 -2.31% -0.02% -7.67% 105.59% 103.31% 101.10% 
117 -9.33% -0.09% -0.58% 104.31% 102.56% 103.13% 
118 -5.10% -0.05% -4.85% 103.69% 102.19% 104.13% 
119 -6.43% -0.06% -3.51% 103.62% 102.15% 104.23% 
120 -6.99% -0.07% -2.95% 104.04% 102.39% 103.56% 
121 -7.58% -0.02% -2.39% 105.03% 102.75% 102.22% 
122 -2.31% -0.01% -7.68% 105.74% 103.13% 101.13% 
123 -9.39% -0.03% -0.58% 104.40% 102.40% 103.20% 
124 -5.12% -0.02% -4.86% 103.75% 102.05% 104.20% 
125 -6.45% -0.02% -3.52% 103.68% 102.01% 104.31% 
126 -7.02% -0.02% -2.96% 104.12% 102.25% 103.63% 
127 -7.52% -0.11% -2.37% 104.24% 103.89% 101.87% 
128 -2.31% -0.03% -7.66% 104.73% 104.34% 100.93% 
129 -9.29% -0.14% -0.58% 103.78% 103.47% 102.75% 
130 -5.09% -0.07% -4.83% 103.29% 103.02% 103.69% 
131 -6.41% -0.09% -3.50% 103.24% 102.97% 103.79% 
132 -6.96% -0.10% -2.94% 103.57% 103.28% 103.15% 
133 -7.06% -0.71% -2.23% 104.76% 103.15% 102.10% 
134 -2.26% -0.23% -7.51% 105.38% 103.56% 101.06% 
135 -8.60% -0.87% -0.53% 104.19% 102.77% 103.04% 
136 -4.88% -0.49% -4.63% 103.60% 102.38% 104.02% 
137 -6.07% -0.61% -3.31% 103.53% 102.34% 104.13% 
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138 -6.57% -0.66% -2.77% 103.93% 102.60% 103.47% 
139 -6.07% -2.02% -1.92% 105.05% 102.71% 102.23% 
140 -2.15% -0.71% -7.14% 105.77% 103.10% 101.13% 
141 -7.17% -2.38% -0.45% 104.42% 102.37% 103.21% 
142 -4.38% -1.46% -4.16% 103.76% 102.02% 104.21% 
143 -5.32% -1.77% -2.91% 103.69% 101.98% 104.32% 
144 -5.70% -1.89% -2.40% 104.13% 102.22% 103.65% 
145 -4.12% -0.67% -5.21% 103.60% 103.67% 102.73% 
146 -0.69% -0.11% -9.20% 104.24% 104.33% 101.43% 
147 -7.08% -1.15% -1.76% 103.06% 103.12% 103.82% 
148 -2.01% -0.33% -7.66% 102.53% 102.58% 104.88% 
149 -2.98% -0.48% -6.53% 102.48% 102.53% 104.99% 
150 -3.51% -0.57% -5.92% 102.83% 102.88% 104.29% 
151 -4.34% -0.17% -5.49% 103.60% 103.67% 102.73% 
152 -0.70% -0.03% -9.28% 104.24% 104.33% 101.43% 
153 -7.77% -0.30% -1.93% 103.06% 103.12% 103.82% 
154 -2.06% -0.08% -7.86% 102.53% 102.58% 104.88% 
155 -3.10% -0.12% -6.78% 102.48% 102.53% 104.99% 
156 -3.67% -0.14% -6.19% 102.83% 102.88% 104.29% 
157 -4.39% -0.06% -5.55% 103.71% 103.48% 102.81% 
158 -0.70% -0.01% -9.29% 104.39% 104.12% 101.48% 
159 -7.92% -0.10% -1.97% 103.14% 102.95% 103.92% 
160 -2.08% -0.03% -7.90% 102.59% 102.43% 104.98% 
161 -3.12% -0.04% -6.84% 102.53% 102.38% 105.09% 
162 -3.70% -0.05% -6.25% 102.89% 102.72% 104.39% 
163 -4.30% -0.25% -5.44% 103.00% 104.73% 102.28% 
164 -0.70% -0.04% -9.26% 103.43% 105.41% 101.16% 
165 -7.65% -0.45% -1.90% 102.61% 104.12% 103.26% 
166 -2.06% -0.12% -7.82% 102.22% 103.50% 104.28% 
167 -3.08% -0.18% -6.74% 102.18% 103.44% 104.38% 
168 -3.64% -0.21% -6.15% 102.44% 103.85% 103.71% 
169 -3.74% -1.52% -4.74% 103.45% 103.93% 102.62% 
170 -0.68% -0.28% -9.05% 104.04% 104.60% 101.36% 
171 -6.04% -2.45% -1.50% 102.95% 103.36% 103.69% 
172 -1.92% -0.78% -7.30% 102.46% 102.80% 104.74% 
173 -2.78% -1.13% -6.09% 102.41% 102.74% 104.85% 
174 -3.23% -1.31% -5.46% 102.73% 103.11% 104.15% 
175 -2.78% -3.70% -3.52% 103.73% 103.44% 102.83% 
176 -0.64% -0.85% -8.51% 104.42% 104.09% 101.49% 
177 -3.88% -5.16% -0.96% 103.15% 102.91% 103.94% 
178 -1.63% -2.17% -6.20% 102.60% 102.40% 105.00% 
179 -2.21% -2.95% -4.84% 102.54% 102.35% 105.11% 
180 -2.49% -3.31% -4.20% 102.91% 102.68% 104.41% 
181 -8.18% -0.21% -1.62% 104.44% 103.18% 102.37% 
182 -3.22% -0.08% -6.70% 105.12% 103.67% 101.21% 
183 -9.40% -0.24% -0.37% 103.85% 102.76% 103.38% 
184 -6.17% -0.16% -3.67% 103.26% 102.33% 104.41% 
185 -7.31% -0.19% -2.50% 103.19% 102.29% 104.52% 
 255 
 
186 -7.75% -0.20% -2.05% 103.59% 102.57% 103.83% 
187 -8.31% -0.05% -1.64% 104.44% 103.18% 102.37% 
188 -3.24% -0.02% -6.74% 105.12% 103.67% 101.21% 
189 -9.57% -0.06% -0.37% 103.85% 102.76% 103.38% 
190 -6.25% -0.04% -3.72% 103.26% 102.33% 104.41% 
191 -7.42% -0.04% -2.54% 103.19% 102.29% 104.52% 
192 -7.87% -0.05% -2.08% 103.59% 102.57% 103.83% 
193 -8.33% -0.02% -1.65% 104.56% 103.01% 102.43% 
194 -3.24% -0.01% -6.75% 105.27% 103.48% 101.25% 
195 -9.61% -0.02% -0.37% 103.94% 102.60% 103.46% 
196 -6.26% -0.01% -3.72% 103.32% 102.19% 104.49% 
197 -7.44% -0.02% -2.54% 103.25% 102.15% 104.60% 
198 -7.90% -0.02% -2.09% 103.67% 102.42% 103.91% 
199 -8.28% -0.08% -1.64% 103.78% 104.20% 102.02% 
200 -3.24% -0.03% -6.73% 104.26% 104.73% 101.01% 
201 -9.54% -0.09% -0.37% 103.35% 103.71% 102.94% 
202 -6.23% -0.06% -3.71% 102.89% 103.20% 103.91% 
203 -7.40% -0.07% -2.53% 102.84% 103.15% 104.01% 
204 -7.85% -0.07% -2.07% 103.15% 103.49% 103.36% 
205 -7.93% -0.50% -1.57% 104.28% 103.43% 102.29% 
206 -3.18% -0.20% -6.62% 104.91% 103.93% 101.16% 
207 -9.07% -0.58% -0.35% 103.73% 102.99% 103.28% 
208 -6.03% -0.38% -3.59% 103.17% 102.54% 104.29% 
209 -7.11% -0.45% -2.43% 103.11% 102.49% 104.40% 
210 -7.53% -0.48% -1.99% 103.49% 102.79% 103.72% 
211 -7.11% -1.48% -1.41% 104.58% 102.97% 102.44% 
212 -3.04% -0.63% -6.33% 105.30% 103.44% 101.26% 
213 -8.02% -1.67% -0.31% 103.96% 102.57% 103.47% 
214 -5.55% -1.15% -3.30% 103.33% 102.16% 104.51% 
215 -6.45% -1.34% -2.21% 103.26% 102.12% 104.62% 
216 -6.79% -1.41% -1.79% 103.68% 102.39% 103.93% 
              
mean -4.92% -0.62% -4.46% 103.15% 103.28% 103.57% 
SD 2.48% 0.94% 2.56% 0.98% 0.86% 1.31% 
 
